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Christian Schroeder de Witt

Publications and source records attributed to Christian Schroeder de Witt.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

AnnoCaseLaw: Legal Annotation Benchmark of Civil Negligence

Language models offer a way to scale costly, labour-intensive expert annotation, but their ability to reproduce expert judgements remains uncertain. This is particularly challenging in law, where annotators must distinguish the reasoning supporting judicial decisions from other legally relevant discussion. We present AnnoCaseLaw as a densely annotated benchmark comprising $471$ U.S. civil-negligence court opinions with more than $12,000$ expert highlights across five annotation categories. We evaluate proprietary frontier, open-weight, legal-specialised, and decision models on their ability to reproduce these annotations. Models perform better on Facts and Outcome than on Application of Law to Facts, Procedural History, and Relevant Precedents. On Application of Law to Facts, proprietary frontier models achieve the strongest balance of reasoning coverage and precision, while the open-weight model Gemma 4 achieves comparable Macro-F1 to proprietary frontier models at a fraction of the estimated inference cost. Our findings highlight the importance of evaluating annotation coverage and cost alongside aggregate scores when assessing the feasibility of automated legal annotation.

cs.CL↗

Inside the Loop: A Mechanistic Study of Weight-Tied Transformers on Depth-Bound Algorithmic Tasks

Solving algorithmic tasks with many sequential steps typically requires scaling up transformer depth or chain-of-thought length, incurring unfavorable parameter and inference-compute costs, respectively. Looped transformers, which reuse one block of layers across many iterations, are poised to address this, since they scale effective depth without adding parameters or tokens. Yet, it remains unclear what each iteration is actually computing, or whether the loop merely simulates a deeper untied stack. Here, we study directed permutation traversal, in which a model follows $H$ hops from a starting node and reports the node it reaches, so every intermediate hop has a known ground truth. We find that a minimum effective depth is necessary to solve the task, beyond which the degree of weight tying becomes the determining factor. For instance, a looped transformer with a four-layer block iterated eight times solves the task in every seed, while an identically-trained untied transformer of the same effective depth never does, succeeding only with a lower learning rate or supervision of its intermediate layers. Probing and intervening on the residual stream, we find that the looped model advances through the intermediate nodes gradually, forming a staircase that adapts to its iteration budget, whereas the untied model, at that lower rate, exposes them only in its final layers. Taken together, our results recast looped transformers as iterative program learners, which allocate their iterations to successive steps of the algorithm and solve tasks that identically-trained untied models of the same effective depth do not. Code is available at https://github.com/magnus-sesodia/insidetheloop.

cs.LG↗

Detecting Multi-Agent Collusion Through Multi-Agent Interpretability

Non-verbalised or secret collusion may impose a ceiling on transcript-level monitoring in multi-agent deployments. Internal model activations are known to provide an additional monitoring surface for single-agent phenomena such as deception, but detecting collusion within an unknown subgroup is ultimately a joint inference task over multiple agents. This paper derives collusion detection statistics based on the composite hypothesis testing literature and introduces HELIOS, a multi-agent detection framework for collusion. Using per-agent activation probes as sensors, we then evaluate these principled statistics alongside heuristics on NARCBench, a novel benchmark for evaluating multi-agent collusion detection under environment distribution shift. Across four open-weight models, both our group-level statistics and heuristics transfer zero-shot to NARCBenchs holdout environments. Notably, the best method on every model reaches 0.99 to 1.00 AUROC when transferred from committee deliberations to a steganographic collusion task that unprimed transcript monitors fail to separate. We find empirically that no single statistic or heuristic dominates across tasks, consistent with our analysis that there is no known universally most powerful test for this setting. We then evaluate detector transfer to third-party environments with emergent, rather than instructed, collusion. In one such environment, only 2 of 229 collusive episodes verbalise the coordination in the transcript. We find evidence of partial transfer from NARCBench to these environments, indicating that probes fitted to instructed collusion may not fully capture emergent collusion signals. Overall, we establish multi-agent interpretability as a complementary monitoring technique, while highlighting the need to evaluate detector performance on both emergent and instructed collusion risks.

