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Alberto Marchesi

Publications and source records attributed to Alberto Marchesi.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Optimal Regret for Profit Maximization in Bilateral Trade

Learning to profit from trade requires learning both sides of a market: what a seller is willing to accept and what a buyer is willing to pay. We study repeated bilateral trade, where an intermediary posts a purchase price to a seller and a sale price to a buyer whose valuations are drawn from an unknown joint distribution. Trade occurs only if both parties accept their respective prices, in which case the intermediary earns the difference between the two prices. The intermediary observes only whether trade occurs, without observing either valuation. We show that learning both sides of the market is no harder, in terms of regret, than learning just one. Specifically, we design an algorithm achieving regret $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{2/3})$ against the best fixed pair of prices, matching, up to logarithmic factors, the classical lower bound for one-dimensional dynamic pricing. Our result shows that the classical one-dimensional regret rate survives the transition to two dimensions, raising the question of whether this absence of a curse of dimensionality extends to arbitrarily high dimensions.

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Toward Optimal Regret in Robust Pricing: Decoupling Corruption and Time

We design the first regret guarantees for robust dynamic pricing that decouple the dependence on the corruption $C$ and the time horizon $T$. In dynamic pricing, a seller with unlimited supply of a good interacts with a stream of buyers over \( T \) rounds, with the goal of maximizing revenue. At each round $t$, the seller posts a price $p_t$, and the buyer purchases the good only if their unknown valuation $v^\star$ exceeds this price. The seller observes only the binary feedback $\mathbb{I} \left\{ p_t \leq v^\star \right\}$, indicating whether a sale occurred. In the \emph{robust} pricing setting, a malicious adversary is allowed to corrupt this feedback in at most $C$ rounds. Even if the learner knows the corruption $C$, the best known regret bound is $\mathcal{O}(C\log\log T)$ by Gupta et al. [2025]. This leaves as an open problem to ``decouple'' the dependence on $C$ and $T$. In this work, we resolve this open problem. In particular, we develop a robust variant of binary search that achieves regret $\mathcal{O}(C+\log T)$ when the corruption $C$ is known and $\mathcal{O}(C+\log^2 T)$ when the corruption is unknown.

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Matching Tasks to Agents: Mechanism Design for Multi-Agent Contracts

We study task assignment under adverse selection and moral hazard. In the single-task setting, agents privately know their types, which determine their success probabilities and effort costs. Based on the agents' reported types, the principal selects an agent to perform the task and offers a success-contingent payment. Although optimal Bayesian contract design is generally computationally intractable and Myerson's characterization does not directly extend to settings with hidden actions and multidimensional private information, we show that the single-task problem admits a simple Myerson-style characterization. Our key insight is that incentive constraints depend only on the ratio between effort cost and success probability. We characterize an optimal mechanism and show that it can be computed in polynomial time. We also establish a tight $Θ(1/(NK))$ worst-case bound on the ratio between the optimal profit and the full-information benchmark, where $N$ is the number of agents and $K$ is the number of types per agent. We then extend our analysis to multiple tasks, showing that an optimal mechanism may not exist. Nevertheless, for a constant number of agents, we provide a polynomial-time approximation scheme for the supremum profit.

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Optimal Regret for Online Market Making with Limit Order Book

We study online learning in market making, where, at each round, a market maker posts bid and ask prices before observing the market price and the private valuation of an incoming trader. In this setting, Maran et al. 2026 introduce a feedback model motivated by limit order books, in which the trader's valuation is revealed only if no transaction occurs. Assuming that trader valuations are drawn i.i.d. from an unknown distribution while market prices are chosen adversarially, they establish an expected regret bound of $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{2/3})$. In this work, we improve upon this guarantee by establishing a high-probability regret bound of $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T})$. As a warm-up, we first consider the full-feedback setting. We introduce a discretization of the bid-ask space based on two coupled grids and combine it with Hedge to achieve the desired regret rate. Building on these ideas, we then address the substantially weaker feedback induced by a limit order book and develop an algorithm that achieves the same guarantee. Finally, we investigate the limits of learnability in fully adversarial environments, where the valuations may vary arbitrarily as well. Perhaps surprisingly, we show that when both market prices and trader valuations are chosen adversarially, sublinear regret is impossible even under full feedback, thereby motivating our stochastic assumption on the valuations.

