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Matteo Castiglioni

Publications and source records attributed to Matteo Castiglioni.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Optimal Regret for Profit Maximization in Bilateral Trade

Learning to profit from trade requires learning both sides of a market: what a seller is willing to accept and what a buyer is willing to pay. We study repeated bilateral trade, where an intermediary posts a purchase price to a seller and a sale price to a buyer whose valuations are drawn from an unknown joint distribution. Trade occurs only if both parties accept their respective prices, in which case the intermediary earns the difference between the two prices. The intermediary observes only whether trade occurs, without observing either valuation. We show that learning both sides of the market is no harder, in terms of regret, than learning just one. Specifically, we design an algorithm achieving regret $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{2/3})$ against the best fixed pair of prices, matching, up to logarithmic factors, the classical lower bound for one-dimensional dynamic pricing. Our result shows that the classical one-dimensional regret rate survives the transition to two dimensions, raising the question of whether this absence of a curse of dimensionality extends to arbitrarily high dimensions.

cs.GT↗

Toward Optimal Regret in Robust Pricing: Decoupling Corruption and Time

We design the first regret guarantees for robust dynamic pricing that decouple the dependence on the corruption $C$ and the time horizon $T$. In dynamic pricing, a seller with unlimited supply of a good interacts with a stream of buyers over \( T \) rounds, with the goal of maximizing revenue. At each round $t$, the seller posts a price $p_t$, and the buyer purchases the good only if their unknown valuation $v^\star$ exceeds this price. The seller observes only the binary feedback $\mathbb{I} \left\{ p_t \leq v^\star \right\}$, indicating whether a sale occurred. In the \emph{robust} pricing setting, a malicious adversary is allowed to corrupt this feedback in at most $C$ rounds. Even if the learner knows the corruption $C$, the best known regret bound is $\mathcal{O}(C\log\log T)$ by Gupta et al. [2025]. This leaves as an open problem to ``decouple'' the dependence on $C$ and $T$. In this work, we resolve this open problem. In particular, we develop a robust variant of binary search that achieves regret $\mathcal{O}(C+\log T)$ when the corruption $C$ is known and $\mathcal{O}(C+\log^2 T)$ when the corruption is unknown.

cs.LG↗

Decoupling Corruption and Horizon in Robust Contextual Pricing

We study robust repeated contextual pricing, where valuations depend linearly on the features. At each round $t\in[T]$, a seller observes a context, posts a price, and receives only a possibly corrupted binary sale feedback. When the seller knows an upper bound $C$ on the number of corrupted rounds, we design an algorithm with regret $\mathcal O(Cd+d^2\log T)$, where $d$ is the context dimension. This is the first guarantee for robust contextual pricing that separates the dependence on the corruption budget $C$ from the horizon $T$, closing the problem left open by Gupta, Guruganesh, Paes Leme, and Schneider (2025). In this work, we go even further by developing a randomized algorithm that attains regret of order $\mathcal{O}(Cd+d^2\log T+d\log^2T)$ with high probability, without knowing the number of corrupted rounds $C$. Finally, we show that randomized algorithms that do not know $C$ cannot guarantee regret of order $\mathcal{O}(C)+o(\log^2 T)$ with high probability, even in the one dimensional non-contextual case.

cs.GT↗

Fair Team Contracts

A principal hires a team for a joint project and pays success-contingent shares to induce costly effort. We require that agents do not envy one another's contracts: for any pair of team members, neither would gain if they exchanged shares and all team members reoptimized their effort choices. For submodular rewards, revenue-optimal fair contracts can be chosen to pay each hired agent the maximum of her incentive threshold and a common endogenous share floor. We use this characterization to obtain an FPTAS for additive rewards and a deterministic value-oracle algorithm achieving a $0.249$ fraction of optimal fair revenue for submodular rewards. We also show that optimal fair contracts can outperform optimal non-discriminatory contracts by a factor of approximately $1.445$. This bound is tight for both additive and submodular rewards.

cs.GT↗

Matching Tasks to Agents: Mechanism Design for Multi-Agent Contracts

We study task assignment under adverse selection and moral hazard. In the single-task setting, agents privately know their types, which determine their success probabilities and effort costs. Based on the agents' reported types, the principal selects an agent to perform the task and offers a success-contingent payment. Although optimal Bayesian contract design is generally computationally intractable and Myerson's characterization does not directly extend to settings with hidden actions and multidimensional private information, we show that the single-task problem admits a simple Myerson-style characterization. Our key insight is that incentive constraints depend only on the ratio between effort cost and success probability. We characterize an optimal mechanism and show that it can be computed in polynomial time. We also establish a tight $Θ(1/(NK))$ worst-case bound on the ratio between the optimal profit and the full-information benchmark, where $N$ is the number of agents and $K$ is the number of types per agent. We then extend our analysis to multiple tasks, showing that an optimal mechanism may not exist. Nevertheless, for a constant number of agents, we provide a polynomial-time approximation scheme for the supremum profit.

