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Ben Du

Publications and source records attributed to Ben Du.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Locating and Enumerating Anycast: a Comparison of Two Approaches

Anycast allows for providing services from multiple, geographically distant Points of Presence (PoPs), using a single IP address, to, e.g., improve resilience. Due to its opaqueness, it is often unknown which addresses are provisioned using anycast and, if so, where the PoPs are located. As anycast is widely used for critical Internet infrastructures (e.g., the DNS) efforts have been made to map anycast deployments. The current state-of-the-art mapping technique, iGreedy, relies on latency-based measurements, and is adversely affected by noise caused by, e.g., network processing delays. Previous work has shown that traceroute can alternatively be used to detect anycast. As traceroute reveals the hops a packet traverses, it may also be used to locate sites using geolocation data for hops near the anycast PoPs. This paper is the first to assess the performance of the traceroute-based approach at scale, by targeting 14k prefixes from an anycast census. Using ground truth we show traceroute achieves a slight increase in enumeration and geolocation precision over iGreedy. However, it suffers from overestimating the number of PoPs and incurs a 4 times increase in probing cost, making it unattractive for anycast censuses.

cs.NI

Expanding Access, Exposing Risk: A Short Study of Exposed Starlink Hosts

In this very short paper, we present a measurement-driven analysis of the security characteristics of Starlink-connected hosts and uncover several concerning trends. We find that Starlink hosts are more likely to run outdated or vulnerable operating systems and network protocols than non-Starlink hosts. Regions like Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Eastern Europe show disproportionately higher risk. Our findings raise important questions for the Internet measurement and policy communities.

cs.NI

Rooting Out Incorrect RIPE Atlas Probe Geolocations

Geolocation plays a critical role in understanding the Internet. In this work, we analyze and fix operator-misreported geolocation. Using DNS root servers to detect speed of Internet violations, we conservatively infer that at least 2% of vantage points in the largest community-vantage point collection, RIPE Atlas, were not located at their operator-reported geolocation between January 2019 and April 2026. To increase the accuracy of future studies that use operator-reported geolocation, we open source our simple methodology, implement a reporting campaign of violating probes within RIPE, work with operators to fix the misreported geolocations, and release a continually updated dataset of RIPE vantage points that likely misreport geolocation.

cs.NI