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Marrying Pricing and Advertising with LLMs

We study a sequential pricing problem in which a seller jointly posts a price and an advertisement generated by a large language model (LLM). The seller aims to maximize revenue under an unknown product demand that depends on both decisions, while observing only whether each offer leads to a purchase. We propose an online actor-critic algorithm that combines low-rank adaptation (LoRA) of a pretrained LLM with a demand model fitted to available data. At each round, the actor generates an advertisement, and the critic estimates purchase probabilities to guide price selection. Then, the resulting feedback is used to update both the actor and the critic, with the critic's revenue estimates providing a baseline for policy gradient updates of the actor. To evaluate our approach, we develop an evaluation framework with three synthetic demand models and a demand simulator built from real-world marketplace data. Finally, we compare our algorithm with benchmarks that do not jointly optimize price selection and advertisement generation, achieving expected revenue gains over the reference policy of 5.69%, 5.18% and 55.96% under the three synthetic demand models and 5.81% under the marketplace simulator.

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Support-Dependent Regret Rates for Profit Maximization in Multilateral Trade

We study online profit maximization in multilateral trade, a setting that generalizes both dynamic pricing and bilateral trade. At each round, an intermediary posts prices to buyers and offers payments to sellers; trade occurs only if every agent accepts. We consider valuations drawn from an unknown joint distribution, allowing arbitrary correlation across agents, under the assumption that each agent's marginal valuation distribution has unknown support of size at most $K$. For constant dimension $d$, we design an algorithm with regret $\widetilde O(\sqrt{K^dT})$. This extends optimal support-dependent guarantees for one-dimensional dynamic pricing to the multidimensional setting of multilateral trade. At the core of our approach is a normalized zooming procedure that adapts to the local probability of trade, avoiding the excessive refinement of nearly flat regions that can arise with standard zooming.

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Online Resource Allocation with Replenishable Budgets

Online Resource Allocation (ORA) is a fundamental framework for sequential decision-making problems under budget constraints. Classical ORA models typically assume that resources are monotonic, meaning that selecting actions can only decrease the available budget. In this work, we study a more general setting with replenishable budgets, in which actions may either consume or replenish resources over time. This extension is necessary to capture scenarios such as inventory systems or energy markets in which capacity can be actively recovered. We develop a dual-based algorithm that recovers best-of-both-worlds guarantees for standard ORA when the replenishment factor $β= 0$, and improves them when $β> 0$. In particular, our algorithm attains $\widetilde{\mathcal O}(\sqrt{T})$ regret in the stochastic setting and $\widetilde{\mathcal O}(\sqrt{T})$ $α$-regret in the adversarial setting, where $α$ depends on the per-round budget and on the replenishment factor of the void action. Moreover, the algorithm ensures strict satisfaction of the budget constraints.

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Breaking the $T^{3/4}$ Barrier for Regret Minimization With Bi-Dimensional CDFs

We study regret minimization for learning CDF-related objectives of the form \[ g(x)\cdot\mathbb{P}_{X\sim\mathcal{D}}(X\le x), \] over $[0,1]^2$, where $g$ is a known Lipschitz function and $\mathcal{D}$ is an unknown distribution. At each round $t$, the learner selects a point $x_t$ and observes the binary feedback $\mathbb{I}(X_t\le x_t)$, where $X_t\sim\mathcal{D}$. We design an algorithm achieving regret $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{7/10})$, improving over the previous best-known bound of $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{3/4})$ and showing that the curse of dimensionality can be at least partially lifted for this class of objectives, though a gap remains with the $Ω(T^{2/3})$ lower bound. As an application, our techniques yield the same $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{7/10})$ regret bound for profit maximization in repeated bilateral trade with fixed prices.

