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Ivan Homoliak

Publications and source records attributed to Ivan Homoliak.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Proof-of-Social-Capital: A Consensus Protocol Replacing Stake for Social Capital

Consensus protocols used today in blockchains often rely on computational power or financial stakes - scarce resources. We propose a novel protocol using social capital - trust and influence from social interactions - as a non-transferable staking mechanism to ensure fairness and decentralization. The methodology integrates zero-knowledge proofs, verifiable credentials, a Whisk-like leader election, and an incentive scheme to prevent Sybil attacks and encourage engagement. The theoretical framework would enhance privacy and equity, though unresolved issues like off-chain bribery require further research. This work offers a new model aligned with modern social media behavior and lifestyle, with applications in finance, providing a practical insight for decentralized system development.

cs.CR

SNARKChain: Proof-of-Useful-Work Blockchain Consensus with General-Purpose SNARK Marketplace

Proof of Work (PoW) is widely regarded as the most secure permissionless blockchain consensus protocol. However, its reliance on computationally intensive yet externally useless puzzles results in excessive electric energy wasting. To alleviate this, Proof of Useful Work (PoUW) has been explored as an alternative to secure blockchain platforms while also producing real-world value. Despite this promise, existing PoUW proposals often fail to embed the integrity of the chain and the identity of the miner into the puzzle solutions, not meeting the necessary requirements for PoW and thus rendering them vulnerable. In this work, we propose a PoUW consensus protocol that computes client-outsourced SNARK proofs as a byproduct, which are simultaneously used to secure the consensus protocol. We further leverage this mechanism to design a decentralized marketplace for outsourcing SNARK proof generation, which is, to the best of our knowledge, the first such marketplace operating at the consensus layer while meeting all necessary properties of PoW.

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Selfish Mining in Multi-Attacker Scenarios: An Empirical Evaluation of Nakamoto, Fruitchain, and Strongchain

The aim of this work is to enhance blockchain security by deepening the understanding of selfish mining attacks in various consensus protocols, especially the ones that have the potential to mitigate selfish mining. Previous research was mainly focused on a particular protocol with a single selfish miner, while only limited studies have been conducted on two or more attackers. To address this gap, we proposed a stochastic simulation framework that enables analysis of selfish mining with multiple attackers across various consensus protocols. We created the model of Proof-of-Work (PoW) Nakamoto consensus (serving as the baseline) as well as models of two additional consensus protocols designed to mitigate selfish mining: Fruitchain and Strongchain. Using our framework, thresholds reported in the literature were verified, and several novel thresholds were discovered for 2 and more attackers. We made the source code of our framework available, enabling researchers to evaluate any newly added protocol with one or more selfish miners and cross-compare it with already modeled protocols.

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AQUAREUM: Non-Equivocating Censorship-Evident Centralized Ledger with EVM-Based Verifiable Execution using Trusted Computing and Blockchain

Distributed ledger systems (i.e., blockchains) have received a lot of attention. They promise to enable mutually untrusted participants to execute transactions while providing the immutability of the data and censorship resistance. Although decentralized ledgers are a disruptive innovation, as of today, they suffer from scalability, privacy, or governance issues. Therefore, they are inapplicable for many important use cases, where interestingly, centralized ledger systems might gain adoption. Unfortunately, centralized ledgers have also drawbacks, e.g., a lack of efficient verifiability or a higher risk of censorship and equivocation. In this paper, we present AQUAREUM, a novel framework for centralized ledgers removing their main limitations. By a unique combination of a trusted execution environment (TEE) with a public blockchain, AQUAREUM provides publicly verifiable non-equivocating censorship-evident private and high-performance ledgers. AQUAREUM is integrated with a Turing-complete virtual machine (e.g., EVM), allowing arbitrary transaction processing logic, such as transfers or client-specified smart contracts. AQUAREUM is fully implemented and can process over 400 transactions per second on a commodity PC. Furthermore, we modeled AQUAREUM using the Universal Composability framework and proved its security.

