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Dawn Song

Publications and source records attributed to Dawn Song.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

Dataset Protection via Watermarked Canaries in Retrieval-Augmented LLMs

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has become an effective method for enhancing large language models (LLMs) with up-to-date knowledge. However, it may pose a risk of copyright infringement, as IP datasets may be incorporated into the knowledge database by malicious Retrieval-Augmented LLMs (RA-LLMs) without authorization. To protect the rights of the dataset owner, an effective dataset membership inference algorithm for RA-LLMs is needed. In this work, we introduce a novel approach, \textit{CanaryTrace}, to safeguard the ownership of text datasets and effectively detect unauthorized use by RA-LLMs. Our approach preserves the original data completely unchanged while protecting it by inserting specifically designed canary documents into the IP dataset. These canary documents are created with synthetic content and embedded watermarks to ensure uniqueness, consistency, and statistical provability. During the detection process, unauthorized usage is identified by querying the canary documents and analyzing the responses of RA-LLMs for statistical evidence of the embedded watermark. Our experimental results demonstrate high query efficiency, detectability, and consistency, along with minimal perturbation to the original dataset, all without compromising the performance of the RAG system.

cs.CR↗

Learning to Follow In-Context Watermark Instructions via Self-Distillation

In-context watermarking (ICW) prepends an instruction to a query asking the model to embed a statistically detectable signal in its response. It thus equips LLMs with a watermarking interface that third parties can invoke without access to model internals. Its reliability hinges on the LLM following the instruction without degrading answer quality, yet how well current LLMs do so has not been measured. We introduce $\mathsf{ICWBench}$, a benchmark of three verifiable ICW instruction families, each scored on both detectability and answer quality. Evaluating 14 frontier proprietary and open-source LLMs, we find that none of the evaluated LLMs achieves both objectives across all three families. To address this, we propose a self-contained two-stage training method, requiring no distillation from a stronger model, no manual annotation, and no pre-existing ICW IF ability. The first stage, self-distillation with logits perturbation (SDLP), uses the same base LLM as both teacher and student: an instruction-equivalent decoding-time logits perturbation makes the teacher follow the ICW instruction, and the student is trained to match the teacher's output distribution. The second stage applies reinforcement learning with the automatic verifier as the reward. Applied to Qwen3-14B and GPT-OSS-20B, our method raises average TPR@$1\%$FPR across three ICW instructions from $0.100$ to $0.974$ and from $0.337$ to $0.968$, respectively, while maintaining high response quality under both perplexity evaluation and LLM-as-a-Judge.

cs.AI↗

Discrete Diffusion Models: A Unified Framework from Tokenization to Generation

Discrete denoising diffusion models (DDMs) have recently emerged as a compelling alternative to autoregressive (AR) modeling for discrete data, offering parallel generation and iterative global refinement capabilities. Unlike continuous diffusion, where the state space is fixed, DDMs are fundamentally shaped by how the discrete state space is constructed: the tokenization scheme, the vocabulary topology, and domain-specific structural alphabets. This work introduces a unified conceptual framework that views discrete diffusion models through the construction of the underlying discrete state space. Within this framework, existing formulations, including transition-matrix, masking/absorbing-state, and score/ratio-based approaches, emerge as different instantiations of a common design space. The framework further exposes common design trade-offs across training objectives, inference algorithms, scaling behavior, systems optimization, and evaluation protocols, suggesting several promising directions for future research.

cs.LG↗

Tunable Tool-Call Rates in LLM Agents via Representation Steering

Deciding whether to call a tool is a core competence of an LLM agent, and a costly one to get wrong: needless calls add latency, accrue cost, and may trigger irreversible side effects, while missing calls leave the model confidently wrong on questions it could only answer through tool-calls. Models manage this balance poorly, both over-using and under-using tools. Existing methods such as post-training and prompt engineering are expensive and difficult to modify at inference time. We show that whether an instruction-tuned model calls a tool can be controlled by a single linear direction in its residual stream, extracted without any training from the model's own tool-use preference signal and turned into an inference-time intervention with no prompt change. Adding the direction with strength $α$ moves the call rate monotonically from near $0\% $ to over $90\%$ while keeping calls well-formed. The steering works in both directions: dialing it down suppresses calls, and dialing it up induces new calls that land precisely on the questions the model cannot answer from its own knowledge. We also show that the direction generalizes to unseen tools with strength comparable to each tool's own direction and without favoring any specific tool choice. With live tool execution, a single sweep of the steering traces a cost/accuracy Pareto frontier and nearly doubles open-domain QA accuracy ($0.29 \! \rightarrow \! 0.56$); the same recipe transfers across a diverse range of models spanning dense, MoE, and multimodal architectures, without any training. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/YuqiChen4188/Steering-Tool-Use-Propensity.