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Regret Minimization for Piecewise Linear Rewards: Contracts, Auctions, and Beyond

Most microeconomic models of interest involve optimizing a piecewise linear function. These include contract design in hidden-action principal-agent problems, selling an item in posted-price auctions, and bidding in first-price auctions. When the relevant model parameters are unknown and determined by some (unknown) probability distributions, the problem becomes learning how to optimize an unknown and stochastic piecewise linear reward function. Such a problem is usually framed within an online learning framework, where the decision-maker (learner) seeks to minimize the regret of not knowing an optimal decision in hindsight. This paper introduces a general online learning framework that offers a unified approach to tackle regret minimization for piecewise linear rewards, under a suitable monotonicity assumption commonly satisfied by microeconomic models. We design a learning algorithm that attains a regret of $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{nT})$, where $n$ is the number of ``pieces'' of the reward function and $T$ is the number of rounds. This result is tight when $n$ is \emph{small} relative to $T$, specifically when $n \leq T^{1/3}$. Our algorithm solves two open problems in the literature on learning in microeconomic settings. First, it shows that the $\widetilde{O}(T^{2/3})$ regret bound obtained by Zhu et al. [Zhu+23] for learning optimal linear contracts in hidden-action principal-agent problems is not tight when the number of agent's actions is small relative to $T$. Second, our algorithm demonstrates that, in the problem of learning to set prices in posted-price auctions, it is possible to attain suitable (and desirable) instance-independent regret bounds, addressing an open problem posed by Cesa-Bianchi et al. [CBCP19].

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Beyond Slater's Condition in Online CMDPs with Stochastic and Adversarial Constraints

We study \emph{online episodic Constrained Markov Decision Processes} (CMDPs) under both stochastic and adversarial constraints. We provide a novel algorithm whose guarantees greatly improve those of the state-of-the-art best-of-both-worlds algorithm introduced by Stradi et al. (2025). In the stochastic regime, \emph{i.e.}, when the constraints are sampled from fixed but unknown distributions, our method achieves $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T})$ regret and constraint violation without relying on Slater's condition, thereby handling settings where no strictly feasible solution exists. Moreover, we provide guarantees on the stronger notion of \emph{positive} constraint violation, which does not allow to recover from large violation in the early episodes by playing strictly safe policies. In the adversarial regime, \emph{i.e.}, when the constraints may change arbitrarily between episodes, our algorithm ensures sublinear constraint violation without Slater's condition, and achieves sublinear $α$-regret with respect to the \emph{unconstrained} optimum, where $α$ is a suitably defined multiplicative approximation factor. We further validate our results through synthetic experiments, showing the practical effectiveness of our algorithm.

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The Sample Complexity of Uniform Approximation for Multi-Dimensional CDFs and Fixed-Price Mechanisms

We study the sample complexity of learning a uniform approximation of an $n$-dimensional cumulative distribution function (CDF) within an error $ε> 0$, when observations are restricted to a minimal one-bit feedback. This serves as a counterpart to the multivariate DKW inequality under ''full feedback'', extending it to the setting of ''bandit feedback''. Our main result shows a near-dimensional-invariance in the sample complexity: we get a uniform $ε$-approximation with a sample complexity $\frac{1}{ε^3}{\log\left(\frac 1 ε\right)^{\mathcal{O}(n)}}$ over a arbitrary fine grid, where the dimensionality $n$ only affects logarithmic terms. As direct corollaries, we provide tight sample complexity bounds and novel regret guarantees for learning fixed-price mechanisms in small markets, such as bilateral trade settings.

