arXiv subjects

Genjie Qin

Publications and source records attributed to Genjie Qin.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Mechanism Design for Bridge Location with Optional Preferences

We study the bridge location problem with optional preferences, where two separated regions each contain one prelocated facility. Each agent has a private location and a private preference specifying a nonempty subset of the two facilities in which she is interested. Her individual cost is measured by one of three natural variants: the maximum, the sum, or the minimum of her distances to the facilities in which she is interested. The social planner must design deterministic strategyproof mechanisms that elicit truthful reports, choose the location of a connecting bridge, and approximately minimize either the social cost or the maximum cost. Our main results are as follows. For the social cost objective, we design optimal mechanisms for the max-variant and sum-variant costs, and provide a 3-approximation mechanism for the min-variant cost, and establish a lower bound of 2 for the min-variant. For the maximum cost objective, we give 5/3-approximation mechanisms for the max-variant and sum-variant costs, and a 3-approximation mechanism for the min-variant cost; we also prove a common lower bound of 5/3 that applies to all three cost variants under the maximum cost objective.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Mechanism Design for Facility Location Games Under a Prelocated Facility

We study the problem of locating a new homogeneous facility under a prelocated facility. Here, a set of $n$ agents is located on a real line or a circle, each of whom has her location as private information, and her cost is the (expected) distance from her location to the nearest facility. Our goal is to design mechanisms which can approximately minimize the maximum cost or the social cost while eliciting agents' private information truthfully (i.e., strategy-proof). Based on real-life scenarios, we consider the problem in two settings: the general setting where each agent can be located at both sides of the prelocated facility, and the special setting where all the agents are located at the same side of the prelocated facility. For agents on a line, in the general setting, we design the best possible deterministic strategy-proof mechanism with $2$-approximation and provide a lower bound of $1.5-ε\textbf{ }(ε>0)$ for any randomized strategy-proof mechanism under the maximum cost objective. For the social cost, we obtain an upper bound of $n$ for deterministic strategy-proof mechanisms and lower bounds of $1.5$ and $1.0425$ for any deterministic strategy-proof mechanism and any randomized strategy-proof mechanism, respectively. In the special setting, we further provide a randomized strategy-proof $5/3$-approximation mechanism for the maximum cost and a deterministic strategy-proof $(n-1)$-approximation mechanism for the social cost. For agents on a circle, we provide a deterministic strategy-proof 2-approximation mechanism under the maximum cost objective.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Fairness--Stability Trade-offs in Many-to-One Matching

We study the trade-off between firm-side fairness and coalition stability in many-to-one matching markets with transferable payments. For a fixed matching $X$, we characterize the largest supportable core factor by a bottleneck financing problem: $α(X)=1/Φ(X)$, where $Φ(X)=\min_{z\ge0}\max_i R_i(X,z)$. This yields a polynomial-time linear program and local sensitivity formulas for one-worker reallocations. We then develop a maximum-edge round algorithm and a broader class of mutual-top safe choices. Every safe execution is EF1 and, with $t=δ(A)$ denoting the minimum positive-edge quality, guarantees $α(X)\ge\max\{t,1/[m-(m-1)t]\}$ and $SW(X)/OPT\geq t+(1-t)/m$. These bounds give finite-firm lower and upper bounds for the EF1--core minimax frontier, with exact results for two firms and for three firms when $δ\le1/2$; as the number of firms grows, the tight scale-free stability rate is $δ$. We also extend the financing formulation to stronger $EFX^+$ fairness and capacity-constrained markets.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Mechanism Design for Locating a Bridge Between Regions with Prelocated Facilities

In many urban planning projects, social planners require the construction of a bridge to connect two regions separated by obstacles such as rivers or highways. This paper studies the mechanism design problem for locating a bridge between two separate regions, each of which has been equipped with a facility. There are a set of agents located in each region and each agent has her location as private information. Once the bridge is built, the agents will go to the nearest facility to receive service and each agent's cost is the distance from her location to the nearest prelocated facility via the bridge. We investigate social cost and maximum cost under strategyproof (SP) mechanisms, with stronger notions of group-strategyproof (GSP) and strong group-strategyproof (SGSP). For the maximum cost objective, we characterize the optimal solution and show that it satisfies GSP. Under the SGSP, we propose a deterministic 3-approximation mechanism and a randomized 2-approximation mechanism, while proving a lower bound of 2 for any deterministic SGSP mechanism. For the social cost objective, we present a deterministic 3-approximation mechanism and a randomized 2-approximation mechanism that satisfy GSP. We establish lower bounds of 2 and 1.1 for deterministic and randomized SP mechanisms, respectively. Under the SGSP, the lower bound for deterministic mechanisms increases to 1 + min{m, n}, and we provide a (1 + 2 min{m, n})-approximation mechanism. For randomized mechanisms, the lower bound remains 1.1, while an upper bound of (1 + 2mn/(m+n)) is achieved.

cs.GT↗