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arXiv · 2611.09452

Optimal robust comonotonic risk sharing under operational constraints

Abstract

Risk-sharing arrangements such as reinsurance programs and catastrophe pools must satisfy operational constraints, including capacity limits, attachment bands, retention rules and cession limits. Under distortion risk measures, the unconstrained optimum assigns each loss layer to the participant for whom that layer is least costly, but operational constraints break this layerwise rule, and there is no general method to compute the constrained optimum. We show that, for comonotonic allocations, the participants' distortion risk measures and the operational constraints are linear in the amount of each loss layer held by each participant, so the constrained risk-sharing problem on a discretized loss is a linear program that standard software can solve. Its dual gives supporting prices for the loss layers and the marginal value of relaxing each operational constraint. Where the set of binding constraints changes, the constrained optimal value can have a kink, and the smallest and largest optimal multipliers then give the one-sided effects of relaxing and tightening a constraint. To protect the allocation against disagreement between loss models, we also consider the robust version of the risk-sharing problem, that is, minimizing the worst-case total risk assessment over finitely many probability scenarios. This robust problem is again a linear program, and we quantify the cost of protection against model uncertainty from its optimal value. We illustrate the approach with a catastrophe reinsurance tower.

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BibTeXRIS

Carole Bernard, Christopher Blier-Wong, Jean-Gabriel Lauzier. 2026-11-06. Optimal robust comonotonic risk sharing under operational constraints. https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.09452

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