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Analysing Multidisciplinary Approaches to Fight Large-Scale Digital Influence Operations

Crime as a Service (CaaS) has evolved from isolated criminal incidents to a broad spectrum of illicit activities, including social media manipulation, foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), and the sale of disinformation toolkits. This article analyses how threat actors exploit specialised infrastructures ranging from proxy and VPN services to AI-driven generative models to orchestrate large-scale opinion manipulation. Moreover, it discusses how these malicious operations monetise the virality of social networks, weaponise dual-use technologies, and leverage user biases to amplify polarising narratives. In parallel, it examines key strategies for detecting, attributing, and mitigating such campaigns by highlighting the roles of blockchain-based content verification, advanced cryptographic proofs, and cross-disciplinary collaboration. Finally, the article highlights that countering disinformation demands an integrated framework that combines legal, technological, and societal efforts to address a rapidly adapting and borderless threat

cs.CY

Towards Secure Decentralized Applications and Consensus Protocols in Blockchains (on Selfish Mining, Undercutting Attacks, DAG-Based Blockchains, E-Voting, Cryptocurrency Wallets, Secure-Logging, and CBDC)

With the rise of cryptocurrencies, many new applications built on decentralized blockchains have emerged. Blockchains are full-stack distributed systems where multiple sub-systems interact. While many deployed blockchains and decentralized applications need better scalability and performance, security is also critical. Due to their complexity, assessing blockchain and DAPP security requires a more holistic view than for traditional distributed or centralized systems. In this thesis, we summarize our contributions to blockchain and decentralized application security. We propose a security reference architecture to support standardized vulnerability and threat analysis. We study consensus security in single-chain Proof-of-Work blockchains, including resistance to selfish mining, undercutting, and greedy transaction selection, as well as related issues in DAG-based systems. We contribute to wallet security with a new classification of authentication schemes and a two-factor method based on One-Time Passwords. We advance e-voting with a practical boardroom voting protocol, extend it to a scalable version for millions of participants while preserving security and privacy, and introduce a repetitive voting framework that enables vote changes between elections while avoiding peak-end effects. Finally, we improve secure logging using blockchains and trusted computing through a centralized ledger that guarantees non-equivocation, integrity, and censorship evidence, then build on it to propose an interoperability protocol for central bank digital currencies that ensures atomic transfers.

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PoS-CoPOR: Proof-of-Stake Consensus Protocol with Native Onion Routing Providing Scalability and DoS-Resistance

Proof-of-Stake (PoS) consensus protocols often face a trade-off between performance and security. Protocols that pre-elect leaders for subsequent rounds are vulnerable to Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, which can disrupt the network and compromise liveness. In this work, we present PoS-CoPOR, a single-chain PoS consensus protocol that mitigates this vulnerability by integrating a native onion routing mechanism into the consensus protocol itself. PoS-CoPOR combines stake-weighted probabilistic leader election with an anonymization layer that conceals the network identity of the next block proposer. This approach prevents targeted DoS attacks on leaders before they produce a block, thus enhancing network resilience. We implemented and evaluated PoS-CoPOR, demonstrating its ability to achieve a throughput of up to 110 tx/s with 6 nodes, even with the overhead of the anonymization layer. The results show that native anonymization can provide robust DoS resistance with only a modest impact on performance, offering a solution to build secure and scalable PoS blockchains.