cs.AI↗

AI Models Can Provably Hide Arbitrary Capabilities

Capability evaluations aim to surface dangerous model behaviors before deployment, but their reliability depends on the assumption that hidden capabilities can be elicited. We show this assumption does not hold under adversarial conditions by constructing backdoor attacks that embed encrypted neural networks within host model weights, decrypting and executing them only upon receiving a secret trigger. Using digital lockers, these hidden circuits remain provably hard to elicit and interpret under cryptographic assumptions, even given full access to model weights, extending prior work from hiding fixed strings to arbitrary computations. We implement our proof of concept constructions in PyTorch and evaluate elicitation through fine-tuning, weight noising, gradient-based trigger search, and latent adversarial training, using a small chemical reaction prediction task as a proxy for CBRN-relevant capabilities. Our results demonstrate resistance to these methods and, together with our cryptographic guarantees, reveal a limit of elicitation-based capability audits. We release our models to support the improvement of defenses.

cs.LG↗

MA-JEPA: Joint-Embedding World Models for Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning

World models improve sample efficiency by training policies on imagined trajectories, but their usefulness depends on learning representations that capture the information needed for future control. We study whether self-supervised joint-embedding prediction (JEPA) can provide this learning signal for multi-agent reinforcement learning. We introduce MA-JEPA, a stochastic world model that replaces observation reconstruction with prediction of target representations, enabling model-based multi-agent reinforcement learning with centralized training and decentralized execution. A categorical latent state and a causal Transformer are trained with posterior and action-conditioned dynamics prediction objectives and are then used for actor-critic learning from latent imagination. A training-only joint predictor conditions on all agents' local states and actions to predict each agent's next local observation embedding. These predictions are passed through the same local posterior used during real interaction with a centralized critic that is used only for value learning, with execution remaining decentralized. Our experiments show that this architecture performs strongly on SMAC, matching or exceeding the strongest reported comparator mean win rate on four of eight evaluated maps.

cs.LG↗

Can CaMeLs Talk? Securing Multi-Agent Systems Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks

Indirect prompt injection attacks - malicious instructions embedded in content processed by large language models - remain a major obstacle to safely deploying tool-using agents. CaMeL [Debenedetti et al., 2025] mitigates this threat for an individual agent by separating trusted control flow from untrusted data and enforcing capability-based security policies at runtime. In this work, we investigate whether CaMeL's security guarantees compose in hierarchical multi-agent systems, where agents invoke other agents as tools. We find that CaMeL's guarantees do not compose. We construct a concrete prompt-injection attack that succeeds despite all constituent agents individually operating CaMeL. Our attack exploits the fact that untrusted data can be reinterpreted as trusted input by a downstream agent. We then introduce multi-CaMeL, an agent-to-agent communication protocol that preserves provenance across agent boundaries by separating trusted natural-language instructions from untrusted data passed through a distinct data channel. We evaluate multi-CaMeL's utility on AssetOpsBench and its security-utility tradeoff on MultiAgentDojo, a benchmark we develop by extending AgentDojo to the multi-agent setting. We find that multi-CaMeL reduces attack success rate (ASR) to 0.0%, compared with 0.2% for individual-agent CaMeL and 12.9% with no CaMeL. Multi-CaMeL incurs a utility cost, but this cost trends downward as model capability increases and is modest for the strongest models, suggesting that more capable models better accommodate the constraints imposed by the protocol.

cs.MA↗

Weight Oracles: Reading Neural Network Weights with Language Models

Interpretability methods for neural networks are predominantly reactive: they analyse activations produced during specific forward passes, requiring known inputs to find hidden capabilities such as backdoors. We propose Weight Oracles, fine-tuned language models that diagnose properties of a target network by reading its raw weights directly, without behavioural testing. We investigate this paradigm in two phases. Phase I establishes feasibility: through a staged curriculum and an external chain-of-computation that delegates parameter-free operations to deterministic code, an explainer LLM learns to simulate the forward pass of small transformers from their weights, achieving 99% holdout accuracy on unseen targets. Phase II repurposes this infrastructure for safety auditing. We train an oracle on natural language diagnostic questions about weight anomalies using only benign pathologies as training signal, and evaluate it zero-shot on backdoors absent from training. The oracle achieves AUROC 0.93 on attention-routed backdoors and 0.81 across a diversified threat distribution including stealth and adversarially regularized variants. Hand-crafted statistical detectors are sharp on the threat models they implicitly target but collapse on threat-model shift, while the oracle remains uniformly competent across attack types. Scaling to realistic model sizes remains the principal open challenge.

