arXiv subjects

Luca Collini

Publications and source records attributed to Luca Collini.

13 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

VeriInteresting: An Empirical Study of Model Prompt Interactions in Verilog Code Generation

Rapid advances in language models (LMs) have created new opportunities for automated code generation while complicating trade-offs between model characteristics and prompt design choices. In this work, we provide an empirical map of recent trends in LMs for Verilog code generation, focusing on interactions among model reasoning, specialization, and prompt engineering strategies. We evaluate a diverse set of small and large LMs, including general-purpose, reasoning, and domain-specific variants. Our experiments use a controlled factorial design spanning benchmark prompts, structured outputs, prompt rewriting, chain-of-thought reasoning, in-context learning, and evolutionary prompt optimization via Genetic-Pareto. Across two Verilog benchmarks, we identify patterns in how model classes respond to structured prompts and optimization, and we document which trends generalize across LMs and benchmarks versus those that are specific to particular model-prompt combinations.

cs.AR↗

arXiv2025

ARIANNA: An Automatic Design Flow for Fabric Customization and eFPGA Redaction

In the modern global Integrated Circuit (IC) supply chain, protecting intellectual property (IP) is a complex challenge, and balancing IP loss risk and added cost for theft countermeasures is hard to achieve. Using embedded configurable logic allows designers to completely hide the functionality of selected design portions from parties that do not have access to the configuration string (bitstream). However, the design space of redacted solutions is huge, with trade-offs between the portions selected for redaction and the configuration of the configurable embedded logic. We propose ARIANNA, a complete flow that aids the designer in all the stages, from selecting the logic to be hidden to tailoring the bespoke fabrics for the configurable logic used to hide it. We present a security evaluation of the considered fabrics and introduce two heuristics for the novel bespoke fabric flow. We evaluate the heuristics against an exhaustive approach. We also evaluate the complete flow using a selection of benchmarks. Results show that using ARIANNA to customize the redaction fabrics yields up to 3.3x lower overheads and 4x higher eFPGA fabric utilization than a one-fits-all fabric as proposed in prior works.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

MARVEL: Multi-Agent RTL Vulnerability Extraction using Large Language Models

Hardware security verification is a challenging and time-consuming task. Design engineers may use formal verification, linting, and functional simulation tests, coupled with analysis and a deep understanding of the hardware design being inspected. Large Language Models (LLMs) have been used to assist during this task, either directly or in conjunction with existing tools. We improve the state of the art by proposing MARVEL, a multi-agent LLM framework for a unified approach to decision-making, tool use, and reasoning. MARVEL mimics the cognitive process of a designer looking for security vulnerabilities in RTL code. It consists of a supervisor agent that devises the security policy of the system-on-chips (SoCs) using its security documentation. It delegates tasks to validate the security policy to individual executor agents. Each executor agent carries out its assigned task using a particular strategy. Each executor agent may use one or more tools to identify potential security bugs in the design and send the results back to the supervisor agent for further analysis and confirmation. MARVEL includes executor agents that leverage formal tools, linters, simulation tests, LLM-based detection schemes, and static analysis-based checks. We test our approach on a known buggy SoC based on OpenTitan from the Hack@DATE competition. We find that of the 51 issues reported by MARVEL, 19 are valid security vulnerabilities, 14 are concrete warnings, and 18 are hallucinated reports.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

VeriThoughts: Enabling Automated Verilog Code Generation using Reasoning and Formal Verification

This paper introduces VeriThoughts, a novel dataset designed for reasoning-based Verilog code generation. We establish a new benchmark framework grounded in formal verification methods to evaluate the quality and correctness of generated hardware descriptions. Additionally, we present a suite of specialized small-scale models optimized specifically for Verilog generation. Our work addresses the growing need for automated hardware design tools that can produce verifiably correct implementations from high-level specifications, potentially accelerating the hardware development process while maintaining rigorous correctness guarantees. Our code and data are available at \href{https://github.com/wilyub/VeriThoughts}{this URL}.