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Secret Leader Election in Ethereum PoS: An Empirical Security Analysis of Whisk and Homomorphic Sortition under DoS on the Leader and Censorship Attacks

Proposer anonymity in Proof-of-Stake (PoS) blockchains is a critical concern due to the risk of targeted attacks such as malicious denial-of-service (DoS) and censorship attacks. While several Secret Single Leader Election (SSLE) mechanisms have been proposed to address these threats, their practical impact and trade-offs remain insufficiently explored. In this work, we present a unified experimental framework for evaluating SSLE mechanisms under adversarial conditions, grounded in a simplified yet representative model of Ethereum's PoS consensus layer. The framework includes configurable adversaries capable of launching targeted DoS and censorship attacks, including coordinated strategies that simultaneously compromise groups of validators. We simulate and compare key protection mechanisms - Whisk, and homomorphic sortition. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first comparative study to examine adversarial DoS scenarios involving multiple attackers under diverse protection mechanisms. Our results show that while both designs offer strong protection against targeted DoS attacks on the leader, neither defends effectively against coordinated attacks on validator groups. Moreover, Whisk simplifies a DoS attack by narrowing the target set from all validators to a smaller list of known candidates. Homomorphic sortition, despite its theoretical strength, remains impractical due to the complexity of cryptographic operations over large validator sets.

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Generative Adversarial Networks Applied for Privacy Preservation in Biometric-Based Authentication and Identification

Biometric-based authentication systems are getting broadly adopted in many areas. However, these systems do not allow participating users to influence the way their data is used. Furthermore, the data may leak and can be misused without the users' knowledge. In this paper, we propose a new authentication method that preserves the privacy of individuals and is based on a generative adversarial network (GAN). Concretely, we suggest using the GAN for translating images of faces to a visually private domain (e.g., flowers or shoes). Classifiers, which are used for authentication purposes, are then trained on the images from the visually private domain. Based on our experiments, the method is robust against attacks and still provides meaningful utility.

cs.CV

VoteMate: A Decentralized Application for Scalable Electronic Voting on EVM-Based Blockchain

Voting is a cornerstone of democracy, allowing citizens to express their will and make collective decisions. With advancing technology, online voting is gaining popularity as it enables voting from anywhere with Internet access, eliminating the need for printed ballots or polling stations. However, despite its benefits, online voting carries significant risks. A single vulnerability could be exploited to manipulate elections on a large scale. Centralized systems can be secure but may lack transparency and confidentiality, especially if those in power manipulate them. Blockchain-based voting offers a transparent, tamper-resistant alternative with end-to-end verifiability and strong security. Adding cryptographic layers can also ensure voter confidentiality.

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SoK: A Survey of Mixing Techniques and Mixers for Cryptocurrencies

Blockchain technologies have overturned the digital finance industry by introducing a decentralized pseudonymous means of monetary transfer. The pseudonymous nature introduced privacy concerns, enabling various deanonymization techniques, which in turn spurred development of stronger anonymity-preserving measures. The purpose of this paper is to create a comprehensive survey of mixing techniques and implementations within the vast ecosystem surrounding anonymization tools and mechanisms available in blockchain cryptocurrencies. First, we begin by reviewing classifications used in the field. Then, we survey various obfuscation techniques, helping to delve into actual implementations and combinations of these techniques. Next, we identify the positive and negative attributes of the approaches and implementations included. Moreover, we examine the implications of anonymization tools for user privacy, including their effectiveness in preserving anonymity and susceptibility to attacks and vulnerabilities. Finally, we discuss the challenges and innovations for extending mixing services into the realm of smart contracts or cross-chain space.

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FeatherWallet: A Lightweight Mobile Cryptocurrency Wallet Using zk-SNARKs

