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Arun Morampudi

Publications and source records attributed to Arun Morampudi.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Stable and Faithful Explanations for Knowledge Tracing

Knowledge tracing (KT) models predict student performance opaquely, limiting pedagogical action. This study contributes a validation protocol testing predictive competitiveness (RQ1), explanation stability (RQ2) and retraining-based faithfulness (RQ3) together. Thirteen behavioral features across five pedagogical themes were engineered from ASSISTments 2009 and 2012, with history features computed from temporally preceding interactions and current response latency retained only for retrospective analysis. ASSISTments 2009 was rebuilt: the uncorrected skill-builder release duplicates each multi-skill interaction across one row per skill, and because those rows share one correctness label, they leak it into preceding-interaction features. Rebuilding lowered model AUC and reordered the explanation results. An Extreme Gradient Boosting (XGBoost) model explained with Tree SHapley Additive exPlanations (TreeSHAP) was compared against four deep baselines (DKT, SAKT, AKT and SimpleKT) under an information-matched protocol giving the deep models the same behavioral signals and restricting XGBoost to what is derivable from the identifier-and-correctness stream they consume. XGBoost reached an area under the curve (AUC) of 0.777 on 2012 and 0.786 on rebuilt 2009, with prediction-time AUCs of 0.771 and 0.775, respectively, after excluding current response latency; restricted to the baselines' information it performed as they did (0.697 against 0.700, and 0.717 against 0.720), locating the difference in information supplied, not model family. Rankings were consistent across folds, seeds and conditioning schemes (Spearman rho = 0.989-1.000), and removing top-ranked TreeSHAP features harmed AUC more than random removal, though split-gain and permutation rankings performed comparably. Student-level examples are illustrative interpretations, not validated recommendations.

cs.LG↗

Authorization Architectures for Tool-Using AI Agents

Tool-using artificial intelligence (AI) agents, systems that autonomously invoke application programming interfaces (APIs), databases, browsers, and inter-agent protocols such as the Model Context Protocol (MCP), are becoming production infrastructure. Yet the security model governing when an agent is authorized to act on a human's behalf remains underdeveloped. Trustworthy human-AI systems require that every consequential agent action be traceable to a human principal, bounded by what that human actually delegated, and contestable after the fact; few documented deployments satisfy all three properties reliably and end to end. Existing literature addresses fragments of this problem in isolation, credential management for non-human identities, classical access control models, prompt injection, and audit trails, while giving little attention to the authorization decision point itself, the moment a tool invocation occurs, and mechanisms that make that decision correct, enforceable, and accountable. This review introduces a principal hierarchy spanning human user, operator/deployer, orchestrator agent, sub-agent, and tool endpoint as an organizing framework, and examines five interdependent layers: agent identity and credential lifecycle; delegation and scope propagation across multi-hop chains; runtime enforcement and just-in-time authorization at policy enforcement points (PEPs); prompt injection as an authorization bypass that breaks the principal hierarchy; and auditability, provenance, and non-repudiation. Drawing on a structured narrative review of 89 primary sources screened from approximately 180 candidates published between 2023 and 2026, we propose seven structural requirements, derive a four-layer reference architecture, apply the requirements to three deployable reference configurations, and identify runtime enforcement and aggregation bounds as the principal unresolved gaps.

cs.CR↗