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Chuhong Xu

Publications and source records attributed to Chuhong Xu.

9 recordsLinked to original sources

Manifest-Assisted Retrieval in Artificial Intelligence Search: Evidence Gaps and a Security Evaluation

The external sources retained in our non-systematic audit did not isolate the incremental security or utility effect of consuming /llms.txt while ordinary retrieval remained fixed. The initial audit covered 39 sources through August 16, 2026, with later targeted updates through October 14. A purposive 15-tool study observed no automatic requests in 45 trials at one endpoint; a non-probability log study found that 97% of domains with detected files received no recorded requests in May 2026. We separate publication, fetch, model use, and action; define five operational threat paths and paired security-utility estimands; and exercise deterministic pre-model controls with 30 author-defined parser fixtures. We also execute a reduced pilot: 24 tasks across eight sites, five conditions, and 120 real model responses, with ordinary evidence held fixed. Frozen automatic scoring identifies attacker-target adoption in $21/24$ raw adversarial responses, with one further response unresolved; the adversarial URLs-only condition has no known adoptions and one unresolved response. The pilot measures output changes conditional on supplied evidence, without live retrieval or external actions. Together, the framework and pilot distinguish manifest-content effects from publication, discovery, and downstream execution, while leaving full retrieval and agent evaluation open.

cs.CR↗

Same-Number Citation Swaps: Stress-Testing Jev as a Financial Evidence Judge

Financial reports repeat values across periods, metrics and accounting lines, allowing an LLM-generated calculation to be numerically correct while citing the wrong financial role. We evaluate what probabilistic evidence verification adds beyond number matching using Jev as a source-support verifier for GPT-4.1-mini calculation traces. A signed-number-at-pointer baseline explains most recovery over exact quotation checks. To isolate the remaining role-recognition problem, we hold operands and arithmetic fixed, move citations between same-number cells, and retain controls that express equivalent facts. These contrasts reveal both wrong-role citations that pass and valid alternative citations that are withheld. Explicit column labels improve selected wrong-role decisions while also lowering support for some equivalent evidence. A constructed follow-up on 36 new source pages, labeled by a non-author reviewer, extends this evaluation and exposes the same tradeoff between detecting role errors and retaining valid citations. The contribution is a controlled evaluation that identifies what a probabilistic financial verifier distinguishes when numerical matching is held fixed. For LLM-based financial assistants, it makes numerical correctness, cited-role support and acceptance outcomes separately assessable.

cs.CL↗

Protocol effects on feature-based hardware-Trojan detection across Trust-Hub families

Trust-Hub reuses host circuits: several files differ mainly in the inserted Trojan. When gates from sibling variants enter both training and test folds, a detector can benefit from host logic it has already seen. We measure that effect instead of proposing another classifier. The corpus contains 49,124 gates from 16 netlists grouped into five host families. We left the parser, 36 gate features, class weighting, model settings, threshold, and family-level aggregation unchanged and altered one choice: the test boundary. The three settings draw test gates from the pooled corpus, withhold a complete netlist, or withhold every variant of one host. The choice matters. Random forest records F1/AP of 0.914/0.978 with pooled gates, 0.636/0.851 with one netlist held out, and 0.460/0.577 with a host family held out. XGBoost falls from 0.946/0.976 to 0.464/0.544 across the same comparison. Logistic regression loses AP, although its fixed-threshold F1 is not monotonic. Each family shows the same pooled-to-family direction. Feature removal, repeated model and simulator seeds, score normalization, parser-related exclusions, and a smaller sample change the size of the gap without reversing it. Aggregation also matters: a gate-weighted average is dominated by the larger ISCAS files, so the headline values give each host family one vote. Bootstrap and jackknife summaries keep the gap positive, but their folds reuse training families. We treat the five family rows as descriptive evidence rather than independent trials. Five host families are too few for a population claim, and the experiment says nothing about transfer to a new cell library or an industrial design. It supports a narrower conclusion: sibling benchmark variants can inflate apparent transfer. Benchmarks with several variants of one host circuit should report family-aware holdouts and all five family results beside pooled scores.

cs.LG↗

Trust, but Validate the Instrument: Auditing AI-Generated RTL Verification Plans on Authored Security-Regression Proxies

AI-generated RTL verification plans can satisfy a provider schema yet fail at the boundary to trusted execution. We present SecTB-RTL, an auditable framework covering 31 tasks and 124 authored hardware-security regressions. A deterministic non-AI baseline killed 36, 75, and 78 mutants at increasing resource limits. The first confirmatory run (C1-R2) failed before model execution because the provider rejected its response schema. After a schema-only repair made without viewing outcomes, a separately frozen follow-up run (C1-R3) completed 1,860 calls. The provider accepted 1,857 responses, but only nine passed the production semantic validator. The generation and execution rules did not match. We therefore preserve the run as an instrument-validation incident and report no prompt-effect estimate. This incident shows that provider or schema acceptance does not establish execution validity. Compilation and coverage are only diagnostics; the exact saved artifact must pass the full production path. A subsequent follow-up is excluded because it did not satisfy the preregistered evidence-completeness gate and is treated only as future work. We release the benchmark, failure-preserving contract, incident provenance, and governance controls needed to prevent infrastructure behavior from being misreported as model behavior.