Traditionally, mobile wallets rely on a trusted server that provides them with a current view of the blockchain, and thus, these wallets do not need to validate the header chain or transaction inclusion themselves. If a mobile wallet were to validate a header chain and inclusion of its transactions, it would require significant storage and performance overhead, which is challenging and expensive to ensure on resource-limited devices, such as smartphones. Moreover, such an overhead would be multiplied by the number of cryptocurrencies the user holds in a wallet. Therefore, we introduce a novel approach, called FeatherWallet, to mobile wallet synchronization designed to eliminate trust in a server while providing efficient utilization of resources. Our approach addresses the challenges associated with storage and bandwidth requirements by off-chaining validation of header chains using SNARK-based proofs of chain extension, which are verified by a smart contract. This offers us a means of storing checkpoints in header chains of multiple blockchains. The key feature of our approach is the ability of mobile clients to update their partial local header chains using checkpoints derived from the proof verification results stored in the smart contract. In the evaluation, we created zk-SNARK proofs for the 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, and 64 headers within our trustless off-chain service. For 64-header proofs, the off-chain service producing proofs requires at least 40 GB of RAM, while the minimal gas consumption is achieved for 12 proofs bundled in a single transaction. We achieved a 20-fold reduction in storage overhead for a mobile client in contrast to traditional SPV clients. Although we have developed a proof-of-concept for PoW blockchains, the whole approach can be extended in principle to other consensus mechanisms, e.g., PoS.

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Enhancing Security of AI-Based Code Synthesis with GitHub Copilot via Cheap and Efficient Prompt-Engineering

AI assistants for coding are on the rise. However one of the reasons developers and companies avoid harnessing their full potential is the questionable security of the generated code. This paper first reviews the current state-of-the-art and identifies areas for improvement on this issue. Then, we propose a systematic approach based on prompt-altering methods to achieve better code security of (even proprietary black-box) AI-based code generators such as GitHub Copilot, while minimizing the complexity of the application from the user point-of-view, the computational resources, and operational costs. In sum, we propose and evaluate three prompt altering methods: (1) scenario-specific, (2) iterative, and (3) general clause, while we discuss their combination. Contrary to the audit of code security, the latter two of the proposed methods require no expert knowledge from the user. We assess the effectiveness of the proposed methods on the GitHub Copilot using the OpenVPN project in realistic scenarios, and we demonstrate that the proposed methods reduce the number of insecure generated code samples by up to 16\% and increase the number of secure code by up to 8\%. Since our approach does not require access to the internals of the AI models, it can be in general applied to any AI-based code synthesizer, not only GitHub Copilot.

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SoK: Cryptocurrency Wallets -- A Security Review and Classification based on Authentication Factors

In this work, we review existing cryptocurrency wallet solutions with regard to authentication methods and factors from the user's point of view. In particular, we distinguish between authentication factors that are verified against the blockchain and the ones verified locally (or against a centralized party). With this in mind, we define notions for $k-factor$ authentication against the blockchain and $k-factor$ authentication against the authentication factors. Based on these notions, we propose a classification of authentication schemes. We extend our classification to accommodate the threshold signatures and signing transactions by centralized parties (such as exchanges or co-signing services). Finally, we apply our classification to existing wallet solutions, which we compare based on various security and key-management features.

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SmartOTPs: An Air-Gapped 2-Factor Authentication for Smart-Contract Wallets (Extended Version)

With the recent rise of cryptocurrencies' popularity, the security and management of crypto-tokens have become critical. We have witnessed many attacks on users and providers, which have resulted in significant financial losses. To remedy these issues, several wallet solutions have been proposed. However, these solutions often lack either essential security features, usability, or do not allow users to customize their spending rules. In this paper, we propose SmartOTPs, a smart-contract wallet framework that gives a flexible, usable, and secure way of managing crypto-tokens in a self-sovereign fashion. The proposed framework consists of four components (i.e., an authenticator, a client, a hardware wallet, and a smart contract), and it provides 2-factor authentication (2FA) performed in two stages of interaction with the blockchain. To the best of our knowledge, our framework is the first one that utilizes one-time passwords (OTPs) in the setting of the public blockchain. In SmartOTPs, the OTPs are aggregated by a Merkle tree and hash chains whereby for each authentication only a short OTP (e.g., 16B-long) is transferred from the authenticator to the client. Such a novel setting enables us to make a fully air-gapped authenticator by utilizing small QR codes or a few mnemonic words, while additionally offering resilience against quantum cryptanalysis. We have made a proof-of-concept based on the Ethereum platform. Our cost analysis shows that the average cost of a transfer operation is comparable to existing 2FA solutions using smart contracts with multi-signatures.