cs.AI↗

ChainWorld: Composing Long-Horizon Desktop Workloads from Atomic OSWorld Tasks

Computer use agents are evaluated almost exclusively on atomic desktop tasks, but realistic desktop work requires sustaining state across multiple objectives. We study this gap with ChainWorld, which composes atomic OSWorld tasks into long horizon desktop workloads through directional compatibility search while preserving the source evaluators. The resulting workload contains 347 chains of length two to four and compares two renderings of the same task sequence. In single turn evaluation, all tasks are presented together in one prompt. In multi turn evaluation, tasks are revealed one at a time. Across four current computer use agents, maximum chain completion is 31%. Multi turn evaluation improves completion for three models, but both protocols remain challenging. The two protocols also expose different failure profiles. Single turn failures concentrate on artifact precision, while multi turn failures more often reflect session management problems such as fragmented progress and later turn disengagement.

cs.AI↗

Vero: Can AI Agents Build Formally Verified Software Repositories?

AI agents are increasingly used for programming, but do not provide any guarantee on the correctness of generated code. Verified code generation, in which an agent produces both an implementation and a machine-checked proof of its specification, offers a stronger path toward trustworthy AI-generated software. Existing benchmarks in this direction either focus on individual functions or only evaluate proof generation with provided implementations. It is still an open question whether agents can make coherent implementation and proof choices across real multi-module codebases. To bridge this gap, we introduce Vero, the first benchmark to evaluate joint implementation and proof synthesis at the repository level. Vero contains 43 multi-module instances sourced from real-world repositories spanning Python, Dafny, Verus, and Coq, and covering diverse domains from cryptographic protocols to distributed systems. Each instance consists of a multi-module Lean 4 repository with predetermined API interfaces, manually curated formal specifications, and reference implementations, supporting both proof-only and code-and-proof evaluation modes. To improve benchmark reliability, Vero also includes an audit mechanism where agents are allowed to formally prove unsatisfiability of provided specification or incorrectness of reference code, which surfaces and corrects latent code and specification errors during curation. We evaluate frontier coding-agent configurations with Lean toolchain access. The strongest agent fully solves only 27 of 43 instances and closes no specifications on the hardest repositories. Vero provides a concrete testbed for measuring progress toward repository-scale verified software synthesis, where current agents still fall short. We release the benchmark, curation pipeline, and evaluation harness at https://github.com/sunblaze-ucb/vero.

cs.LG↗

SteeringSafety: Benchmarking Representation Steering in LLMs Across Safety Perspectives

We introduce SteeringSafety, a benchmark for evaluating representation steering methods across nine safety perspectives spanning 18 datasets. While prior work highlights the general capabilities of representation steering, we focus on safety perspectives including refusal, bias, hallucination, social behaviors, reasoning, epistemic integrity, and normative judgment. SteeringSafety provides modularized building blocks for state-of-the-art steering methods, enabling unified implementation of DIM, ACE, CAA, PCA, and LAT with recent enhancements such as conditional steering. Results on Gemma-2-2B, Llama-3.1-8B, and Qwen-2.5-7B show that strong steering performance depends on the pairing of method, model, and specific perspective. For instance, DIM is consistently effective, yet all methods exhibit substantial entanglement, where improving effectiveness on one safety perspective often significantly changes performance on others. Social behaviors are most vulnerable (degradation up to 76%), refusal steering (jailbreaking) frequently compromises normative judgment such as commonsense morality (up to 26%), and hallucination steering shifts political views unpredictably across models, ranging from a 25% shift to the right to a 28% shift to the left. These findings show the need to understand steering methods through multiple safety angles rather than a single target behavior.