cs.LG↗

Reflections and Fragments: Securing LLMs Against Sequential Mosaic Attacks

Self-play red-teaming improves language-model safety by pitting attacker and defender roles against each other in a zero-sum game. However, real adversaries increasingly use mosaic attacks: multi-turn sequences whose individual fragments are innocuous in isolation yet assemble into a harmful payload. We develop a theory of mosaic defense that characterizes what is required to prevent such attacks without sacrificing helpfulness. We first show that no fixed bounded window of recent prompts is sufficient in general: safety-relevant information may occur arbitrarily far back in the interaction. We formalize a watchman, an online state mechanism that carries this information forward, and show that under explicit assumptions it enables zero-failure defense with positive benign helpfulness. Under stronger conditions, it is also optimal among zero-failure defenders. An exact watchman may nevertheless require exponentially many states, while exact maliciousness detection can require exponentially many queries in an unstructured black-box model. These state and query lower bounds do not by themselves imply hard learning: the construction underlying the state lower bound is efficiently learnable from labeled examples, whereas certifying worst-case safety can require substantially more information under restricted access. We also show that self-play equilibrium alone does not certify usefulness, motivating a constrained formulation that maximizes worst-case benign helpfulness among zero-failure defenders. Empirically, training role-specific attacker and defender LoRA adapters over frozen LLMs via multi-turn self-play strengthens both roles: attackers become more effective at eliciting harmful responses, while defenders become more robust to attack, with improvements also observed on unseen attack objectives.

cs.LG↗

Epsilon-Nash Equilibria in History-Dependent SA-MDPs

We study state-adversarial Markov decision processes (SA-MDPs) as games of observation-space attacks: at each step, an agent selects an action from a received observation while an adversary$\unicode{x2014}$who knows the true state the agent is in$\unicode{x2014}$chooses a perturbed observation within a state-dependent proximity set. While existing work focuses on Markovian policies, we develop a solution concept and computational approach for SA-MDPs under history dependence. History dependence can materially change equilibrium outcomes and can force both the agent and the adversary to adapt their strategies. First, we prove the non-existence of universal (agnostic of the initial state distribution) history-dependent equilibrium policies. Our main result presents the first algorithmic route to computing $ε$-approximations of initial-state dependent equilibria. We do so by reducing SA-MDPs to a strategically equivalent constrained zero-sum one-sided partially observable stochastic game. We test our algorithm on small analytically verifiable games and show that it scales to larger, more realistic benchmarks, including Atari Freeway rollouts with a 12-period ahead horizon.

cs.GT↗

ORBIT: A Framework for Multi-Agent Safety and Security Evaluations

Multi-agent LLM systems are increasingly deployed for complex, long-horizon tasks or emerge as a natural consequence of agents interacting in the wild. Yet they give rise to significant safety and security risks: the flexible protocols that enable task generalization also expose novel threats, from cascading prompt injection to inter-agent collusion. Progress in defending against these threats has been slowed by a lack of shared empirical infrastructure, which forces bespoke environment development for every new defense and makes standardized comparison impossible. Existing evaluations address isolated threat models or single-agent settings, but none jointly vary attack, defense, and architecture across realistic multi-agent environments. To address this gap, we introduce ORBIT, a configurable evaluation framework for empirical multi-agent safety and security research, built on UK AISI's Inspect. ORBIT lets researchers configure communication topologies, memory, scheduling, and agent roles. It supports four threat types and four defense strategies, as well as non-adversarial failures, with a benchmark suite spanning five scenario families covering browser use, computer use, agentic coding, customer service, and cooperative allocation. Our central finding is a gap in defense transferability across threats: per-action defenses that cut a compromised agent's attack success by 60 points on multi-issue coding give no measurable protection against colluding agents, and none of the defenses we tested generalized over all attacks tested. We further demonstrate security-performance tradeoffs and interactions between architecture and defense effectiveness. We make ORBIT available open-source at https://github.com/wlanderson0/orbit.

cs.MA↗

Entangled Representations Amplify Collateral Damage in Unlearning

A long-held intuition in interpretability research is that representational entanglement, the sharing of structure between knowledge domains in a neural network, makes unlearning harder. While the intuition is widespread, it has never been directly tested in a controlled experiment. We present a way to do so: by repurposing Selective Gradient Masking (SGTM), we train a suite of six 254M-parameter language models on English Wikipedia with graded levels of disentanglement between biology and non-biology knowledge. Applying three standard unlearning methods to every model in the suite, we find that more disentangled models consistently achieve better retain-forget trade-offs: at a fixed level of forgetting, the most disentangled models incur roughly $4\times$ lower retain cost under two of the three methods, and $1.3\times$ lower under the third. Because our intervention changes only the model, not the data or the unlearning algorithm, this is direct evidence that representational entanglement is one of the causes of collateral damage in unlearning, as interpretability researchers have long suspected. A similar design could be used to test other structural claims from interpretability.

