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Arkarup Basu Mallik

Publications and source records attributed to Arkarup Basu Mallik.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Stochastic Choice, Limited Attention, and Aggregation over Attributes

We study an attribute-based model of stochastic choice in which attention to each attribute is limited, and characterize two choice rules within it. The Multiplicative Attention Rule (MAR) rewards an alternative only for the attributes on which it ranks first, combining attention to these multiplicatively across attributes; it captures choice deferral driven by the cognitive load of attending to `too many' attributes. The Additive Attention Rule (AAR) instead averages attention across attributes and credits an alternative by its full ordinal rank within the menu. This difference in aggregation is what separates the two rules behaviourally: AAR reproduces the Attraction Effect while holding the relevant attributes fixed across menus, something MAR can do only when the attribute set itself changes, though AAR, in turn, cannot accommodate the Compromise Effect. Both rules are characterized by axioms on observable choice data, and in both cases the underlying attention parameters and attribute-based preferences are uniquely identified from that data.

econ.TH↗

Strategy-Proof Set-Valued Choice on Single-Dipped Domains

We study strategy-proof social choice where agents have single-dipped preferences and outcomes may be sets of alternatives. While point-valued strategy-proof rules select an endpoint, we ask which outcomes survive when sets are compared through responsive extensions. Under the standard responsive extension, preferences over fixed-length intervals remain single-dipped, so the endpoint restriction persists and anonymity yields a single-threshold rule. Under responsive dominance, the incomplete order shared by all responsive extensions, an interior interval can survive because the two extreme intervals need not be comparable. For arbitrary sets, requiring every chosen alternative to be most preferred by some agent yields voting-by-committees rules, with one committee per endpoint; anonymous rules have a two-threshold quota form. The characterization holds on the entire endpoint-peaked domain, and every such rule is group-strategy-proof.

econ.TH↗