arXiv subjects

Patrick Allmis

Publications and source records attributed to Patrick Allmis.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Mobile but Miserable: Social comparison networks and social mobility

Although social mobility is widely viewed as desirable, we document an 'inverse-U' shaped relationship with well-being: mobility is positively associated with well-being when low, but the association diminishes as mobility increases and eventually becomes negative. To explain this, we build a model in which agents are embedded in a social comparison network and suffer from falling behind their peers. The model highlights two channels that can cause welfare to be decreasing in mobility at high levels. First, when mobility is high, further increases widen already significant gaps between agents from similar parental backgrounds but of different abilities. Second, when mobility is high, high-ability agents are already relatively well off. So further increases in social mobility increase inequality. We find evidence supportive of both channels in US data. The model also predicts, and data supports, that social integration -- where relationships form more along ability than background lines -- allows societies to benefit from mobility for longer. We interpret this as social mobility being multidimensional with both economic and social dimensions that are complementary.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2026

Revealing information -- or not -- in a social network of traders

We build upon a simple micro-founded model of asset trading proposed by Kyle (1985) to study under what conditions a trader who is privately informed of the future return of the asset may want to share her information with other traders. Despite what conventional wisdom suggests, we show that in the unique equilibrium of the game the informed trader reveals her information with positive probability. A consequence of it is that, in contrast with the corresponding no-communication benchmark, the equilibrium price need not be fully revealing of the asset's return, even if traders are risk neutral. This, in turn, has significant implications on the distribution of the social surplus. While our model initially assumes that inter-agent communication is restricted by an arbitrarily given social network, we also study which such networks arise when links are endogenously formed through traders' prior connection decisions.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2024

Cohesion, Ideology, and Tolerance

Agents with different ideologies often form alliances to achieve their goals. Paradoxically, ideologically similar agents are often opponents. In this paper, ideologically heterogeneous agents choose the ideological composition of their neighborhood, their tolerance, and invest into connections. The resulting weighted network describes allies, opponents, and strengths. Disputes with opponents determine benefits, which increase in an agent's strength and cohesion. Cohesive agents have fewer mutual allies with opponents. In equilibrium, the network is segregated when cohesion is effective enough and some agents tolerate ideologically distant types to oppose closer ones. Subsidizing connections dampens polarization in societies on the verge of segregation.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2023

A Model of Polarization on Social Media

We develop a model of social media in which users produce different types of content and choose whom to follow. Even when abstracting from algorithmic bias, linking costs shape networks and polarization. In the welfare-maximizing equilibrium, lower linking costs can raise welfare but also increase exposure to extreme content, while very low costs reduce welfare and heighten polarization by discouraging moderate contributors. Policies that incentivize content provision can generate large welfare gains by changing who produces information, whereas link subsidies or attention reallocation mainly affect exposure and have limited welfare impact. These insights help explain why exposure-based interventions on social media platforms often yield ambiguous effects on polarization.

econ.TH↗