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DAG-Sword: A Simulator of Large-Scale Network Topologies for DAG-Oriented Proof-of-Work Blockchains

The blockchain brought interesting properties for many practical applications. However, some properties, such as the transaction processing throughput remained limited, especially in Proof-of-Work blockchains. Therefore, several promising directions, such as sharding designs and DAG-based protocols emerged. In this paper, we focus on DAG-based consensus protocols and present a discrete-event simulator for them. Our simulator can simulate realistic blockchain networks created from data of a Bitcoin network, while its network configuration and topology can be customized. The simulated network consists of honest and malicious miners. Malicious miners do not make any attack on consensus itself. Instead, they use a different transaction selection strategy than honest miners (who select transactions randomly) with the intention to earn unfairly more profits than honest miners at the cost of downgrading the protocol performance by duplicate transactions. As a consequence, this harms the performance of some DAG-based protocols (e.g., PHANTOM and GHOSTDAG) in terms of transaction processing throughput, which we demonstrate in our experiments and extend the results of the related work that contains a small-scale network of 10 nodes by the results obtained on a large-scale network with 7000 nodes. Next, we empirically compare different algorithms for the mempool structure, and we propose a composite mempool structure that is memory-efficient and thus convenient for simulations of resource-demanding large-scale networks.

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Always on Voting: A Framework for Repetitive Voting on the Blockchain

Elections repeat commonly after a fixed time interval, ranging from months to years. This results in limitations on governance since elected candidates or policies are difficult to remove before the next elections, if needed, and allowed by the corresponding law. Participants may decide (through a public deliberation) to change their choices but have no opportunity to vote for these choices before the next elections. Another issue is the peak-end effect, where the judgment of voters is based on how they felt a short time before the elections. To address these issues, we propose Always on Voting (AoV) -- a repetitive voting framework that allows participants to vote and change elected candidates or policies without waiting for the next elections. Participants are permitted to privately change their vote at any point in time, while the effect of their change is manifested at the end of each epoch, whose duration is shorter than the time between two main elections. To thwart the problem of peak-end effect in epochs, the ends of epochs are randomized and made unpredictable, while preserved within soft bounds. These goals are achieved using the synergy between a Bitcoin puzzle oracle, verifiable delay function, and smart contracts.

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Incentive Attacks on DAG-Based Blockchains with Random Transaction Selection

Several blockchain consensus protocols proposed to use of Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) to solve the limited processing throughput of traditional single-chain Proof-of-Work (PoW) blockchains. Many such protocols utilize a random transaction selection (RTS) strategy (e.g., PHANTOM, GHOSTDAG, SPECTRE, Inclusive, and Prism) to avoid transaction duplicates across parallel blocks in DAG and thus maximize the network throughput. However, previous research has not rigorously examined incentive-oriented greedy behaviors when transaction selection deviates from the protocol. In this work, we first perform a generic game-theoretic analysis abstracting several DAG-based blockchain protocols that use the RTS strategy, and we prove that such a strategy does not constitute a Nash equilibrium, which is contradictory to the proof in the Inclusive paper. Next, we develop a blockchain simulator that extends existing open-source tools to support multiple chains and explore incentive-based deviations from the protocol. We perform simulations with ten miners to confirm our conclusion from the game-theoretic analysis. The simulations confirm that greedy actors who do not follow the RTS strategy can profit more than honest miners and harm the processing throughput of the protocol because duplicate transactions are included in more than one block of different chains. We show that this effect is indirectly proportional to the network propagation delay. Finally, we show that greedy miners are incentivized to form a shared mining pool to increase their profits. This undermines the decentralization and degrades the design of the protocols in question. To further support our claims, we execute more complex experiments on a realistic Bitcoin-like network with more than 7000 nodes.

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