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Angeliki Kritikakou

Publications and source records attributed to Angeliki Kritikakou.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

TreeFI: Value-Aware Statistical Fault Injection for Deep Neural Networks

Reliability evaluation of deep neural networks under hardware faults commonly relies on fault injection, but exhaustive campaigns are intractable for modern models and datasets. Statistical fault injection reduces this cost, yet existing approaches still require large injection budgets because they do not explicitly exploit a key property of floating-point faults: the effect of a bit flip depends strongly on the value being corrupted. We propose TreeFI, a value-aware statistical fault-injection methodology for FP32 single-bit faults in DNN activations and weights. TreeFI partitions each layer's value distribution into intervals with similar expected bit-flip behavior, learned using regression trees, and allocates injections across these intervals according to their relevance for failure-rate estimation. This stratified allocation preserves the target confidence and error margin while avoiding unnecessary injections in low-impact regions of the fault space. We validate TreeFI on CNN and Transformer models using CIFAR-10 and ImageNet. On ResNet8, where exhaustive activation fault injection is feasible, TreeFI provides more accurate estimates than state-of-the-art statistical FI baselines under the same campaign setting. Across the evaluated models, TreeFI reduces the required injection budget by up to 72.1x, with average reductions of 44.9x for activation faults and 11.2x for the executed weight campaigns.

cs.AR

JENGA: Exploiting Counter-Based RowHammer Countermeasures to Break Real-Time Predictability

Safety-critical real-time systems must satisfy multiple dependability requirements, notably time predictability and security. In such systems, tasks must complete within bounded and known execution times, typically characterised through Worst-Case Execution Time (WCET) analysis. At the same time, DRAM-based platforms are increasingly sensitive to the RowHammer read-disturbance security vulnerability, which has motivated the development of numerous hardware and software countermeasures in both academia and industry. However, the impact of these defences is generally evaluated in terms of average-case performance, a metric that is insufficient for safetycritical real-time systems, where worst-case behaviour is the primary concern. In this paper, we study the impact of RowHammer countermeasures based on hardware counters on the timing behaviour of real-time systems. We use a Per-Row-Activation-Counter (PRAC) countermeasure as a case study, standardised for recent DDR5 memories, and show that it can introduce significant timing variations. Based on this observation, we introduce JENGA, an attack in which an attacker-controlled task manipulates the internal state of the RowHammer countermeasure mechanism to increase the execution time of a victim real-time task beyond its expected WCET. We implement JENGA in a gem5 and Ramulator 2.0 simulation environment and evaluate its impact on TACLeBench workloads. We show that such an attack can delay tasks up to 200% of their WCET, making the initial timesafety assumptions unsafe. To address this issue, we derive a safe analytical bound that accounts for mitigation-induced delays in WCET analysis for DRAM systems protected by hardware countermeasures, such as PRAC-N.

cs.CR