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Regret Minimization in Bilateral Trade With Perturbed Markets

We address the problem of maximizing Gain from Trade (GFT) in repeated buyer-seller exchanges subject to global budget balance constraints. While this problem is well-understood in purely adversarial and stochastic settings, these environments exhibit a sharp dichotomy: adversarial environments allow for no-regret learning against the best fixed-price mechanism, whereas stochastic environments allow for no-regret learning against the best distribution over prices that is budget balanced in expectation. This gap is significant, as policies balanced in expectation can increase the GFT by a multiplicative factor of two. In this work, we bridge these extremes by studying perturbed markets, where an underlying stochastic distribution is subject to an adversarial corruption $C$. We design an algorithm that adaptively scales with the level of corruption, achieving an $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{3/4}) + \mathcal{O}(C\log(T))$ regret bound against the best budget-balanced distribution over prices. Simultaneously, our algorithm maintains the worst-case $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{3/4})$ regret bound relative to a per-round budget-balanced baseline, ensuring optimality even in fully adversarial environments.

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Online Resource Allocation With General Constraints

Online resource allocation (ORA) is a fundamental framework for sequential decision-making problems under budget constraints, with applications ranging from online advertising to revenue management. In this work, we study a broader setting that includes both budget constraints and general constraints, extending the classical budget-only model. This extension is essential for modeling critical economic requirements, such as Return-on-Investment (ROI) constraints. We develop an algorithm that achieves best-of-both-world guarantees within this generalized framework. In particular, against a dynamic benchmark, our algorithm achieves $\widetilde{\mathcal O}(\sqrt{T})$ regret in the \emph{stochastic} regime and $α$-regret of order $\widetilde{\mathcal O}(\sqrt{T})$ in the \emph{adversarial} regime, where $α$ depends on the feasibility margin of the corresponding offline problem. At the same time, our algorithm guarantees strict satisfaction of the budget constraints and $\widetilde{\mathcal O}(\sqrt{T})$ cumulative violation for the general ones. From a technical perspective, introducing general constraints alongside budgets precludes the use of standard budget-focus methods. While budget methods rely on a zero-consumption ``safe'' action to ensure feasibility, general constraints are much less ``aligned'' towards feasibility. We overcome these difficulties with a new analysis that exploits \emph{weak adaptivity} to get boundedness of the Lagrangian multipliers and best-of-both-world guarantees.

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Multi-Armed Bandits With Best-Action Queries

We study \emph{multi-armed bandits} (MABs) augmented with \emph{best-action queries}, in which the learner may additionally query an oracle that reveals the best arm in the current round. This setting was recently characterized by Russo et al. [2024] in the \emph{full-feedback} model, where the learner observes the rewards of all arms after each round. They show that, in both \emph{stochastic} and \emph{adversarial} environments, $k$ best-action queries reduce the optimal $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T})$ regret to $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\min\{T/k,\sqrt{T}\})$. Whether this improvement extends to the more realistic \emph{bandit-feedback} model -- where the learner observes only the reward of the played arm -- was left as an open problem. We fully resolve this question. When rewards are stochastic but correlated among arms, we show that the full-feedback result does not carry over: any algorithm must incur regret at least $Ω(\sqrt{T-k})$. This lower bound directly extends to adversarial environments. On the positive side, we show that $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\min\{T/k,\sqrt{T-k}\})$ regret is still achievable when rewards are stochastic and i.i.d., and establish a matching lower bound, up to logarithmic factors. Together, these results provide a complete characterization of the benefits of \emph{best-action queries} in the \emph{bandit-feedback} model.