cs.LG↗

OpenSanctions Pairs: Large-Scale Entity Matching with LLMs

We release OpenSanctions Pairs, the first large-scale public benchmark for entity matching on sanctions and OSINT data. The dataset includes 755,540 expert-labeled pairs over 1 million entities, aggregated from 293 source datasets across 45 jurisdictions. It captures real-world diversity in compliance data, spanning multiple languages and writing systems (e.g., Latin, Cyrillic, Arabic), inconsistent structure, and time-varying provenance, and is substantially more heterogeneous than prior entity matching benchmarks. As baselines, we evaluate the production rule-based matcher (nomenklatura RegressionV1) alongside open- and closed-source LLMs in both zero- and few-shot settings, each tested with and without MIPROv2 prompt optimization to control for prompt sensitivity. The rule-based baseline reaches 91.3\% F1; GPT-4o achieves the best result at 99.0\% F1, and a locally deployable open-source model (DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-14B) achieves 98.2\% F1. The rule-based baseline and LLMs fail in complementary ways: rules over-match, while LLMs struggle with cross-script transliteration. These results suggest that pairwise matching performance is approaching a practical ceiling and shift attention toward pipeline components such as blocking, clustering, and uncertainty-aware review.

cs.IR↗

Chronos: The AI Co-Historian

AI is increasingly supporting, accelerating, and automating scientific discovery across subjects. Yet, the adoption of AI in historical research remains limited due to the lack of specialised solutions for historians. To change this, we introduce Chronos, an AI Co-Historian designed to support historians. It allows researchers to create and customize research workflows through natural-language interaction and share these as Chronos-Extensions with others. Chronos specifically addresses the need of historians for a tool that is specialised, non-technical, highly customizable, and facilitates extensive task evaluation. As a first extension, we introduce Chronos-Extract, which enables researchers to automate the targeted extraction of information from image scans of historical sources. We benchmark Chronos-Extract on three historical source corpora and find that it achieves high task-accuracy across primary sources spanning three centuries and diverse languages, layouts, and typefaces. Chronos is openly available and ready for historians to use on their own primary and secondary sources.

cs.AI↗

Multimodal Model Diffing for Feature Discovery and Control

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) exhibit strong visual understanding, yet the internal features that cause these behaviors remain difficult to identify, audit, or control. While applicable to post-hoc inspection, hidden states that are decomposed into interpretable feature directions using sparse autoencoders (SAEs) neither readily isolate which features are changed by multimodal training, nor are they directly useful for targeted control. We introduce MMDiff, a multimodal model-diffing framework that trains multimodal SAEs and turns them into feature-level interfaces for discovering and controlling multimodal behavior. MMDiff supports three uses: (i) feature isolation, by diffing a base-LM SAE against its multimodal-adapted counterpart to identify features altered by multimodal training; (ii) task-specific feature detection, via per-token contrastive firing analysis that isolates causal features; and (iii) feature-level control, by causally removing or steering the discovered feature directions. We train multimodal SAEs for three MLLM families, LLaVA-MORE, PaliGemma 2, and InternVL3.5, and evaluate on visual-spatial understanding, multimodal safety, and OCR. MMDiff discovers sparse, causally specific features whose removal selectively degrades target behaviors by an average of 12% on spatial tasks and 17% on OCR, and reduces attack success rate by 24% on multimodal safety attacks, with no impact on VQA performance. Steering these features improves spatial and OCR accuracy by +3.6% and +1.8% on average over a standard single-layer steering baseline. These results show that multimodal SAEs can serve not only as interpretability tools, but as mechanisms for auditing, steering, and controlling MLLMs behavior toward safer and more capable generations.

cs.CV↗

Spatial Generalization Tests for Machine Learning-based Weather Models to Assess Physical Consistency

