arXiv subjects

Adam Hamdan

Publications and source records attributed to Adam Hamdan.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Very Justified Envy

This paper studies the intensity of priority violations in matching markets. An agent is said to have very justified envy if she prefers another agent's match to her own and her priority advantage for the object exceeds $k$ ranks. I show that unless $k$ is prohibitively large, Pareto efficiency is incompatible with the elimination of very justified envy. A simple generalization of Deferred Acceptance and Immediate Acceptance is proposed and shown to eliminate very justified envy for any $k$. In simulations of random matching markets, I find that modest relaxations to justified envy can yield significant improvements in assignment ranks.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2026

Making Serial Dictatorships Fair

In priority-based matching, serial dictatorship (SD) is simple, strategyproof, and Pareto efficient, but not free of justified envy (i.e. fair). This paper studies how to optimally order agents in SD based on their priorities to minimize justified envy. I show that this problem can be formulated in terms of rank aggregation and identify a novel connection with the social choice literature: for any distribution of agents' preferences and any capacity structure, the serial order that minimizes the expected number of justified envy cases coincides with the (weighted) Kemeny ranking of agents' priorities (Kemeny, 1959).

econ.TH↗