Search arXiv⌕ Search

arXiv subjects

Ozan Solmaz

Publications and source records attributed to Ozan Solmaz.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

No Place to Hide: An Analysis on Protected Order Flow Sandwich Attacks

Front-running has long plagued Ethereum's public mempool, earning it the nickname of a "dark forest", where predators lurk for profitable transactions. In response, Ethereum and other blockchain ecosystems increasingly rely on private RPCs and native protections to shield transactions from adversaries, which we refer to as protected order flow. Yet the effectiveness of these mechanisms in preventing front-running, and what trust assumptions they entail, remain poorly understood. In this work, we conduct the first longitudinal, three-year measurement study of sandwich attacks against protected order flow across six blockchains: Ethereum, Solana, Tron, Base, Arbitrum, and Monad. We introduce detection heuristics that capture wide attacks, both within and across blocks, and filter on bot behavior to distinguish sandwiches from legitimate trading activity. We identify 28.0 million sandwich attacks on Solana, 38,567 on Tron, 30,607 on Ethereum, and 1,889 on Base against transactions intended to be protected from front-running. Reorged blocks expose a further 2,875 Ethereum victims. Unlike conventional public-mempool sandwiches, these attacks rarely occur tightly around their victims and, outside Solana, are carried out by a small number of entities. Our analysis uncovers exposures at every layer: validator- and application-level exposure on Solana, order-flow auctions and reorged blocks on Ethereum, first-come-first-served ordering that fails to prevent latency-based front-running on Tron, and both an RPC bug that exposes pending transactions and predictable victim behavior on Base. These findings show that existing front-running protections can provide substantially weaker guarantees than users expect, highlighting the need for stronger end-to-end defenses against sandwich attacks.

cs.CR↗

Optimistic MEV in Ethereum Layer 2s: Why Blockspace Is Always in Demand

Layer 2 rollups are rapidly absorbing DeFi activity, securing over $40 billion and accounting for nearly half of Ethereum's DEX volume by Q1 2025, yet their MEV dynamics remain understudied. We address this gap by defining and quantifying optimistic MEV, a form of speculative, on-chain MEV whose detection and execution logic reside largely on-chain in smart contracts. As a result of their speculative nature and lack of off-chain opportunity verification, optimistic MEV transactions frequently decide not to execute any trades. In this work, we focus on cyclic arbitrage, which we find is predominantly executed as optimistic MEV on Layer 2s. Using our multi-stage identification pipeline on Arbitrum, Base, and Optimism, we show that in Q1 2025, transactions from cyclic arbitrage contracts account for over 50% of on-chain gas on Base and Optimism and 7% on Arbitrum, driven mainly by "interaction" probes (on-chain computations searching for arbitrage). This speculative probing indicates that cyclic arbitrage on Layer 2s is predominantly executed as optimistic MEV and contributes to generally keeping blocks on Base and Optimism persistently full. Despite consuming over half of on-chain gas, these optimistic MEV transactions pay less than one quarter of total gas fees. Cross-network comparison reveals divergent success rates, differing patterns of code reuse, and sensitivity to varying sequencer ordering and block production times. Finally, OLS regressions link optimistic MEV trade count to ETH volatility, retail trading activity, and DEX aggregator usage. Together, these findings show that optimistic MEV has become a major source of persistent spam-like transaction activity on Layer 2s, dominating blockspace with low-value probes and reshaping the composition of on-chain activity.

cs.CE↗