arXiv subjects

Edward Raff

Publications and source records attributed to Edward Raff.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Attribution in Scientific Literature: New Benchmark and Methods

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly generate citation-backed responses, yet citation hallucination remains a major challenge for trustworthy scientific information access. We introduce REASONS, a benchmark of 12,723 sentence-level citation instances spanning 12 arXiv subject categories, designed to evaluate scientific citation attribution under varying evidence conditions. We propose a dual-metric framework consisting of Abstention Rate (AR) and Hallucination Rate (HR) to characterize the trade-off between reliability and responsiveness. Using author-attribution and title-attribution tasks, we evaluate proprietary and open-source LLMs under zero-context, metadata-augmented, cascaded metadata-augmented prompting (CMP), retrieval-augmented, and adversarial settings. Advanced RAG lowers HR relative to Naive RAG (65.4% vs. 87.6%) but reduces AR from 5.0% to 0%. Under adversarial metadata, several systems exceed 85% HR, while retrieval-augmented variants frequently maintain near-zero abstention. Human evaluation of 1,000 outputs ($κ=0.78$) finds a 12.7:1 ratio of factual hallucinations to acceptable paraphrases. Our findings demonstrate that citation attribution systems should be evaluated not only for correctness but also for their ability to abstain appropriately under uncertainty. REASONS provides a benchmark and evaluation framework for studying attribution reliability in citation generation.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2026

Why Is SHAP Not a Reliable Standalone Explanation Framework for Malware Detection?

Machine learning is widely used for malware detection, but its decisions must be explained. An analyst needs to know whether a model has learned genuine malicious behavior or only dataset-specific patterns \cite{gaur2021semantics}. SHapley Additive exPlanations (SHAP) is the standard tool for this, backed by formal properties such as local accuracy, missingness, and consistency. We argue that these guarantees are insufficient for reliable malware interpretation. We claim SHAP explains a chosen feature-coalition game, not malware behavior in the data. That game is fixed only after the analyst selects the feature players, the missing feature rule, the background distribution, and the simplified input mapping. In static Portable Executable feature spaces, groups such as byte histograms, byte-entropy, strings, headers, sections, imports, and data-directories are not independent signals but are jointly shaped by file structure, packing, compiler behavior, and family conventions. We prove that this dependence makes conditional SHAP dilute a model's feature credit by a factor of $1/m$ across $m-1$ redundant features, attributes importance to features the model never uses, and even reverses the sign of an unused feature's attribution when the data distribution changes; interventional SHAP, meanwhile, queries off-manifold coalitions that no real executable would exhibit. Experiments on EMBER-2018, EMBER-2024, and BODMAS with fixed LightGBM and XGBoost detectors confirm these effects. We therefore position SHAP as a limited diagnostic that requires an explicitly stated data distribution and domain validation, not a standalone account of malware behavior.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

When LLM Decompilers Recompile More and Preserve Less

Decompilation recovers high-level source from compiled machine code and serves as a foundation for security tasks such as vulnerability detection and malware analysis. Traditional decompilers like Ghidra and Hex-Rays expose whatever they cannot resolve as visible placeholders and often emit pseudocode that will not compile or execute; LLM-based decompilers produce clean, idiomatic C and are now judged almost entirely by recompilability and re-executability: whether the output builds and passes its shipped input/output tests. We show that these metrics can reward the wrong path: a function may recompile and pass every shipped test yet diverge on other legitimate inputs, and a disclosed vulnerability may disappear from the recompiled code with no visible trace of the crash. Neither failure is caught by existing suites. To address this gap, we propose Decompile-Diverge, a behavioral comparison oracle not relying on fixed or hand-crafted tests: for each function it synthesizes a driver, grows a fuzzing corpus from the reference, and reruns the decompiled code on the same inputs to detect changes in the function's behavior. Across eight systems in nine configurations on established LLM decompilation corpora, candidates that pass every shipped test still diverge from the original on our input corpus: 4.9% overall, and as many as 13% for a single system. On 300 real GitHub library functions and 287 CVE-grounded functions, recompilability and behavioral agreement can come apart: the strongest refinement LLM lifts Ghidra's build rate from 75% to 90%, while its Matched rate falls from 74% to 62%; on disclosed vulnerabilities, up to one tenth exhibit Crash Absence in its output. Source-level analysis traces this divergence to introduced fields, types, callees, and guards that replace the visible unknowns traditional tools leave behind.

cs.CR↗