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arXiv · 2611.07419

Robust prizes in all-pay contests with loss aversion

Dmitry Ryvkin·Qin Wu
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Abstract

We study robust prize design in all-pay contests with loss-averse agents when the principal does not know the agents' convex cost of effort, subject to an aggregate productivity constraint. The robustly optimal prize structure awards equal prizes to all contestants except the one ranked last. The optimal bottom prize is zero under moderate loss aversion, but becomes positive and increases with loss aversion when loss aversion is sufficiently strong. Under strong loss aversion, the robust solution involves partial participation in the contest.

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Dmitry Ryvkin, Qin Wu. 2026-11-05. Robust prizes in all-pay contests with loss aversion. https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.07419

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