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Anil Kumar Reddy

Publications and source records attributed to Anil Kumar Reddy.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Fast BSS Transition for Multi-PSK Community Wi-Fi in MDU Networks: Fragmented RADIUS Key Delivery, Server-Derived PMK-R0/PMK-R1 Distribution through a Cloud Management API, and Lease-Driven Key Revocation

Multi-dwelling-unit (MDU) properties increasingly deploy one community-wide SSID on which every unit or resident has its own pre-shared key, mapped to its own VLAN so that each unit is a separate network. Vendors name this capability differently (ePSK, iPSK, MPSK, DPSK, PPSK); we call it multi-PSK (mPSK). When the keys are held in an external RADIUS server or a cloud controller, the access point (AP) must ask the key server to identify a client's key. Enabling IEEE 802.11r Fast BSS Transition with WPA2-PSK (FT-PSK), which large properties need for roaming voice and video, breaks this exchange in three ways. First, the server must identify the key from an FT handshake whose MIC depends on the FT key hierarchy. Second, the RADIUS messages no longer fit: EAPOL-Key message 2 and the key material the AP needs both exceed the 247-octet value capacity of a RADIUS vendor-specific attribute (VSA). Third, the AP a device roams to needs a PMK-R1 for that device, and all key material must disappear when the resident leaves. We present FT-mPSK. The key server identifies the PSK, derives PMK-R0 and PMK-R1, and returns the serving AP's keys in a two-fragment Key-Bundle VSA that the AP reassembles and authenticates before decryption. It then calls one POST API on the cloud management system, which pushes PMK-R0 to the primary AP. On a roam, the target AP obtains PMK-R1 from the primary AP, located by the R0KH-ID in the FT Authentication Request, or from the key server. When the Property Management System reports a move-out or lease end, the key server issues the same POST as a delete keyed by the resident's mPSK username, and every AP purges that username's PSK, PMK, PMK-R0 and PMK-R1. We specify the external-RADIUS and cloud-controller methods, the attribute and fragment formats, the API, algorithms, size budgets, complexity, security properties and the validation plan.

cs.NI↗

RADIUS-Assisted Companion PSK Discovery: Enabling WPA3-SAE in Externally Authenticated Multi-PSK (ePSK / MPSK / DPSK / iPSK / PPSK) Deployments

Large multi-dwelling unit (MDU), student-housing and hospitality networks rarely store resident pre-shared keys (PSKs) on the access point (AP). Instead, the per-resident keys of ePSK, MPSK, DPSK, iPSK or PPSK services are held in an external RADIUS server or cloud database synchronised with the property-management system. Our earlier work, Companion-BSSID-Assisted PSK Discovery (CAPD), brought WPA3-SAE to multi-PSK networks by learning the client's PSK on a WPA2-only companion BSSID and steering the client with IEEE 802.11v to a hidden WPA2/WPA3 primary BSSID of the same SSID. CAPD assumes that the AP can test every PSK itself. This paper removes that assumption. We propose RADIUS-Assisted Companion PSK Discovery (RA-CAPD). The AP forwards the ANonce, the raw EAPOL-Key message 2 (SNonce, MIC, RSNE), the SSID, the client MAC, the BSSID and the AP MAC to the external server in RADIUS vendor-specific attributes (VSAs). The server validates the MIC against all provisioned keys, identifies the matching PSK, and returns it encrypted under the RADIUS shared secret (or a per-AP key for cloud databases), together with the unit, room or user identity and the VLAN. The AP binds the client to this PSK and identity, synchronises the binding across all APs in the domain, and moves the client to the configured profile: 802.11v-capable clients via a BSS Transition Management request, and other clients by disconnection and reconnection. On that profile, SAE-capable clients complete WPA3-SAE and WPA2-only clients complete WPA2-PSK, both with the learned key and no further search, so the companion BSSID serves only for onboarding. We present the design, attribute dictionary, algorithms, complexity and security properties, together with laboratory validation on commercial access points.

cs.NI↗