arXiv subjects

Filip Tokarski

Publications and source records attributed to Filip Tokarski.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Targeting Without Transfers

I study the welfare-maximizing allocation of heterogeneous goods when monetary transfers are prohibited. Agents have private values, and the designer chooses a mechanism subject to incentive compatibility and aggregate supply constraints. I characterize when the optimal mechanism takes the form of a simple menu, where each option offers some amount of one kind of good and none of the others. When this is the case, it can be implemented as a competitive equilibrium with equal incomes. However, this mechanism can be suboptimal when narrow preference margins between pure options are sufficiently predictive of higher values. In such cases, the designer can improve welfare by offering mixed bundles, targeting high-value agents through their willingness to accept mixing.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2026

Strategically Analogous Mechanisms

This paper studies when strategic understanding acquired in one mechanism can be transferred to another. It introduces a framework in which agents have a limited understanding of how actions affect payoffs, and formalizes how they use analogies to transfer this understanding between mechanisms. We ask when such reasoning allows agents to transfer their understanding of equilibrium between mechanisms. We first consider mechanisms that are strategically equivalent---that is, share the same game form up to relabeling of actions---and show that agents' understanding of equilibrium transfers once they recognize how the actions in these mechanisms map to one another. We then define strategic analogy, a weaker notion that allows actions and types to be remapped, and show that equilibrium understanding transfers once agents recognize how the actions and types in these mechanisms relate. Applications include single-item auctions, scoring auctions, and nonlinear pricing with capacity constraints.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2026

Screening with tolls and damages

A welfare-maximizing designer allocates two kinds of goods using two screening instruments: tolls, whose costs are separable from agents' values, and damages, which are more costly to agents whose values for the goods are higher. Tolls include payments, queues, and administrative burdens; damages include quality reductions, delays, and restrictions on use. When agents differ only in their value for one kind of good, the designer can never gain from damaging it. However, when valuations for both kinds of goods are heterogeneous, damages can be useful. I provide conditions under which the optimal mechanism includes a damaged option, as well as conditions under which it does not; in the latter case, the optimal mechanism posts ``market-clearing'' tolls for each good. Intuitively, damages are more likely to be optimal when values for the two kinds of goods are positively affiliated, and less likely when high value for one good predicts low value for the other.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2026

Ironing Without Concavification

I propose a new approach to solving standard screening problems when the monotonicity constraint binds. A simple geometric argument shows that when virtual values are quasi-concave, the optimal allocation can be found by appropriately truncating the solution to the relaxed problem. I provide an algorithm for finding this optimal truncation when virtual values are concave.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2025

Equitable screening

A designer distributes goods while considering the perceived equity of the resulting allocation. Such concerns are modeled through an equity constraint requiring that equally deserving agents receive equal allocations. I ask what forms of screening are compatible with equity and show that while the designer cannot equitably screen with a single instrument (e.g., payments or ordeals), combining multiple instruments, which on their own favor different groups, allows her to screen while still producing an equitable allocation.

econ.TH↗