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Chansu Han

Publications and source records attributed to Chansu Han.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Safety Direction Adapter: A Training-Free Post-Hoc Safety Patch for Fine-Tuned Open-Weight LLMs

Open-weight LLMs are routinely fine-tuned from public repositories, yet task-specific adaptation can silently erode safety alignment inherited from instruct-tuned bases. This is a supply-chain risk when organizations ship third-party checkpoints without full re-alignment. Prior work rarely audits diverse public fine-tunes under a shared multi-axis safety-utility protocol or offers training-free mitigation at deployment time. We propose Safety Direction Adapter (SDA), a training-free post-hoc safety patch that extracts a safety direction once from an aligned base and transfers it one-to-many within that base family as a small PEFT-compatible weight update, evaluated under the same multi-axis protocol. Across six direction extractors, we evaluate 14 checkpoints from two 1-2B lineages and probe 8B and 27B fleets (n=5 each) on 15 benchmarks (12538 prompts). On Llama, SDA improves the four-axis mean by about 2.3 points against a 4.2-point instruct-relative gap (about 55 percent recovery; partial Avg), with Safety and Cyber recovering toward or beyond instruct; Safety gains about 8.5 points against about 4.9 points mean degradation. On Qwen, degradation is larger and excess-driven; SDA still lifts Avg (about 36 percent of the gap) while trading Safety and Cyber against Excess and General. We report dual-use risks of publishing direction adapters and do not claim robustness to adaptive or white-box attacks.

cs.CR↗

Don't Trust the AI Ecosystem: Analyzing Privacy Leakage in Compromised Open-Source Components

Existing model inversion (MI) attacks predominantly rely on post-training optimization to recover private data from model outputs. However, these methods are fundamentally constrained by the target model's generalization bottleneck, often yielding generic features rather than specific identities, particularly on high-dimensional datasets. In this paper, we introduce GradLock, a novel training-time injection attack that stealthily injects sensitive training data directly into the model parameters. Operating within a compromised supply chain context, GradLock leverages stateless deterministic indexing to establish isolated data vaults and employs dynamic gradient locking to prevent payload degradation during the optimization process. This mechanism allows the adversary to extract pixel-perfect data from the final model without retaining access to the training environment. Extensive experiments on MNIST, Imagenette, and CelebA demonstrate that GradLock achieves near-lossless reconstruction (SSIM ~ 1.0) and instant extraction (< 1.0s). Compared to existing training-time injection methods, our approach exhibits superior robustness against standard deployment optimizations, including quantization, pruning, and fine-tuning. Furthermore, a user deployment study reveals that 93.3% of participants failed to detect the malicious logic, highlighting a severe blind spot in the security of modern AI supply chains.

cs.CR↗