Search arXiv⌕ Search

arXiv subjects

Juraj Mariani

Publications and source records attributed to Juraj Mariani.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

SoK: Cryptocurrency Mixing and Anonymity - Architectures, Threat Models, Operational Aspects and Security

Public blockchains record transaction histories that enable address clustering, taint analysis, and cross-service attribution, thereby motivating the development of mixers and privacy layers. Our work presents a structured scoping review of 22 representative systems, defining a common unlinkability objective and five adversary archetypes. We evaluate these systems against a taxonomy of attack surfaces, including chain analysis, timing inference, custodial compromise, coordination abuse, network metadata, and trusted execution compromise. While nominal anonymity-set size and cryptographic strength characterize privacy in theory, effective anonymity in practice depends on transaction denominations, cover traffic, relayer behavior, and compliance-interface design. Distinguishing nominal from effective anonymity, we derive four core lessons: (1) Privacy is strongest when integrated into everyday transactions, since standalone mixing creates an easily profiled user subset; (2) Trust points, including operators, peer quorums, and hardware enclaves, must be explicit so users know who can break privacy; (3) Network metadata, including gas funding and timing, must be treated formally as protocol data in privacy evaluations; and (4) Compliance should use auditable cryptographic predicates for selective disclosure rather than broad operator discretion. Ultimately, our systematization clarifies the strengths, failures, and future requirements of blockchain privacy architectures.

cs.CR↗

Proof-of-Social-Capital: A Consensus Protocol Replacing Stake for Social Capital

Consensus protocols used today in blockchains often rely on computational power or financial stakes - scarce resources. We propose a novel protocol using social capital - trust and influence from social interactions - as a non-transferable staking mechanism to ensure fairness and decentralization. The methodology integrates zero-knowledge proofs, verifiable credentials, a Whisk-like leader election, and an incentive scheme to prevent Sybil attacks and encourage engagement. The theoretical framework would enhance privacy and equity, though unresolved issues like off-chain bribery require further research. This work offers a new model aligned with modern social media behavior and lifestyle, with applications in finance, providing a practical insight for decentralized system development.

cs.CR↗