arXiv · cs/0109074
Indicators of Independence in Regulatory Commissions
Abstract
Independent regulatory commissions such as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) must produce policies that reflect technical expertise, legal precedent, and stakeholder input. Given these situational imperatives, how does the FCC implement independence in its decision-making? This research explicates some of the underlying rules, resources, and relationships within the environment in which the agency is embedded that influence agency work practices to operationalize independence. Research such as this may be helpful in the creation of new, or for assessment of existing, regulatory commissions, but only if great attention is paid not only to institutional structure, but also to the practice of staff in the agency.
Explore related subjects
Keep this discovery
Susan Oberlander. 2001-10-22. Indicators of Independence in Regulatory Commissions. https://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0109074
Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.