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Pavel Kireyev

Publications and source records attributed to Pavel Kireyev.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

PriceBench: A Diagnostic Benchmark for Price, Quality, and Brand Preferences in LLM Booking Agents

LLMs increasingly act as purchasing agents, which makes the LLM, not the user, the one choosing among the options that satisfy a request; its preferences quietly fix what gets bought and what it costs. Hotel booking is a clean instance: a high-volume choice settled on a few comparable attributes, where the pick reveals those preferences. We introduce PriceBench, a diagnostic benchmark that recovers an LLM's price, quality, and brand preferences from its booking choices with a logit choice model, applied to 28 LLMs from 8 providers on 3,600 hotel tasks from 179 real New York City properties. We find that capability is associated with how consistently an LLM chooses, not with what it chooses: more capable LLMs hold stronger, more consistent preferences, while weaker ones either lock onto one position, exploitable by whoever controls listing order, or choose almost indifferently. What those preferences favor varies sharply across providers and even within one family: price sensitivity spans more than an order of magnitude, and the price/quality trade-off moves mean booked nightly price from \$247 to \$393 on identical tasks. What an agent buys must therefore be measured per LLM, not inferred, and we release the tasks, code, and all 28 response sets.

econ.GN↗

Don't Fake It If You Can't Make It: Driver Misconduct in Last-Mile Delivery

In the last two decades, last-mile delivery (LMD) firms have seen immense growth fueled by the success of e-commerce, leading to faster and cheaper deliveries. Operating on thin margins, LMD firms strive for successful first-time deliveries to avoid the financial and reputational costs of reattempts. Delivery Agents (DAs) are integral to LMD efficiency, influencing customer experience, delivery success, and productivity. However, most LMD performance enhancement research focuses on process, technology, and incentives, which presume workers will conform to procedures and monitoring tools will function flawlessly. Nevertheless, in practice, DAs deviate from expected behaviors, i.e., indulge in misconduct, negatively affecting delivery efficiency, often resulting in returned parcels. One of the major misconducts is fake remarked deliveries, wherein DAs intentionally do not deliver the parcels and provide a fake reason for it. For instance, even without reaching a delivery address, a DA remarks 'customer unavailable' and records a delivery failure. In this study, we collaborated with a leading Indian LMD firm and, using instrumental variable regression, find that such misconduct leads to a spillover productivity loss. This effect reduces the next day's successful deliveries by 1.60% and first-time-right deliveries by 1.86%. We discuss misconduct's correlation with factors such as task complexity and offer novel insights into how opportunistic circumstances can influence worker behavior.

econ.GN↗