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Bingxiang He

Publications and source records attributed to Bingxiang He.

39 records · Page 3Linked to original sources

UltraFeedback: Boosting Language Models with Scaled AI Feedback

Learning from human feedback has become a pivot technique in aligning large language models (LLMs) with human preferences. However, acquiring vast and premium human feedback is bottlenecked by time, labor, and human capability, resulting in small sizes or limited topics of current datasets. This further hinders feedback learning as well as alignment research within the open-source community. To address this issue, we explore how to go beyond human feedback and collect high-quality \textit{AI feedback} automatically for a scalable alternative. Specifically, we identify \textbf{scale and diversity} as the key factors for feedback data to take effect. Accordingly, we first broaden instructions and responses in both amount and breadth to encompass a wider range of user-assistant interactions. Then, we meticulously apply a series of techniques to mitigate annotation biases for more reliable AI feedback. We finally present \textsc{UltraFeedback}, a large-scale, high-quality, and diversified AI feedback dataset, which contains over 1 million GPT-4 feedback for 250k user-assistant conversations from various aspects. Built upon \textsc{UltraFeedback}, we align a LLaMA-based model by best-of-$n$ sampling and reinforcement learning, demonstrating its exceptional performance on chat benchmarks. Our work validates the effectiveness of scaled AI feedback data in constructing strong open-source chat language models, serving as a solid foundation for future feedback learning research. Our data and models are available at https://github.com/thunlp/UltraFeedback.

cs.CL↗

Tell Me More! Towards Implicit User Intention Understanding of Language Model Driven Agents

Current language model-driven agents often lack mechanisms for effective user participation, which is crucial given the vagueness commonly found in user instructions. Although adept at devising strategies and performing tasks, these agents struggle with seeking clarification and grasping precise user intentions. To bridge this gap, we introduce Intention-in-Interaction (IN3), a novel benchmark designed to inspect users' implicit intentions through explicit queries. Next, we propose the incorporation of model experts as the upstream in agent designs to enhance user-agent interaction. Employing IN3, we empirically train Mistral-Interact, a powerful model that proactively assesses task vagueness, inquires user intentions, and refines them into actionable goals before starting downstream agent task execution. Integrating it into the XAgent framework, we comprehensively evaluate the enhanced agent system regarding user instruction understanding and execution, revealing that our approach notably excels at identifying vague user tasks, recovering and summarizing critical missing information, setting precise and necessary agent execution goals, and minimizing redundant tool usage, thus boosting overall efficiency. All the data and codes are released.

cs.CL↗

A Unified Evaluation of Textual Backdoor Learning: Frameworks and Benchmarks

Textual backdoor attacks are a kind of practical threat to NLP systems. By injecting a backdoor in the training phase, the adversary could control model predictions via predefined triggers. As various attack and defense models have been proposed, it is of great significance to perform rigorous evaluations. However, we highlight two issues in previous backdoor learning evaluations: (1) The differences between real-world scenarios (e.g. releasing poisoned datasets or models) are neglected, and we argue that each scenario has its own constraints and concerns, thus requires specific evaluation protocols; (2) The evaluation metrics only consider whether the attacks could flip the models' predictions on poisoned samples and retain performances on benign samples, but ignore that poisoned samples should also be stealthy and semantic-preserving. To address these issues, we categorize existing works into three practical scenarios in which attackers release datasets, pre-trained models, and fine-tuned models respectively, then discuss their unique evaluation methodologies. On metrics, to completely evaluate poisoned samples, we use grammar error increase and perplexity difference for stealthiness, along with text similarity for validity. After formalizing the frameworks, we develop an open-source toolkit OpenBackdoor to foster the implementations and evaluations of textual backdoor learning. With this toolkit, we perform extensive experiments to benchmark attack and defense models under the suggested paradigm. To facilitate the underexplored defenses against poisoned datasets, we further propose CUBE, a simple yet strong clustering-based defense baseline. We hope that our frameworks and benchmarks could serve as the cornerstones for future model development and evaluations.

cs.LG↗