arXiv · 2611.02527
When Neither Side Confirms: Destructive Tool Approval Across MCP Servers and Hosts
Abstract
LLM agents call tools that delete data or move money through the Model Context Protocol (MCP). The specification asks for a human who can deny tool calls but splits the mechanism between the server, which can annotate a tool or ask the user through the host (elicitation), and the host application, which decides whether to prompt. We measure both sides from source code. In a 1,000-repository sample of the official MCP registry, an estimated 90% of destructive tools (95% CI 82-95) have no server-side confirmation, and most servers that elicit proceed, or fall back to a flag the model can set, when the host cannot relay the question. Of 41 popular open-source hosts and agent SDKs, 32 have no approval step by default, including 16 of 25 applications. Pairing sampled destructive tools flagged by a rule-based extractor with these applications, 60.7% of pairs have no enforced human approval by default. Through four agent SDKs, four of five low-cost models executed an injected deletion in 479 of 960 runs. If hosts prompted for every tool not annotated read-only or non-destructive, the unapproved share of these pairs would fall to 5.4%; universal elicitation support would leave 56.7%. Applications should therefore configure approval.
Explore related subjects
Keep this discovery
Explore connections, maps & timelines
Junwei Yao, Zike Yang, Zhijun Wang, Yongxi Zhou, Wenbo Ye. 2026-11-02. When Neither Side Confirms: Destructive Tool Approval Across MCP Servers and Hosts. https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02527
Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.