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arXiv · 2611.09569

Performance Bottlenecks in Computing ZK Proofs on a GPU

Abstract

Zero-knowledge proofs allow one party to prove the correctness of a statement or execution of a computation while revealing no more than the statement of correctness itself. Recent use cases, such as AI datasets, suggest the need for faster proof generation over increasingly large constraint sets. This paper explores efforts in optimizing zero-knowledge proof generation, specifically PlonK, using GPUs, for applications that are not amenable to solution via incrementally verifiable computing (IVC). Our intention with this work is to improve ZK performance by introducing fundamental changes in the low-level architectural structure of proof generation. These changes affect performance curves for most current proof generation algorithms. In particular, this paper explores the trade-offs between increased parallelization on GPUs and the resultant memory management problems that occur due to this parallelization. We implement a parallelized PlonK in order to analyze these trade-offs and make arguments concerning the nature of data flows within the proving protocol. Our results lead us to consider multi-GPU environments to maximize performance for large circuit sizes. Such environments introduce issues of communication, efficient hardware management, data partition, and data transfers. This paper further discusses the use cases that motivate multi-GPU implementations, their cost models, and the use of remote direct memory access (RDMA) for data transfer among GPUs.

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BibTeXRIS

Victor Carolino, Caleb Geren, Michael Kaufman, Maximilian Nussbaum, William Scott, Henry F. Korth. 2026-11-06. Performance Bottlenecks in Computing ZK Proofs on a GPU. https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.09569

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