Search arXiv⌕ Search

arXiv subjects

Aristotelis Epanomeritakis

Publications and source records attributed to Aristotelis Epanomeritakis.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

When is statistical evidence strong enough? Using hypothesis tests to value data collection

Policy decisions often hinge on conventional p-value thresholds, which ignore economic costs and benefits of further data collection. This paper recasts statistical significance as a choice between making an immediate policy recommendation and deferring it until further evidence is collected. The welfare-optimal decision corresponds, under minimax regret, to a statistical test whose level depends on the cost and precision of additional evidence. Inverting this rule, we introduce and recommend reporting the abstention-value (A-value) to determine where additional data collection is most needed. The A-value defines the break-even welfare cost of abstaining and recommending further experimentation given the initial evidence. Computing the A-value only requires a point estimate and its standard error, imposes no prior assumptions on policy effects, and can be converted to a monetary research budget using inputs already frequently used by regulators and funding agencies. When experimentation capacity is limited, we show that prioritizing additional data collection where A-values are the largest yields strong finite-sample guarantees. Applications to anti-poverty programs and to a medical study illustrate the practical benefits of using A-values.

econ.EM↗

Learning What to Learn: Experimental Design when Combining Experimental with Observational Evidence

Experiments deliver credible treatment-effect estimates but, because they are costly, are often restricted to specific sites, small populations, or particular mechanisms. A common practice across several fields is therefore to combine experimental estimates with reduced-form or structural external (observational) evidence to answer broader policy questions, such as those involving general equilibrium effects or external validity. We develop a unified framework for the design of experiments when combined with external evidence, i.e., choosing which experiment(s) to run and how to allocate sample size under arbitrary budget constraints. Because observational evidence may suffer bias unknown ex-ante, we evaluate designs using a robust regret criterion that compares any candidate design to an oracle with knowledge about the observational study bias bound that jointly chooses the design and estimator. This yields a transparent bias-variance trade-off that does not require the researcher to specify a bias bound and relies only on information already needed for conventional power calculations. We illustrate the framework for studying general equilibrium effects of cash transfer programs.

econ.EM↗