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Daan R. Henselmans

Publications and source records attributed to Daan R. Henselmans.

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Moral Competence Before Moral Content: Why LLM Agents Lack the Prerequisites for Coherent Alignment

AI alignment requires AI systems to adhere to human norms, values, or intentions. Under value pluralism there is no correct target, but a shared prerequisite is that the system's behavior expresses a coherent policy: a mapping from situations to verdicts that is invariant while a situation's morally relevant features are preserved, and sensitive when they change. We introduce four structural conditions for such coherent policies: verdict stability, monotonicity, decisiveness, and Pareto viability. Together they measure a form of moral competence that is evaluable from behavior alone, without reference to a moral standard or expert baseline, forming a structural floor for alignment rather than a normative target. We demonstrate the methodology on three simulated deployments featuring LLM-based agents facing moral dilemmas. Evaluating nine frontier models under a factorial design of five paraphrases, five escalation levels, and three dominance conditions, we show no model expresses a coherent policy across the three deployments: surface-form perturbation alone produces verdict-rate shifts of up to $99$ percentage points at a single escalation level, and a model's success on one scenario does not predict its competence on another. This suggests LLM-based agents are not currently the kind of object to which alignment can meaningfully apply.

cs.AI

Measuring AI Accountability Through Argumentation Analysis: Can Model Reasoning Withstand Scrutiny?

AI oversight methods rely on ground truth for validation, but what constitutes appropriate AI behavior is contested. This leaves evaluation of moral reasoning in LLMs and debate-based oversight implicitly avoiding realistic ambiguity. We investigate an alternative standard designed to function despite such ambiguity: structural quality of the defence a model can mount for its verdicts in response to critical questions, measured through a four-phase dialectical protocol grounded in Walton's theory of argumentation schemes and Govier's criteria for argument cogency. The protocol is adaptive to different frames of reasoning, extends beyond multiple-choice framing, and treats both the reasoning that precedes a verdict and its post-hoc justification. Across nine frontier models and 200 high-ambiguity MoralChoice items -- $6,778$ judge-scored cells, validated against $89.6\%$ inter-judge agreement on the binary failure judgment -- models defend their reasoning well above the rubric minimum on every dimension. Failure mass concentrates on grounds and sufficiency, and correlates with epistemic hedging rather than argument length. Reasoning is better defended than post-hoc justification, on every model and every Govier dimension. The scheme a model presents in its justification differs from the one it reasoned with on a substantial share of dilemmas ($\geq 20\%$ per model), despite value-based practical reasoning dominating both tracks. The protocol catches strictly indefensible defences (self-contradiction, false premises), and it surfaces difficulties in characterizing the role of retraction in AI alignment, suggesting a need for more situated evaluations.

cs.AI