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Martin Van der Linden

Publications and source records attributed to Martin Van der Linden.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Incontestable Assignments

We study an information-based weakening of stability for school choice, using the evidence students may invoke in appeals. The model permits partial information about schools' choice functions and the realized assignment. A student has a legitimate complaint if, in every compatible state, she can block with some more-preferred school, and an assignment is incontestable if no student has such a complaint. We characterize legitimate complaints using an ex-post safety-set. For school-side information rules, under which the only admissible assignment-side information is the student's own assignment and all interim-compatible school-side states are preserved, incontestability is equivalent to respecting interim safety-sets. Stable mechanisms and Top Trading Cycles with responsive priorities are incontestable for every such rule. Pareto improvements preserve this robustness. When schools' choice functions are path-independent, all mechanisms that are incontestable for every school-side information rule, are non-wasteful, and guarantee group protection give each student the same attainable set conditional on her preferences and interim information.

econ.TH↗

Exclusion of Extreme Jurors and Minority Representation: The Effect of Jury Selection Procedures

We compare two jury selection procedures meant to safeguard against the inclusion of biased jurors that are perceived as causing minorities to be under-represented. The Strike and Replace procedure presents potential jurors one-by-one to the parties, while the Struck procedure presents all potential jurors before the parties exercise their challenges. Struck more effectively excludes extreme jurors but leads to a worse representation of minorities. The advantage of Struck in terms of excluding extremes is sizable in a wide range of cases. In contrast, Strike and Replace better represents minorities only if the minority and majority are polarized. Results are robust to assuming the parties statistically discriminate against jurors based on group identity.

econ.GN↗

Betting and Belief: Prediction Markets and Attribution of Climate Change

Despite much scientific evidence, a large fraction of the American public doubts that greenhouse gases are causing global warming. We present a simulation model as a computational test-bed for climate prediction markets. Traders adapt their beliefs about future temperatures based on the profits of other traders in their social network. We simulate two alternative climate futures, in which global temperatures are primarily driven either by carbon dioxide or by solar irradiance. These represent, respectively, the scientific consensus and a hypothesis advanced by prominent skeptics. We conduct sensitivity analyses to determine how a variety of factors describing both the market and the physical climate may affect traders' beliefs about the cause of global climate change. Market participation causes most traders to converge quickly toward believing the "true" climate model, suggesting that a climate market could be useful for building public consensus.

cs.MA↗