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arXiv · 2611.09685

Who Picks First? Compensatory Fairness When Equal Division Is Impossible

Abstract

When indivisible objects, such as heirlooms or tickets to sports events, do not divide evenly among agents with equal claims, some agents must receive more objects than others. Can picking first compensate those with fewer objects? We propose two principles of compensatory fairness. An agent with fewer objects must not envy a larger bundle with any one of its objects removed, and priority advantages among agents with equally many objects must alternate rather than accumulate. Non-wastefulness, neutrality and an object-wise form of Maskin monotonicity characterize the draft rules, in which agents pick in a fixed sequence. Adding the two principles and envy-freeness up to one object singles out the block--snake draft, in which agents with fewer objects pick first in every round and each group's order reverses between rounds. Among draft rules, compensation is compatible with strategy-proofness, but envy-freeness up to one object is not: once at least two agents receive more than one object, no draft that satisfies it is even weakly strategy-proof, and with two such agents the conflict extends to all non-wasteful and neutral rules. When agents may be indifferent between objects, resolving each tie in favor of the earliest later picker who strictly cares preserves the draft's fairness guarantees and ensures efficiency under pairwise dominance.

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BibTeXRIS

Aleksei Chernulich, M. Bumin Yenmez. 2026-11-06. Who Picks First? Compensatory Fairness When Equal Division Is Impossible. https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.09685

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