arXiv subjects

Hanping Xu

Publications and source records attributed to Hanping Xu.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Monotone Equilibrium, Admissibility and Perfection

This paper studies monotone equilibrium, admissibility, and perfection in Bayesian games. Athey (2001), McAdams (2003), and Reny (2011) prove existence of pure-strategy monotone equilibria under single-crossing and quasi-supermodularity. We construct a counterexample satisfying these assumptions but with no admissible monotone equilibrium, showing these results cannot generally be strengthened without further conditions. To address this existence problem, we introduce perfect monotone equilibrium, combining monotonicity with trembling-hand robustness. We show that stronger assumptions such as increasing differences and supermodularity ensure existence of perfect (and hence admissible) monotone equilibria. We also demonstrate the practical relevance of our results through auctions and Bertrand competitions.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2024

Equilibrium convergence in large games

This paper presents a general closed graph property for (randomized strategy) Nash equilibrium correspondence in large games. In particular, we show that for any large game with a convergent sequence of fiinite-player games, the limit of any convergent sequence of Nash equilibria of the corresponding finite-player games can be induced by a Nash equilibrium of the large game. Such a result goes beyond earlier results on the closed graph property for pure strategy Nash equilibrium correspondence in large games in multiple aspects. An application on equilibrium selection in large games is also presented.

math.OC↗

arXiv2019

Does randomization matter in dynamic games?

This paper investigates mixed strategies in dynamic games with perfect information. We present an example to show that a player may obtain higher payoff by playing mixed strategy. By contrast, the main result of the paper shows that every two-player dynamic zero-sum game with nature has the no-mixing property, which implies that mixed strategy is useless in this most classical class of games. As for applications, we show the existence of pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria in two-player zero-sum games with nature. Based on the main result, we also prove the existence of a universal subgame-perfect equilibrium that can induce all the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria in such games. A generalization of the main result for multiple players and some further results are also discussed.

math.OC↗