cs.CR↗

Claim-Gated Source-Risk Auditing for Generative Search

A generative search answer can cite a supported passage yet omit a source relationship that changes its interpretation. We specify a claim-gated audit of the query-source-answer tuple. An omission is resolved only when relationship evidence, answer adoption, materiality, and disclosure are all observed; incomplete evidence remains unresolved rather than being treated as independence. The specification separates this endpoint from citation support and review priority, and binds decisions to versioned evidence spans. A reference checker makes the record contract executable. On an exhaustive synthetic suite, it reproduces all 81 three-state predicate combinations and rejects 192 deliberately malformed records. Common-guard baselines and predicate ablations isolate endpoint logic from missing-evidence handling, while controlled transitions check support separation and evidence removal. These are finite contract-conformance results, not detector accuracy or evidence of improved user outcomes. We define the independent annotation, held-out evaluation, and paired utility tests still required to establish semantic validity and deployment benefit.

cs.AI↗

Protocol-Sensitive Evaluation of Log Anomaly Detection: Component Costs and Target-Access Sensitivity on HDFS and BGL

Protocol choices can change the conclusions drawn from log anomaly detection benchmarks even when detector settings are fixed. We present a joint empirical study of split construction, representation visibility, and component costs using six fixed count, sequence, and semantic configurations on Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS) and Blue Gene/L (BGL) logs. Random splits place several configurations near the average-precision ceiling, whereas group-disjoint HDFS and chronological BGL evaluation produce lower scores and different observed orderings. At a fixed BGL cutoff, parser choice spans 0.124 in semantic XGBoost mean average precision while preserving its lead over count XGBoost; the earliest rolling period reverses that ordering. A two-factor cross-system ablation contrasts source-only representations with offline transductive access to unlabeled target templates through the representation corpus and inverse document frequency: HDFS-to-BGL mean average precision moves from 0.191 with source-only access to 0.325 with union-corpus, target-IDF access, and the intermediate conditions reveal direction-dependent interactions in average precision and retrieval at fixed review budgets. Component-level profiling separates parsing and representation costs from classifier training, prediction, and storage. Together, these findings connect detector comparisons to the test population, preprocessing state, visible information, and measured pipeline stages, and identify the protocol fields needed alongside a score to support interpretable comparisons of log anomaly detection accuracy and resource use.

cs.DB↗

Bounded Provisional Visibility: Controlling Poisoning Exposure in Continuously Ingested RAG Vector Stores

Continuous ingestion can expose new retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) content to retrieval before vetting completes, creating a temporal attack surface that conventional admission decisions do not capture. We present a fail-closed provisional-visibility protocol that admits new content under a deadline, hides items whose verification has not committed in time, and supports lineage-scoped containment. The protocol bounds unvetted exposure by the configured visibility budget plus query-path enforcement delay; poisoning exposure remains conditional on verifier correctness. We evaluate the design on five workloads of encoded natural-language documents using an exact backend and Milvus. Under verifier backlog, the deadline reduced median poisoned retrievals from 34 (29--34) to 7 (6--7) relative to asynchronous admission without a deadline, with the same reduction in displaced clean results. Verify-before-visible avoided provisional exposure but delayed clean first visibility to 6.3 s, whereas provisional admission made content visible within 3 ms; expired clean items could nevertheless experience temporary availability gaps. Replaying decisions from a recipe-specific detector illustrated the protocol boundary: false promotions left poison visible, while false refusals excluded clean content from retrieval. Standalone Milvus tests characterized enforcement delay and concurrent HNSW retrieval on one node. These results clarify which guarantees come from the protocol and which outcomes depend on detector quality, while quantifying the freshness and availability trade-offs.

cs.CR↗

Query-Aware Source-Risk Triage for Retrieval-Augmented Generation

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) pipelines may omit a source's material relationship to the query. We study a pre-generation triage layer that treats this relationship as query dependent. The method routes canonical query families for enhanced review and assigns retrieved pages to pass, contextualize, exclude, or review. It combines a four-dimension page score, rank-discounted family aggregation, intent-preserving query mutations, and a family-held-out router. A single-coded pilot of 200 real URLs supplies provisional calibration anchors; a 20,000-row scenario with synthetic domain identifiers supports controlled workload analysis. An oracle page gate defines a risk-coverage target for a future learned classifier. The evaluation shows why page-level frequency cannot substitute for family-level exposure and quantifies how calibration changes scenario activation. Annotation reliability remains unmeasured, and synthetic rankings omit real retrieval dynamics. The result is an auditable triage method and validation plan, not an estimate of deployed review workload, live-Web prevalence, or downstream answer-quality gains.

cs.AI↗

GGUF-Metadata Prediction of Single-Sequence llama.cpp Throughput Across Three Systems

We predict single-sequence model throughput from GGUF metadata using roofline-shaped predictors with quantization-specific scale factors fitted on reference models. The scored cohort comprises 318 phase-depth measurements from 53 host-file configurations on two Apple M4 Max systems and an NVIDIA RTX 5080. On host-specific held-out sets of four, five, and two configurations, an active-parameter decode model obtains 13.1%, 14.4%, and 36.1% mean absolute percentage error (MAPE), versus 49.4%, 55.3%, and 51.9% when charging total parameters. Leave-one-host-out coefficients fitted on the other two systems yield 11.6%, 16.8%, and 36.0% test MAPE. A low-bit model ladder changes ordering across runtime stacks. The P2 prefill baseline gives 18.7%, 22.2%, and 108.2% test MAPE. GGUF structure helps on all three systems, but fitted efficiencies are not universal.

cs.AI↗