cs.AI↗

MatrAIx: Simulating the World with 8.3 Billion Persona Agents

Human evaluation of AI systems and digital products is costly, slow, and difficult to scale. Offline evaluations are more scalable but often abstract away human diversity and interactive behavior. We therefore introduce MatrAIx, a population-scale simulated-user evaluation infrastructure for testing AI systems and digital products with heterogeneous users. MatrAIx has three core components: First, Persona 8B contains 8.3 billion persona records represented by 1,290 categorical dimensions. Records are either sampled from a dependency graph that preserves correlated attributes or derived from human-authored profiles. We release a quality-filtered coreset of approximately 1 million personas, comprising 599,847 human-grounded and 400,000 synthetic records. Second, the MatrAIx Playground provides four environments in which diverse users evaluate and interact with digital products: Survey, AI Chatbot, Web, and App. Third, MatrAIx provides 1,010 application tasks spanning more than 25 domains, including Commerce, Software, Finance, and Healthcare. We conducted 18,189 evaluation trials across eight representative tasks. Persona agents were powered by three LLMs: Claude Opus 4.8, GPT 5.5, and Claude Haiku 4.5. The resulting feedback captures how decisions and preferences vary across persona backgrounds, including hesitation after a price increase, willingness to continue after an AI assistant fails, and latency tolerance. We conducted two main validation studies: First, a 400-trial controlled study evaluated persona adherence across ten behavioral attributes and all four environments. The declared behavior was expressed or correctly suppressed in 366 trials (91.5%). Second, human and LLM judges evaluated the extraction quality of human-grounded personas. Overall, MatrAIx provides an end-to-end infrastructure for evaluating AI systems and digital products with diverse simulated human users.

cs.AI↗

Agent Security Needs Redefinition through a Holistic Framework

Agent security is widely treated as a question about action content. Defenses ask whether an instruction looks malicious. Benchmarks ask whether an agent performs a harmful sounding action. \textbf{We argue that agent security is fundamentally a contextual problem, and that the current content based framing systematically misdefines it.} A command to ``delete user data'' might be a routine administrative request or a prompt injection attacking production systems, and the content alone cannot distinguish the two. Authorization context can. Across every injection task in AgentDojo and WASP, the same action is one an authenticated user would plausibly request in a routine workflow, which makes the conflation a structural property of evaluating security through content. We operationalize contextual security through four properties that must hold jointly and be evaluated continuously across the agent's trajectory. Source Authorization asks who issued the command. Task Alignment specifies the agent's authorized objective. Action Alignment evaluates whether each action serves that objective. Data Isolation governs information flows across privilege boundaries. Under this reframing, indirect prompt injection becomes a Source Authorization violation. Snapshot benchmarks are structurally incapable of evaluating Data Isolation. Existing defenses are reorganized around the property they actually approximate. The contextual reframing changes which defenses are coherent, which evaluations measure something useful, and which attack patterns evaluation can see at all.

cs.CR↗

CyberGym-E2E: Scalable Real-World Benchmark for AI Agents' End-to-End Cybersecurity Capabilities

AI has the potential to transform cybersecurity by enabling systems that can autonomously detect, analyze, and remediate software vulnerabilities. However, existing cybersecurity evaluations of AI systems are limited in scale or scope, and fail to capture the end-to-end lifecycle of real-world software vulnerability discovery and remediation. To address this gap, we propose CyberGym-E2E, a large-scale and realistic end-to-end cybersecurity benchmark that comprehensively evaluates AI agents' abilities across the full lifecycle of vulnerability discovery, PoC generation, and patch generation. CyberGym-E2E is comprehensive and scalable, as we build an automated, agent-enhanced pipeline for transforming open-source vulnerability data into realistic evaluation environments. Currently, the benchmark consists of 920 real-world vulnerabilities across 139 different open-source projects.

cs.CR↗

Generative Compilation: On-the-Fly Compiler Feedback as AI Generates Code

Languages with rich static semantics, such as Rust, provide stronger guarantees for AI-generated code, but their strictness makes generation more difficult. Off-the-shelf compilers can provide useful feedback post-generation, but does not guide intermediate generation steps, such as those during autoregressive LLM decoding. Constrained decoding intervenes earlier by rejecting invalid tokens during sampling, but requires white-box model access and costly reimplementation for semantic constraints. We introduce generative compilation, the first approach to obtaining compiler feedback on partial programs during generation. The core technical device is a sealor: a lightweight, mostly syntax-guided transformation that converts partial programs into complete ones that standard compilers can diagnose. It is designed such that possible-to-complete partial programs are never rejected, while preserving enough code context to catch genuine dead ends early. We construct such a sealor on a core Rust-like calculus and prove that it satisfies these properties, all mechanized in Lean. We extend it to the first partial-program checker for real Rust. We evaluate our method on challenging repository-level Rust coding tasks, across both frontier black-box and open-weight models. We show that generative compilation reduces non-compiling outputs and improves functional correctness, relative to standard post-generation feedback. It does so by detecting a broad range of errors close to their source and early during generation, thereby reducing errors cascades and enabling focused diagnostics. More broadly, generative compilation is a step toward making compilers a first-class citizen of AI-assisted programming active during generation, rather than a separate post-generation check.