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Truly Adapting to Adversarial Constraints in Constrained MABs

We study the constrained variant of the \emph{multi-armed bandit} (MAB) problem, in which the learner aims not only at minimizing the total loss incurred during the learning dynamic, but also at controlling the violation of multiple \emph{unknown} constraints, under both \emph{full} and \emph{bandit feedback}. We consider a non-stationary environment that subsumes both stochastic and adversarial models and where, at each round, both losses and constraints are drawn from distributions that may change arbitrarily over time. In such a setting, it is provably not possible to guarantee both sublinear regret and sublinear violation. Accordingly, prior work has mainly focused either on settings with stochastic constraints or on relaxing the benchmark with fully adversarial constraints (\emph{e.g.}, via competitive ratios with respect to the optimum). We provide the first algorithms that achieve optimal rates of regret and \emph{positive} constraint violation when the constraints are stochastic while the losses may vary arbitrarily, and that simultaneously yield guarantees that degrade smoothly with the degree of adversariality of the constraints. Specifically, under \emph{full feedback} we propose an algorithm attaining $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T}+C)$ regret and $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T}+C)$ {positive} violation, where $C$ quantifies the amount of non-stationarity in the constraints. We then show how to extend these guarantees when only bandit feedback is available for the losses. Finally, when \emph{bandit feedback} is available for the constraints, we design an algorithm achieving $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T}+C)$ {positive} violation and $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T}+C\sqrt{T})$ regret.

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Replicable Constrained Bandits

Algorithmic \emph{replicability} has recently been introduced to address the need for reproducible experiments in machine learning. A \emph{replicable online learning} algorithm is one that takes the same sequence of decisions across different executions in the same environment, with high probability. We initiate the study of algorithmic replicability in \emph{constrained} MAB problems, where a learner interacts with an unknown stochastic environment for $T$ rounds, seeking not only to maximize reward but also to satisfy multiple constraints. Our main result is that replicability can be achieved in constrained MABs. Specifically, we design replicable algorithms whose regret and constraint violation match those of non-replicable ones in terms of $T$. As a key step toward these guarantees, we develop the first replicable UCB-like algorithm for \emph{unconstrained} MABs, showing that algorithms that employ the optimism in-the-face-of-uncertainty principle can be replicable, a result that we believe is of independent interest.

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A Stronger Benchmark for Online Bilateral Trade: From Fixed Prices to Distributions

We study online bilateral trade, where a learner facilitates repeated exchanges between a buyer and a seller to maximize the Gain From Trade (GFT), i.e., the social welfare. In doing so, the learner must guarantee not to subsidize the market. This constraint is usually imposed per round through Weak Budget Balance (WBB). Despite that, Bernasconi et al. [2024] show that a Global Budget Balance (GBB) constraint on the profit -- enforced over the entire time horizon -- can improve the GFT by a multiplicative factor of two. While this might appear to be a marginal relaxation, this implies that all existing WBB-focused algorithms suffer linear regret when measured against the GBB optimum. In this work, we provide the first algorithm to achieve sublinear regret against the GBB benchmark in stochastic environments under one-bit feedback. In particular, we show that when the joint distribution of valuations has a bounded density, our algorithm achieves $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{3/4})$ regret. Our result shows that there is no separation between the one-dimensional problem of learning the optimal WBB price and the two-dimensional problem of learning the optimal GBB distribution over pairs of prices.

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Learning in Bayesian Stackelberg Games With Unknown Follower's Types

We study online learning in Bayesian Stackelberg games, where a leader repeatedly interacts with a follower whose unknown private type is independently drawn at each round from an unknown probability distribution. The goal is to design algorithms that minimize the leader's regret with respect to always playing an optimal commitment computed with knowledge of the game. We consider, for the first time to the best of our knowledge, the most realistic case in which the leader does not know anything about the follower's types, i.e., the possible follower payoffs. This raises considerable additional challenges compared to the commonly studied case in which the payoffs of follower types are known. First, we prove a strong negative result: no-regret is unattainable under action feedback, i.e., when the leader only observes the follower's best response at the end of each round. Thus, we focus on the easier type feedback model, where the follower's type is also revealed. In such a setting, we propose a no-regret algorithm that achieves a regret of $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$, when ignoring the dependence on other parameters.

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