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arXiv · 2611.09870

AI Exposure and the Changing Responsibilities in Job Postings

Abstract

The growing adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) in the workplace has raised questions about how employer demand for different work activities is changing. We examine how the prevalence and content of work activities in online job postings change in association with activity-level measures of AI exposure, derived from Copilot and Claude usage. To enable systematic comparisons, we develop a pipeline that extracts the responsibilities from job advertisements and maps them onto O*NET's standardized taxonomy of Intermediate Work Activities (IWAs). We then apply this approach to 50,000 job advertisements from 33 firms between 2023 and 2025. From this analysis, we first find that explicit mentions of AI increased by 66%, although much of this growth occurs outside descriptions of the actual work activities associated with a job. Looking specifically at the advertised job responsibilities, activities with greater AI exposure tend to decline in advertised prevalence, but only mildly as a share of the total number of responsibilities. At the same time, more AI-exposed work activities increasingly are associated with explicitly AI-related responsibilities, suggesting that employers are looking to hire people who can perform these responsibilities with AI.

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Dora Zhao, Lin Ai, Pranav Khadpe, Siddharth Suri, Scott Counts. 2026-11-06. AI Exposure and the Changing Responsibilities in Job Postings. https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.09870

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