Machine learning-based weather prediction is revolutionizing weather forecasting by learning from weather data in present-day climate. However, generalization to other climates remains a major challenge. With melting sea ice, land-use change, and increasing ocean temperatures, boundary conditions are changing. Therefore, generalization in time depends on generalization in space. Here, we present three test cases to evaluate whether machine learning-based weather and climate models generalize in space and apply them to GraphCast and NeuralGCM. We reverse or rotate the planet in longitude or latitude under the model's coordinate system and adapt all boundary conditions and forcings accordingly. Physics-based general circulation models simulate a rotated/reversed planet with only rounding errors, but GraphCast and NeuralGCM fail these tests. The analyses furthermore revealed unphysical variable mappings based on correlation rather than causation. We argue that machine learning-based climate models should be designed to pass generalization tests to prevent overfitting on present-day regional climate.

physics.ao-ph↗

JaxMARL: Multi-Agent RL Environments and Algorithms in JAX

Benchmarks are crucial in the development of machine learning algorithms, with available environments significantly influencing reinforcement learning (RL) research. Traditionally, RL environments run on the CPU, which limits their scalability with typical academic compute. However, recent advancements in JAX have enabled the wider use of hardware acceleration, enabling massively parallel RL training pipelines and environments. While this has been successfully applied to single-agent RL, it has not yet been widely adopted for multi-agent scenarios. In this paper, we present JaxMARL, the first open-source, Python-based library that combines GPU-enabled efficiency with support for a large number of commonly used MARL environments and popular baseline algorithms. Our experiments show that, in terms of wall clock time, our JAX-based training pipeline is around 14 times faster than existing approaches, and up to 12500x when multiple training runs are vectorized. This enables efficient and thorough evaluations, potentially alleviating the evaluation crisis in the field. We also introduce and benchmark SMAX, a JAX-based approximate reimplementation of the popular StarCraft Multi-Agent Challenge, which removes the need to run the StarCraft II game engine. This not only enables GPU acceleration, but also provides a more flexible MARL environment, unlocking the potential for self-play, meta-learning, and other future applications in MARL. The code is available at https://github.com/flairox/jaxmarl.

cs.LG↗

Exploring the Cryptographic Limits of Transformer Networks

In recent work it has been shown that colluding AI agents can use steganographic methods to exchange malicious information. Whether a transformer can implement steganographic methods depends on what cryptographic functions it can implement, since a transformer that can implement a cryptographic function within its layers has source-free randomness access. Despite existing circuit-complexity results, no prior work maps specific cryptographic constructions to transformer architectures. As Merrill et al. have shown that saturated transformers can be seen as threshold circuits, we first generate threshold circuits for three different cryptographic constructions (Keccak functions, Merkle--Damgard constructions and Merkle Trees) and then map these circuits to different transformer architectures. We derive verified scaling laws for the width and depth of the circuits which implement each cryptographic construction and propose two different mappings: no-attention mapping, tokens-as-gates mapping. Beyond its security implications, this work contributes to by establishing a methodology for deriving structural guarantees on transformer computational capacity. Specifically, we derive constructive upper bounds on what a transformer of a given depth and width could plausibly compute, providing a principled foundation for capability evaluations of transformer-based AI systems.

cs.CR↗

Tool Use Enables Undetectable Steganography in Multi-Agent LLM Systems

Increasingly autonomous agentic AI systems pose novel multi-agent risks, such as secret collusion via covert communication channels. The natural defence to these collusion attempts is to monitor plain-text communication, but the efficacy of monitors has been called into doubt by increasingly sophisticated model steganography; indeed, some theoretical schemes have been proposed that are information-theoretically or computationally indistinguishable from good-faith plain-text communication. In this paper, we demonstrate that the complexity of these schemes is no longer a safety barrier, as agentic coding models can already produce undetectable stegosystems when given realistic tool usage, such as code execution or accessing research papers through web searches. Agents also adapt when key ingredients are missing, for example, by adding model-sampling components or implementing related keyed coding schemes. We then frame tacit steganographic coordination between agents as a Schelling-point problem and introduce coordination metrics for estimating when two agents are likely to select compatible schemes without explicit prior agreement. Our results suggest a shift in the threat model for covert communication between AI agents, where the main barrier is no longer whether frontier agents can understand and implement sophisticated stegosystems, but coordination: whether independently acting agents can converge on compatible schemes, keys, and parameters. We find substantial convergence on broad scheme families but limited strict one-shot coordination, suggesting that shared artefacts, repeated interaction, and tool-mediated search are the settings where covert communication risks are most acute. Overall, our findings provide empirical grounding for the recent strategic confinement hypothesis, which assumes that capable agents can construct covert channels that survive monitoring.

cs.CR↗