Gaps and Augmentations in Bayesian Scheduling
The recent resolution of the Nisan--Ronen conjecture~\cite{NR,CKK} establishes that the optimal worst-case approximation ratio of deterministic truthful mechanisms for makespan on m unrelated machines is exactly m. We ask how prior information, Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC), randomization, and machine-side resource augmentation change this barrier. We obtain three main results. First, we prove an asymptotic 4/3 lower bound for randomized BIC mechanisms with two machines, strengthening the previous 1.2 deterministic-BIC lower bound~\cite{MS}. Second, in the prior-free setting for two machines, randomization improves the known truthful ratio from 2 to 7/4~\cite{NR}. We show that randomized BIC scheduling mechanisms are likewise strictly more powerful than their deterministic counterparts, exhibiting an asymptotic BIC-integrality gap of 8/7. Thus, optimality in prior-dependent BIC scheduling can strictly require randomization. This parallels the role of lotteries in multidimensional revenue maximization, where randomization can strictly improve revenue~\cite{MV,BCKW}. Third, we show that when job assignments are sufficiently well spread across machines (more formally, when the pairwise collision parameter $Δ_r$ is bounded by a constant independent of both the number of machines m and the number of sampled layers r), then $O(m/\varepsilon)$ sampled layers suffice for the standard truthful MinWork mechanism to achieve a $1+\varepsilon$-approximation to the original first-best benchmark. Equivalently, $O(m/\varepsilon)$ sampled replicas per machine suffice. This resource-augmentation result parallels the Bulow--Klemperer perspective~\cite{BK,EFFTW}. As a by-product, in the standard unaugmented model, MinWork achieves a $(1+\frac{Δ_1(m-1)}{2})$-approximation to the first-best benchmark for every prior.