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Emilia Grass

Publications and source records attributed to Emilia Grass.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

A General Multicriteria Optimization Perspective on Resilience

Resilience is a system's capability to prepare for, resist, absorb, and recover from adverse events. By definition, resilience therefore encompasses multiple criteria that can conflict and may prescribe different decisions. Importantly, a system must also maintain its effectiveness during routine operations and appropriately scale its preparedness for adverse events. Although resilience is inherently multicriteria, existing models often focus on a single criterion and do not explicitly analyze potential conflicts, the associated trade-offs, and their implications for decision-making. We formulate rebound, resistance, loss, and maximum performance degradation as separate resilience criteria in a general two-stage multicriteria model of network flows over time that integrates preparedness, effectiveness, and response. We show that, in general, such multicriteria optimization models are intractable and develop an enclosure-based heuristic for approximating the nondominated set. Our computational results show that different preparedness instruments and activation timings are associated with different resilience criteria and that the corresponding trade-offs are strongly instance-specific. Thus, resilience should be approached from an explicit multicriteria perspective rather than through a universal, preference-independent scalar index.

math.OC↗

A Defender-Attacker-Defender Model for Optimizing the Resilience of Hospital Networks to Cyberattacks

Considering the increasing frequency of cyberattacks affecting multiple hospitals simultaneously, improving resilience at a network level is essential. Various countermeasures exist to improve resilience against cyberattacks, such as deploying controls that strengthen IT infrastructures to limit their impact, or enabling resource sharing, patient transfers and backup capacities to maintain services of hospitals in response to realized attacks. However, determining the most cost-effective combination among these wide range of countermeasures is a complex challenge, further intensified by constrained budgets and competing priorities between maintaining efficient daily hospital operations and investing in disaster preparedness. To address these challenges, we propose a defender-attacker-defender optimization model that supports decision-makers in identifying effective strategies for improving the resilience of a network of hospitals against cyberattacks. The model explicitly captures interdependence between hospital services and their supporting IT infrastructures. By doing so, cyberattacks can be directly translated into reductions of service capacities, which allows to assess proactive and reactive strategies on both the operational and technical sides within a single framework. Further, time-dependent resilience measures are incorporated as design objectives to account for the mid- to long-term consequences of cyberattacks. The model is validated based on the German hospital network, suggesting that enabling cooperation with backup capacities particularly in urban areas, alongside strengthening of IT infrastructures across all hospitals, are crucial strategies.

cs.CR↗