cs.PL↗

arXiv2025

Can Reasoning Models Reason about Hardware? An Agentic HLS Perspective

Recent Large Language Models (LLMs) such as OpenAI o3-mini and DeepSeek-R1 use enhanced reasoning through Chain-of-Thought (CoT). Their potential in hardware design, which relies on expert-driven iterative optimization, remains unexplored. This paper investigates whether reasoning LLMs can address challenges in High-Level Synthesis (HLS) design space exploration and optimization. During HLS, engineers manually define pragmas/directives to balance performance and resource constraints. We propose an LLM-based optimization agentic framework that automatically restructures code, inserts pragmas, and identifies optimal design points via feedback from HLs tools and access to integer-linear programming (ILP) solvers. Experiments compare reasoning models against conventional LLMs on benchmarks using success rate, efficiency, and design quality (area/latency) metrics, and provide the first-ever glimpse into the CoTs produced by a powerful open-source reasoning model like DeepSeek-R1.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

The Impact of Logic Locking on Confidentiality: An Automated Evaluation

Logic locking secures hardware designs in untrusted foundries by incorporating key-driven gates to obscure the original blueprint. While this method safeguards the integrated circuit from malicious alterations during fabrication, its influence on data confidentiality during runtime has been ignored. In this study, we employ path sensitization to formally examine the impact of logic locking on confidentiality. By applying three representative logic locking mechanisms on open-source cryptographic benchmarks, we utilize an automatic test pattern generation framework to evaluate the effect of locking on cryptographic encryption keys and sensitive data signals. Our analysis reveals that logic locking can inadvertently cause sensitive data leakage when incorrect logic locking keys are used. We show that a single malicious logic locking key can expose over 70% of an encryption key. If an adversary gains control over other inputs, the entire encryption key can be compromised. This research uncovers a significant security vulnerability in logic locking and emphasizes the need for comprehensive security assessments that extend beyond key-recovery attacks.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2024

C2HLSC: Leveraging Large Language Models to Bridge the Software-to-Hardware Design Gap

High-Level Synthesis (HLS) tools offer rapid hardware design from C code, but their compatibility is limited by code constructs. This paper investigates Large Language Models (LLMs) for automatically refactoring C code into HLS-compatible formats. We present a case study using an LLM to rewrite C code for NIST 800-22 randomness tests, a QuickSort algorithm, and AES-128 into HLS-synthesizable C. The LLM iteratively transforms the C code guided by the system prompt and tool's feedback, implementing functions like streaming data and hardware-specific signals. With the hindsight obtained from the case study, we implement a fully automated framework to refactor C code into HLS-compatible formats using LLMs. To tackle complex designs, we implement a preprocessing step that breaks down the hierarchy in order to approach the problem in a divide-and-conquer bottom-up way. We validated our framework on three ciphers, one hash function, five NIST 800-22 randomness tests, and a QuickSort algorithm. Our results show a high success rate on benchmarks that are orders of magnitude more complex than what has been achieved generating Verilog with LLMs.

cs.AR↗

arXiv2024

C2HLSC: Can LLMs Bridge the Software-to-Hardware Design Gap?

High Level Synthesis (HLS) tools offer rapid hardware design from C code, but their compatibility is limited by code constructs. This paper investigates Large Language Models (LLMs) for refactoring C code into HLS-compatible formats. We present several case studies by using an LLM to rewrite C code for NIST 800-22 randomness tests, a QuickSort algorithm and AES-128 into HLS-synthesizable c. The LLM iteratively transforms the C code guided by user prompts, implementing functions like streaming data and hardware-specific signals. This evaluation demonstrates the LLM's potential to assist hardware design refactoring regular C code into HLS synthesizable C code.

cs.AR↗

arXiv2023

ALMOST: Adversarial Learning to Mitigate Oracle-less ML Attacks via Synthesis Tuning