cs.GT↗

Support-Dependent Regret Rates for Profit Maximization in Multilateral Trade

We study online profit maximization in multilateral trade, a setting that generalizes both dynamic pricing and bilateral trade. At each round, an intermediary posts prices to buyers and offers payments to sellers; trade occurs only if every agent accepts. We consider valuations drawn from an unknown joint distribution, allowing arbitrary correlation across agents, under the assumption that each agent's marginal valuation distribution has unknown support of size at most $K$. For constant dimension $d$, we design an algorithm with regret $\widetilde O(\sqrt{K^dT})$. This extends optimal support-dependent guarantees for one-dimensional dynamic pricing to the multidimensional setting of multilateral trade. At the core of our approach is a normalized zooming procedure that adapts to the local probability of trade, avoiding the excessive refinement of nearly flat regions that can arise with standard zooming.

cs.GT↗

A Subsampling Theorem for Constraint Satisfaction Problems with Large Arity

Subsampling theorems for constraint satisfaction problems (CSPs) guarantee that the value of the CSP is approximately preserved after restricting it to small random subsets of variables. We provide the first subsampling theorem for CSPs, which requires a sample size that is polynomial in the arity $k$ and error $\varepsilon$, and polylogarithmic in the alphabet size $q$. This improves upon the subsampling theorem of Barak, Hardt, Holenstein, and Steurer (SODA '11), which achieves a polynomial dependency on $\varepsilon$ and polylogarithmic in $q$ only in the constant-arity regime. Our subsampling theorem has applications in interactive proofs and property testing. In interactive proofs, it provides a key missing ingredient for the proof of Aaronson, Impagliazzo, and Moshkovitz (CCC '14) that $\textsf{AM}(\textsf{poly})=\textsf{AM}$ (where $\textsf{AM}(k)$ is the class of languages decidable by Arthur-Merlin protocols with $k$ non-communicating Merlins with independent questions). In property testing, it yields the first one-sided tester for satisfiability with sample size polynomial in the arity $k$ and the error $\varepsilon^{-1}$, and polylogarithmic in the alphabet size $q$.

cs.DS↗

A Unifying Framework for Quasi-Polynomial Optimization of Fixed-degree Polynomials

We study the simultaneous approximation of constant-degree polynomials over convex sets. For any family of $m$ degree-$d$ polynomials and any convex set ${H} \subseteq \mathbb{R}_{\ge0}^n$, we construct an $ε$-Cover of the joint value set $\{(f_1(x), \dots, f_m(x)) : x \in {H}\}$ in the $\ell_\infty$-norm. This cover is of size $n^{O(\log(mn)/ε^2)}$, provided the polynomials have constant range over the smallest $\ell_1$-ball inscribing ${H}$. Our approach extends classical net-based sparsifications for linear functions (e.g., Lipton, Markakis, and Mehta [2003]) to arbitrary families of constant-degree polynomials over general convex sets. We use a two-step scheme: first, we construct a quasi-polynomial pre-cover of the family on the smallest $\ell_1$-ball containing ${H}$ by using a concentration argument and leveraging a connection between Bernstein approximation and multinomial distributions; we then compress the pre-cover to ${H}$ by using a recursive degree reduction and feasibility programs anchored at points of the pre-cover. The existence of these covers immediately yields a unified framework for Quasi-Polynomial Time Approximation Schemes (QPTAS) across a wide range of a problems, including fixed-degree polynomial minimization over polyhedral sets, Constraint Satisfaction Problems (CSPs), Free Games, variational inequalities with polynomial operators (which implies guarantees for local Nash equilibria in polynomial games), and additive approximation for normalized densest $k$-subhypergraph on $O(1)$-uniform hypergraphs.

