arXiv subjects

Azim Shariff

Publications and source records attributed to Azim Shariff.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2025

The Science Fiction Science Method

Predicting the social and behavioral impact of future technologies, before they are achieved, would allow us to guide their development and regulation before these impacts get entrenched. Traditionally, this prediction has relied on qualitative, narrative methods. Here we describe a method which uses experimental methods to simulate future technologies, and collect quantitative measures of the attitudes and behaviors of participants assigned to controlled variations of the future. We call this method 'science fiction science'. We suggest that the reason why this method has not been fully embraced yet, despite its potential benefits, is that experimental scientists may be reluctant to engage in work facing such serious validity threats as science fiction science. To address these threats, we consider possible constraints on the kind of technology that science fiction science may study, as well as the unconventional, immersive methods that science fiction science may require. We seek to provide perspective on the reasons why this method has been marginalized for so long, what benefits it would bring if it could be built on strong yet unusual methods, and how we can normalize these methods to help the diverse community of science fiction scientists to engage in a virtuous cycle of validity improvement.

cs.HC↗

arXiv2018

Blaming humans in autonomous vehicle accidents: Shared responsibility across levels of automation

When a semi-autonomous car crashes and harms someone, how are blame and causal responsibility distributed across the human and machine drivers? In this article, we consider cases in which a pedestrian was hit and killed by a car being operated under shared control of a primary and a secondary driver. We find that when only one driver makes an error, that driver receives the blame and is considered causally responsible for the harm, regardless of whether that driver is a machine or a human. However, when both drivers make errors in cases of shared control between a human and a machine, the blame and responsibility attributed to the machine is reduced. This finding portends a public under-reaction to the malfunctioning AI components of semi-autonomous cars and therefore has a direct policy implication: a bottom-up regulatory scheme (which operates through tort law that is adjudicated through the jury system) could fail to properly regulate the safety of shared-control vehicles; instead, a top-down scheme (enacted through federal laws) may be called for.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2017

Cooperating with Machines

Since Alan Turing envisioned Artificial Intelligence (AI) [1], a major driving force behind technical progress has been competition with human cognition. Historical milestones have been frequently associated with computers matching or outperforming humans in difficult cognitive tasks (e.g. face recognition [2], personality classification [3], driving cars [4], or playing video games [5]), or defeating humans in strategic zero-sum encounters (e.g. Chess [6], Checkers [7], Jeopardy! [8], Poker [9], or Go [10]). In contrast, less attention has been given to developing autonomous machines that establish mutually cooperative relationships with people who may not share the machine's preferences. A main challenge has been that human cooperation does not require sheer computational power, but rather relies on intuition [11], cultural norms [12], emotions and signals [13, 14, 15, 16], and pre-evolved dispositions toward cooperation [17], common-sense mechanisms that are difficult to encode in machines for arbitrary contexts. Here, we combine a state-of-the-art machine-learning algorithm with novel mechanisms for generating and acting on signals to produce a new learning algorithm that cooperates with people and other machines at levels that rival human cooperation in a variety of two-player repeated stochastic games. This is the first general-purpose algorithm that is capable, given a description of a previously unseen game environment, of learning to cooperate with people within short timescales in scenarios previously unanticipated by algorithm designers. This is achieved without complex opponent modeling or higher-order theories of mind, thus showing that flexible, fast, and general human-machine cooperation is computationally achievable using a non-trivial, but ultimately simple, set of algorithmic mechanisms.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2015

The social dilemma of autonomous vehicles

Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) should reduce traffic accidents, but they will sometimes have to choose between two evils-for example, running over pedestrians or sacrificing itself and its passenger to save them. Defining the algorithms that will help AVs make these moral decisions is a formidable challenge. We found that participants to six MTurk studies approved of utilitarian AVs (that sacrifice their passengers for the greater good), and would like others to buy them, but they would themselves prefer to ride in AVs that protect their passengers at all costs. They would disapprove of enforcing utilitarian AVs, and would be less willing to buy such a regulated AV. Accordingly, regulating for utilitarian algorithms may paradoxically increase casualties by postponing the adoption of a safer technology.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2014

Analytical reasoning task reveals limits of social learning in networks

Social learning -by observing and copying others- is a highly successful cultural mechanism for adaptation, outperforming individual information acquisition and experience. Here, we investigate social learning in the context of the uniquely human capacity for reflective, analytical reasoning. A hallmark of the human mind is our ability to engage analytical reasoning, and suppress false associative intuitions. Through a set of lab-based network experiments, we find that social learning fails to propagate this cognitive strategy. When people make false intuitive conclusions, and are exposed to the analytic output of their peers, they recognize and adopt this correct output. But they fail to engage analytical reasoning in similar subsequent tasks. Thus, humans exhibit an 'unreflective copying bias,' which limits their social learning to the output, rather than the process, of their peers' reasoning -even when doing so requires minimal effort and no technical skill. In contrast to much recent work on observation-based social learning, which emphasizes the propagation of successful behavior through copying, our findings identify a limit on the power of social networks in situations that require analytical reasoning.

cs.SI↗