Meijia Chen | Search arXiv

arXiv2026

LayerRoute: Action-Conditioned Mixture-of-Layers Routing for Vision-Language-Action Policies

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) policies leverage pretrained vision-language models (VLMs) to guide action generation for robot control. VLMs provide hierarchical visual-semantic representations that evolve across layers, from local visual geometry to abstract, language-aligned semantics; different manipulation tasks may therefore require different mixtures of layer representations. Meanwhile, the action module maintains intermediate representations that evolve throughout action computation and may provide useful information for subsequent decisions. However, existing VLA interfaces offer limited flexibility in representation access: VLM information is exposed through fixed layer assignments for each action layer, while intermediate action states are only propagated implicitly through residual streams without explicit reuse. We introduce LayerRoute, an action-conditioned representation routing interface that enables adaptive access to VLM layers and action representations. The Layer Mixture Router dynamically forms mixtures of cached VLM representations, while Action-State Reread reuses earlier action representations. Across diverse simulation and real-world benchmarks, LayerRoute consistently improves StarVLA-$\pi$ and $\pi_{0.5}$, achieving up to 7.2 gains on LIBERO Long with only 0.31% / 3.87% additional parameters. Ablation studies validate the benefit of action-conditioned layer routing, while routing analyses reveal structured allocation patterns across action layers and task settings.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

One Token to Fool LLM-as-a-Judge

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly trusted as automated judges, assisting evaluation and providing reward signals for training other models, particularly in reference-based settings like Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR). However, we uncover a critical vulnerability even in this reference-based paradigm: generative reward models are systematically susceptible to reward hacking. We find that superficial inputs, which we term ''master keys'' such as non-word symbols (e.g., '':'' or ''.'') or generic reasoning openers (e.g., ''Thought process:'' or ''Let's solve this problem step by step.''), can consistently elicit false positive rewards without any substantive reasoning. Our systematic evaluation demonstrates this is a widespread failure affecting a diverse range of models, including leading proprietary systems such as GPT-o1 and Claude-4. These results challenge the assumed robustness of LLM judges and pose a significant threat to their reliability. To address this, we propose a simple yet effective data augmentation strategy using truncated model outputs as adversarial negative examples. The resulting Master Reward Models (Master-RMs) demonstrate state-of-the-art robustness against these ''master key'' attacks while maintaining high performance in standard evaluation settings. We supplement these findings with a comprehensive analysis of the vulnerability across model scales, prompt variations, and common inference-time strategies, offering insights to guide future research on robust LLM evaluation. We release our robust, general-domain reward models and the synthetic training data at https://huggingface.co/sarosavo/Master-RM and https://huggingface.co/datasets/sarosavo/Master-RM.

cs.LG↗