Oracle-less machine learning (ML) attacks have broken various logic locking schemes. Regular synthesis, which is tailored for area-power-delay optimization, yields netlists where key-gate localities are vulnerable to learning. Thus, we call for security-aware logic synthesis. We propose ALMOST, a framework for adversarial learning to mitigate oracle-less ML attacks via synthesis tuning. ALMOST uses a simulated-annealing-based synthesis recipe generator, employing adversarially trained models that can predict state-of-the-art attacks' accuracies over wide ranges of recipes and key-gate localities. Experiments on ISCAS benchmarks confirm the attacks' accuracies drops to around 50\% for ALMOST-synthesized circuits, all while not undermining design optimization.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2022

Don't CWEAT It: Toward CWE Analysis Techniques in Early Stages of Hardware Design

To help prevent hardware security vulnerabilities from propagating to later design stages where fixes are costly, it is crucial to identify security concerns as early as possible, such as in RTL designs. In this work, we investigate the practical implications and feasibility of producing a set of security-specific scanners that operate on Verilog source files. The scanners indicate parts of code that might contain one of a set of MITRE's common weakness enumerations (CWEs). We explore the CWE database to characterize the scope and attributes of the CWEs and identify those that are amenable to static analysis. We prototype scanners and evaluate them on 11 open source designs - 4 system-on-chips (SoC) and 7 processor cores - and explore the nature of identified weaknesses. Our analysis reported 53 potential weaknesses in the OpenPiton SoC used in Hack@DAC-21, 11 of which we confirmed as security concerns.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2022

ALICE: An Automatic Design Flow for eFPGA Redaction

Fabricating an integrated circuit is becoming unaffordable for many semiconductor design houses. Outsourcing the fabrication to a third-party foundry requires methods to protect the intellectual property of the hardware designs. Designers can rely on embedded reconfigurable devices to completely hide the real functionality of selected design portions unless the configuration string (bitstream) is provided. However, selecting such portions and creating the corresponding reconfigurable fabrics are still open problems. We propose ALICE, a design flow that addresses the EDA challenges of this problem. ALICE partitions the RTL modules between one or more reconfigurable fabrics and the rest of the circuit, automating the generation of the corresponding redacted design.

cs.AR↗

arXiv2022

Designing ML-Resilient Locking at Register-Transfer Level

Various logic-locking schemes have been proposed to protect hardware from intellectual property piracy and malicious design modifications. Since traditional locking techniques are applied on the gate-level netlist after logic synthesis, they have no semantic knowledge of the design function. Data-driven, machine-learning (ML) attacks can uncover the design flaws within gate-level locking. Recent proposals on register-transfer level (RTL) locking have access to semantic hardware information. We investigate the resilience of ASSURE, a state-of-the-art RTL locking method, against ML attacks. We used the lessons learned to derive two ML-resilient RTL locking schemes built to reinforce ASSURE locking. We developed ML-driven security metrics to evaluate the schemes against an RTL adaptation of the state-of-the-art, ML-based SnapShot attack.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2021

Optimizing the Use of Behavioral Locking for High-Level Synthesis

The globalization of the electronics supply chain requires effective methods to thwart reverse engineering and IP theft. Logic locking is a promising solution, but there are many open concerns. First, even when applied at a higher level of abstraction, locking may result in significant overhead without improving the security metric. Second, optimizing a security metric is application-dependent and designers must evaluate and compare alternative solutions. We propose a meta-framework to optimize the use of behavioral locking during the high-level synthesis (HLS) of IP cores. Our method operates on chip's specification (before HLS) and it is compatible with all HLS tools, complementing industrial EDA flows. Our meta-framework supports different strategies to explore the design space and to select points to be locked automatically. We evaluated our method on the optimization of differential entropy, achieving better results than random or topological locking: 1) we always identify a valid solution that optimizes the security metric, while topological and random locking can generate unfeasible solutions; 2) we minimize the number of bits used for locking up to more than 90% (requiring smaller tamper-proof memories); 3) we make better use of hardware resources since we obtain similar overheads but with higher security metric.

cs.AR↗