arXiv · quant-ph/0701238
Experimental implementation of non-Gaussian attacks on a continuous-variable quantum key distribution system
Abstract
An intercept-resend attack on a continuous-variable quantum-key-distribution protocol is investigated experimentally. By varying the interception fraction, one can implement a family of attacks where the eavesdropper totally controls the channel parameters. In general, such attacks add excess noise in the channel, and may also result in non-Gaussian output distributions. We implement and characterize the measurements needed to detect these attacks, and evaluate experimentally the information rates available to the legitimate users and the eavesdropper. The results are consistent with the optimality of Gaussian attacks resulting from the security proofs.
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Jerome Lodewyck, Thierry Debuisschert, Raul Garcia-Patron, Rosa Tualle-Brouri, Nicolas J. Cerf, Philippe Grangier. 2007-01-31. Experimental implementation of non-Gaussian attacks on a continuous-variable quantum key distribution system. https://doi.org/10.1103/physrevlett.98.030503
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