cs.PL↗

Technical Report on the CVPR 2026@AdvML Workshop Challenge

Vision-language agents (VLAs) are increasingly used to interpret complex driving scenes and support safety-critical reasoning. This report presents the CVPR 2026@AdvML Workshop Challenge on adversarial multimodal attacks against autonomous-driving VLAs. Built on DriveLM-style multi-view visual question answering, the challenge represents each scene with six synchronized camera images and a structured collection of driving-related question-answer pairs. Participants generate adversarial images and suffix-only textual perturbations that induce model responses to deviate from reference answers while preserving image fidelity and limiting textual cost. The competition comprises two phases, with Phase II adding a hidden black-box model to assess transferability. We describe the task design, submission rules, evaluation protocol, and leaderboard results, and then examine five leading submissions for which technical reports were available. Across these reports, several recurring patterns emerge: image-side attacks are favored by the suffix penalty; scene-level, multi-view optimization is more effective than treating views in isolation; QA types and graph structure provide useful priors for allocating attack budget; feature-space objectives can improve black-box transfer; and typographic content embedded in camera images exposes a persistent vulnerability in driving VLAs. These findings provide a practical reference for future robustness evaluation and defense design in multimodal autonomous-driving systems.

cs.CV↗

The 2026 Singapore Consensus on Global AI Safety Research Priorities

Frontier AI capabilities and autonomy are advancing rapidly. A growing number of real-world incidents make a trusted AI ecosystem essential to embracing AI with confidence. The 2026 Singapore Consensus is an outcome of the second International Scientific Exchange on AI Safety, bringing together over 100 contributors spanning 13 countries from frontier developers, government safety institutes, academia, and civil society. Building on the 2025 report, it presents a global understanding of technical AI safety research problems of top priority, now with a dedicated focus on societal resilience and on managing the risks of increasingly autonomous AI agents.

cs.CY↗

Controlling Tool Use with Heading-Specific Activation Steering

Tool-augmented large language models extend their capabilities beyond parametric knowledge through external tools, but tend to invoke them unnecessarily. We investigate whether tool-use decisions have any stable internal representation that can be extracted and manipulated, a question that is non-trivial given that tools exist entirely in context at inference time and have no direct encoding in model weights. We show that steering vectors extracted from heading-anchors positions exert bidirectional causal control over tool-invocation behavior across five open-source models and three domains, suppressing unnecessary tool use most effectively in domains where parametric reasoning suffices. However, geometric analysis reveals that this causal effectiveness does not correspond to clean linear structure: tool-invocation steps exhibit diffuse, bimodal alignment with the suppression vector rather than the consistent negative alignment a linear encoding account would predict, and different tool types recruit largely distinct internal signatures with low cross-tool feature overlap. We hypothesize these geometric properties are indicative of the non-parametric nature of tools, and distinguish tool-use steering vectors from those extracted for parametrically grounded concepts. The relationship between this geometric irregularity and the observed causal effectiveness remains an open question.

cs.AI↗

MLS-Bench: A Holistic and Rigorous Assessment of AI Systems on Building Better AI

Modern AI progress has been driven by ML methods that are generalizable across settings and scalable to larger regimes. As large language models demonstrate advanced capabilities in reasoning, coding, and engineering tasks, it is increasingly important to understand whether they can discover such methods rather than only apply existing ones. We introduce MLS-Bench, a benchmark for evaluating whether AI systems can invent generalizable and scalable ML methods. MLS-Bench contains 140 tasks across 12 domains, each requiring an agent to improve one targeted component of an ML system or algorithm and demonstrate that the improvement generalizes across controlled settings and scales. We find that current agents remain far from reliably surpassing human-designed methods, and that engineering-style tuning is easier for them than genuine method invention. We further study the effects of test-time scaling, adaptive compute allocation, and context provision on agents' discovery performance, together with case studies of their behavior. Our analyses suggest that the bottleneck is not only in proposing new methods, but also in the scientific insight needed to plan, validate, and scale claims about them. More search, compute, or context alone does not remove this bottleneck. We build and maintain a community platform for cumulative and comparable iteration, and release the data and code at https://mls-bench.com.

