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arXiv · 2610.22947

SwitchTube: A Proof-of-Concept System Introducing "Adaptable Commitment Interfaces" as a Tool for Digital Wellbeing

Kai Lukoff·Ulrik Lyngs·Karina Shirokova·Raveena Rao·Larry Tian·Himanshu Zade·Sean A. Munson·Alexis Hiniker
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Abstract

YouTube has many features, such as homepage recommendations, that encourage users to explore its vast library of videos. However, when users visit YouTube with a specific intention, e.g., learning how to program in Python, these features to encourage exploration are often distracting. Prior work has innovated 'commitment interfaces' that restrict social media but finds that they often indiscriminately block needed content. In this paper, we describe the design, development, and evaluation of an 'adaptable commitment interface,' the SwitchTube mobile app, in which users can toggle between two interfaces when watching YouTube videos: Focus Mode (search-first) and Explore Mode (recommendations-first). In a three-week field deployment with 46 US participants, we evaluate how the ability to switch between interfaces affects user experience, finding that it provides users with a greater sense of agency, satisfaction, and goal alignment. We conclude with design implications for how adaptable commitment interfaces can support digital wellbeing.

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Kai Lukoff, Ulrik Lyngs, Karina Shirokova, Raveena Rao, Larry Tian, Himanshu Zade, Sean A. Munson, Alexis Hiniker. 2026-10-16. SwitchTube: A Proof-of-Concept System Introducing "Adaptable Commitment Interfaces" as a Tool for Digital Wellbeing. https://doi.org/10.1145/3544548.3580703

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