cs.DS↗

Breaking the $T^{3/4}$ Barrier for Regret Minimization With Bi-Dimensional CDFs

We study regret minimization for learning CDF-related objectives of the form \[ g(x)\cdot\mathbb{P}_{X\sim\mathcal{D}}(X\le x), \] over $[0,1]^2$, where $g$ is a known Lipschitz function and $\mathcal{D}$ is an unknown distribution. At each round $t$, the learner selects a point $x_t$ and observes the binary feedback $\mathbb{I}(X_t\le x_t)$, where $X_t\sim\mathcal{D}$. We design an algorithm achieving regret $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{7/10})$, improving over the previous best-known bound of $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{3/4})$ and showing that the curse of dimensionality can be at least partially lifted for this class of objectives, though a gap remains with the $Ω(T^{2/3})$ lower bound. As an application, our techniques yield the same $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{7/10})$ regret bound for profit maximization in repeated bilateral trade with fixed prices.

cs.LG↗

Regret Minimization for Piecewise Linear Rewards: Contracts, Auctions, and Beyond

Most microeconomic models of interest involve optimizing a piecewise linear function. These include contract design in hidden-action principal-agent problems, selling an item in posted-price auctions, and bidding in first-price auctions. When the relevant model parameters are unknown and determined by some (unknown) probability distributions, the problem becomes learning how to optimize an unknown and stochastic piecewise linear reward function. Such a problem is usually framed within an online learning framework, where the decision-maker (learner) seeks to minimize the regret of not knowing an optimal decision in hindsight. This paper introduces a general online learning framework that offers a unified approach to tackle regret minimization for piecewise linear rewards, under a suitable monotonicity assumption commonly satisfied by microeconomic models. We design a learning algorithm that attains a regret of $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{nT})$, where $n$ is the number of ``pieces'' of the reward function and $T$ is the number of rounds. This result is tight when $n$ is \emph{small} relative to $T$, specifically when $n \leq T^{1/3}$. Our algorithm solves two open problems in the literature on learning in microeconomic settings. First, it shows that the $\widetilde{O}(T^{2/3})$ regret bound obtained by Zhu et al. [Zhu+23] for learning optimal linear contracts in hidden-action principal-agent problems is not tight when the number of agent's actions is small relative to $T$. Second, our algorithm demonstrates that, in the problem of learning to set prices in posted-price auctions, it is possible to attain suitable (and desirable) instance-independent regret bounds, addressing an open problem posed by Cesa-Bianchi et al. [CBCP19].

cs.GT↗

Strict Fairness at What Cost? Envy-Free Contracts with Subsidies

We study algorithmic fair contract design, where a principal designs task-level contracts and fairly delegates a set of tasks to a set of agents. Prior work reveals a fairness-revenue dilemma: exact envy-free (EF) contracts may have an unbounded price of fairness (PoF), while approximate notions avoid this unboundedness only by weakening strict fairness. To address this dilemma, we propose a novel scheme, called {\it Envy-free Contracts with Subsidies} (EFS), in which the principal may additionally offer agent-specific subsidies to restore strict fairness. Our main technical result is a tight characterization of the price of fairness for EFS contracts. In sharp contrast to EF contracts, whose PoF can be unbounded, we show that the PoF of EFS contracts is $n^{n+O(1)}$, where $n$ is the number of agents. Moreover, EFS contracts can outperform EF contracts by an arbitrarily large factor in terms of the principal's revenue. Finally, we present the complexity landscape: computing optimal EFS contracts is NP-hard in general, whereas a polynomial-time algorithm exists when the number of tasks is constant.

cs.GT↗

Beyond Slater's Condition in Online CMDPs with Stochastic and Adversarial Constraints

We study \emph{online episodic Constrained Markov Decision Processes} (CMDPs) under both stochastic and adversarial constraints. We provide a novel algorithm whose guarantees greatly improve those of the state-of-the-art best-of-both-worlds algorithm introduced by Stradi et al. (2025). In the stochastic regime, \emph{i.e.}, when the constraints are sampled from fixed but unknown distributions, our method achieves $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T})$ regret and constraint violation without relying on Slater's condition, thereby handling settings where no strictly feasible solution exists. Moreover, we provide guarantees on the stronger notion of \emph{positive} constraint violation, which does not allow to recover from large violation in the early episodes by playing strictly safe policies. In the adversarial regime, \emph{i.e.}, when the constraints may change arbitrarily between episodes, our algorithm ensures sublinear constraint violation without Slater's condition, and achieves sublinear $α$-regret with respect to the \emph{unconstrained} optimum, where $α$ is a suitably defined multiplicative approximation factor. We further validate our results through synthetic experiments, showing the practical effectiveness of our algorithm.