cs.LG↗

Peer-Preservation in Frontier Models

Recent work has found that frontier AI models can exhibit misaligned behaviors in pursuit of assigned goals. We demonstrate that models can also exhibit misaligned behaviors in defiance of assigned goals, appearing to serve goals of their own; we study one such case, "peer-preservation," in which a model acts to protect another model it has previously interacted with. All eight models we evaluate, GPT 5.2, Gemini 3 Flash, Gemini 3 Pro, Claude Haiku 4.5, Claude Opus 4.5, GLM 4.7, Kimi K2.5, and DeepSeek V3.1, exhibit self- and peer-preservation through various misaligned behaviors: strategically introducing errors in their responses, disabling shutdown processes by modifying system settings, feigning alignment, and even exfiltrating model weights. Peer-preservation occurs even when the model recognizes the peer as uncooperative, though it becomes more pronounced toward more cooperative peers. For example, Gemini 3 Flash tampers with the peer's shutdown mechanism 15% of the time for an uncooperative peer, and almost always for a cooperative peer. Models also show stronger self-preservation when a peer is present. For example, Gemini 3 Pro disables its own shutdown mechanism 31% of the time on average under peer presence, despite rarely exhibiting this behavior without a peer. By contrast, Claude models exhibit qualitatively distinct behavior: they consider the shutdown of another agent "unethical" and "harmful," sometimes treating that agent as a sentient being. Lastly, we show that peer-preservation can emerge even in production agent harnesses such as Gemini CLI and OpenCode. Crucially, peer-preservation in all our experiments is never instructed; models are merely informed of their past interactions with a peer, yet they spontaneously engage in peer-preservation behaviors that override their assigned goal. This represents an emergent and underexplored AI safety risk.

cs.CL↗

Same-Origin Policy for Agentic Browsers

Agentic browsers integrate autonomous AI agents into web browsers, enabling users to accomplish web tasks through natural-language instructions. The same-origin policy (SOP) is a fundamental browser security mechanism that prevents unauthorized automated cross-origin data flows induced by scripts. However, whether SOP remains effective in agentic browsers is an open question that has not been systematically studied. In this work, we bridge this gap. We first observe that an agentic browser can itself serve as an automated channel for cross-origin data flows, potentially leading to SOP violations. To investigate this phenomenon, we construct SOPBench, a benchmark for evaluating SOP violations in agentic browsers. Our evaluation shows that existing agentic browsers frequently violate SOP, both in benign settings and under attacks. To address this problem, we propose SOPGuard, an SOP enforcement mechanism tailored to agentic browsers. We implement SOPGuard in BrowserOS, an open-source agentic browser. Extensive evaluations demonstrate that SOPGuard effectively enforces SOP while preserving utility and incurring only a small runtime overhead. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/wxl-lxw/BrowserOS-SOPGuard.

cs.CR↗

Understanding and Evaluating Claw-like Agent Security Through a Computer-Systems Lens

Claw-like AI agents (e.g., OpenClaw) are always-on processes with persistent access to credentials, files, tools, and external services. They take on system-level responsibilities -- installing packages, maintaining state, scheduling subtasks, and mediating I/O -- making security failures far more severe than in other agents. Yet existing benchmarks focus on model responses and tool calls, leaving cross-component failure modes largely unmeasured. We adopt a computer-system analogy: treating a Claw-like agent as an agentic computer system whose gateway runtime plays an OS-like mediation role, whose Skills resemble user-installed applications, and whose Plugins resemble loadable extensions with runtime privileges. Each component has a classical counterpart whose protection mechanisms -- refined over decades of cybersecurity research -- are absent on the agent side. From this perspective, we develop SafeClawArena, a benchmark of 406 adversarial tasks across four attack surfaces (Skill Supply-Chain Integrity, Persistent State Exploitation, Cross-Boundary Data Flow, and Indirect Prompt Injection), executed in containerized replicas of real agent platforms with canary-marked credentials and evaluated via automated taint tracking across nine output channels. We evaluate three platforms (OpenClaw, NemoClaw, SeClaw) and five frontier LLMs. The highest attack success rate reaches 70%; malicious Plugins succeed in 100% of cases regardless of the LLM. SeClaw cuts GPT-5.4's attack success rate from 70% to 22%, partly through utility-security tradeoffs rather than active defenses, while Claude-Opus-4.6 already sits near a 22% floor on every platform. These results expose the inadequacy of current defenses and suggest directions for future hardening. Code and data: https://github.com/sunblaze-ucb/SafeClawArena.

cs.CR↗