arXiv subjects

Kyle Polley

Publications and source records attributed to Kyle Polley.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

PII-TRACE: A Benchmark for Context-Aware PII Detection in Multi-Turn LLM Conversations

LLM assistants and agentic systems log long multi-turn conversations. AI providers often scan these conversations for Personally Identifiable Information (PII) and mask the PII before storing or processing conversation data. Yet most PII detectors and benchmarks target self-contained records rather than cross-turn evaluation. To evaluate PII detection across turns in multi-turn conversations, we introduce PII-TRACE (Tracing Recurring PII Across Conversational Exchanges), to our knowledge the first PII benchmark to assess whether detectors identify PII in conversational contexts and cover every mention of a recurring identifier across turns. PII-TRACE contains 13,148 synthetic multi-turn dialogues in 13 languages with character-level spans and identifier clusters. Across eleven baselines, including frontier LLMs, no detector achieves full entity-level coverage without substantial false positives on PII-free conversations, and single-pass reading loses a third of the gold characters on long dialogues. To close this gap, we introduce PII-Tracer, a compact 0.6B-parameter detector trained with conversation-level supervision. PII-Tracer attains the highest entity-level coverage of any system we evaluate and also performs strongly on standard single-record benchmarks.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2026

BrowseSafe: Understanding and Preventing Prompt Injection Within AI Browser Agents

The integration of artificial intelligence (AI) agents into web browsers introduces security challenges that go beyond traditional web application threat models. Prior work has identified prompt injection as a new attack vector for web agents, yet the resulting impact within real-world environments remains insufficiently understood. In this work, we examine the landscape of prompt injection attacks and synthesize a benchmark of attacks embedded in realistic HTML payloads. Our benchmark goes beyond prior work by emphasizing injections that can influence real-world actions rather than mere text outputs, and by presenting attack payloads with complexity and distractor frequency similar to what real-world agents encounter. We leverage this benchmark to conduct a comprehensive empirical evaluation of existing defenses, assessing their effectiveness across a suite of frontier AI models. We propose a multi-layered defense strategy comprising both architectural and model-based defenses to protect against evolving prompt injection attacks. Our work offers a blueprint for designing practical, secure web agents through a defense-in-depth approach.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

Security Considerations for Artificial Intelligence Agents

This article, a lightly adapted version of Perplexity's response to NIST/CAISI Request for Information 2025-0035, details our observations and recommendations concerning the security of frontier AI agents. These insights are informed by Perplexity's experience operating general-purpose agentic systems used by millions of users and thousands of enterprises in both controlled and open-world environments. Agent architectures change core assumptions around code-data separation, authority boundaries, and execution predictability, creating new confidentiality, integrity, and availability failure modes. We map principal attack surfaces across tools, connectors, hosting boundaries, and multi-agent coordination, with particular emphasis on indirect prompt injection, confused-deputy behavior, and cascading failures in long-running workflows. We then assess current defenses as a layered stack: input-level and model-level mitigations, sandboxed execution, and deterministic policy enforcement for high-consequence actions. Finally, we identify standards and research gaps, including adaptive security benchmarks, policy models for delegation and privilege control, and guidance for secure multi-agent system design aligned with NIST risk management principles.

cs.LG↗