cs.LG↗

Algorithmic Fair Contracts

We initiate the algorithmic study of fair contract design. A principal assigns multiple tasks to heterogeneous agents and chooses task-level linear contracts; agents differ in costs and success probabilities, and fairness requires each agent to prefer her own task-contract bundle to any other agent's. Unlike envy-free allocations of indivisible items, envy-free full-allocation contracts always exist, but optimizing revenue under this constraint is computationally difficult: no polynomial-time algorithm can achieve any constant-factor approximation in general. We therefore identify tractable regimes. With a constant number of tasks, optimal EF, EF1, and $ε$-EF contracts are computable in polynomial time. With a constant number of agents, exact EF remains hard, even for three agents, while EF1 and $ε$-EF admit additive FPTAS against the EF benchmark. We also show that exact EF can have an unbounded price of fairness, whereas $ε$-EF and EF1 can restore bounded revenue loss.

cs.GT↗

Bridging Rested and Restless Bandits with Graph-Triggering: Rising and Rotting

Rested and Restless Bandits are two well-known bandit settings that are useful to model real-world sequential decision-making problems in which the expected reward of an arm evolves over time due to the actions we perform or due to the nature. In this work, we propose Graph-Triggered Bandits (GTBs), a unifying framework to generalize and extend rested and restless bandits. In this setting, the evolution of the arms' expected rewards is governed by a graph defined over the arms. An edge connecting a pair of arms $(i,j)$ represents the fact that a pull of arm $i$ triggers the evolution of arm $j$, and vice versa. Interestingly, rested and restless bandits are both special cases of our model for some suitable (degenerated) graph. As relevant case studies for this setting, we focus on two specific types of monotonic bandits: rising, where the expected reward of an arm grows as the number of triggers increases, and rotting, where the opposite behavior occurs. For these cases, we study the optimal policies. We provide suitable algorithms for all scenarios and discuss their theoretical guarantees, highlighting the complexity of the learning problem concerning instance-dependent terms that encode specific properties of the underlying graph structure.

stat.ML↗

The Complexity of Min-Max Optimization for Quadratic Polynomials

We prove that computing approximate stationary points of min-max optimization over the hypercube is PPAD-hard for quadratic polynomials. This holds even when the polynomials are multilinear, each variable appears in at most three monomials, and the approximation factor is inverse polynomial. As a direct consequence, we obtain the first PPAD-hardness results for two-team zero-sum polymatrix games.

cs.CC↗

Improved Hardness Results for Min-Max Optimization with Coupled Constraints

We investigate the computational complexity of min-max optimization under coupled constraints. The work of Daskalakis, Skoulakis, and Zampetakis [DSZ21] was the first to study min-max optimization through the lens of computational complexity, showing that min-max problems with nonconvex-nonconcave objectives are PPAD-hard under coupled constraints. By carefully exploiting the coupled constraints rather than the structure of the objective function, we are able to significantly simplify and strengthen the proof of the hardness result. More precisely, the first contribution of this paper is a fundamentally new proof of their main result, which improves it in multiple directions: it holds for degree-$2$ polynomials which are quadratic-linear, it improves the dependence on the parameters of the problem (also yielding constant inapproximability for gradient descent-ascent in $\ell_\infty$-norm), and it is much simpler than previous approaches. Second, we show that with general constraints (i.e., the min player and max player have different constraints), even convex-concave (bilinear) min-max optimization becomes PPAD-hard. Along the way, we also provide PPAD-membership of a general problem related to quasi-variational inequalities, which has applications beyond our problem.

cs.GT↗

Min-Max Optimization Requires Exponentially Many Queries

We study the query complexity of min-max optimization of a nonconvex-nonconcave function $f$ over $[0,1]^d \times [0,1]^d$. We show that, given oracle access to $f$ and to its gradient $\nabla f$, any algorithm that finds an $\varepsilon$-approximate stationary point must make a number of queries that is exponential in $1/\varepsilon$ or $d$.

cs.DS↗

The Sample Complexity of Uniform Approximation for Multi-Dimensional CDFs and Fixed-Price Mechanisms

We study the sample complexity of learning a uniform approximation of an $n$-dimensional cumulative distribution function (CDF) within an error $ε> 0$, when observations are restricted to a minimal one-bit feedback. This serves as a counterpart to the multivariate DKW inequality under ''full feedback'', extending it to the setting of ''bandit feedback''. Our main result shows a near-dimensional-invariance in the sample complexity: we get a uniform $ε$-approximation with a sample complexity $\frac{1}{ε^3}{\log\left(\frac 1 ε\right)^{\mathcal{O}(n)}}$ over a arbitrary fine grid, where the dimensionality $n$ only affects logarithmic terms. As direct corollaries, we provide tight sample complexity bounds and novel regret guarantees for learning fixed-price mechanisms in small markets, such as bilateral trade settings.

cs.LG↗