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Peichun Hua

Publications and source records attributed to Peichun Hua.

12 recordsLinked to original sources

WebHarbor: Docking Real Websites for Evolving GUI Agent Environments

GUI web agents require realistic and interactive environments that remain stable during both evaluation and training. Live website evaluation suffers from changing content, access restrictions, and limited coverage of authenticated workflows, while existing synthetic environments for training often lack functional depth and visual fidelity. We propose WebHarbor, a suite of 153 executable and dockerized website environments that faithfully reconstruct the visual interfaces, content, and functional workflows of real-world web services under deterministic control. We build WebHarbor through task-driven human-agent collaboration, where environments evolve as new tasks expand their functional scope, coding agents implement the required changes, and human contributors audit visual fidelity, functional correctness, and task validity. The resulting suite comprises 3,518 tasks spanning multi-step and post-authentication workflows, where existing works often fail to cover. Beyond reliable evaluation, WebHarbor provides high-fidelity synthetic web environments for cost-efficient reinforcement learning (RL). We demonstrate that a Qwen 4B-level GUI agent trained with RL in WebHarbor generalizes to unseen tasks and performs competitively with leading open-source GUI web agents across four benchmarks. The code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/aiming-lab/WebHarbor.

cs.AI↗

Matryoshka Hash Representations for Model-Aware Compact Semantic Retrieval

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) depends on dense retrieval: each document is stored as a learned vector, and queries are answered by nearest-neighbor search. Keeping one full-precision vector per document dominates index cost at corpus scale, so systems replace each vector with a short code of a few bytes (quantization). Standard quantizers such as product quantization (PQ) pick the code that best reconstructs the original vector, but reconstruction is only a proxy for retrieval: at a few bytes per document, a model-aware code trained on the retriever's ranking signal uses the budget better. A single code is even more useful if its short prefixes are each directly searchable, letting a deployment set its efficiency-quality operating point without re-encoding the corpus. But training all prefixes under one objective makes the early bits a compromise across budgets: short codes improve while the full-width code degrades. Binary codes sharpen the conflict, since a gradient step either flips a stored bit or leaves it unchanged. We introduce Matryoshka Hash Representations (MHR), a two-stage procedure that separates full-width training from prefix organization. MHR first learns a longer binary code, then freezes the model and trains zero-initialized residual code adaptors for directly searchable prefixes. Documents are stored at one bit per coordinate, queries keep continuous logits as in PQ, and search runs on FAISS FastScan. Trained on MS MARCO and zero-shot transferred to seven BEIR datasets, one MHR code reaches 0.502 NDCG@10 at 16 bytes and 0.556 at 32 bytes, against 0.404 and 0.524 for the best compact baselines; the gains hold across training seeds, on all 13 public BEIR datasets, and against off-the-shelf binary Matryoshka embeddings with stronger backbones. The same code also helps shortlist candidates for reranking and prune low-storage graph indexes such as LEANN.

cs.IR↗

Tessera: Structure-Completed Evidence Units for Web Retrieval-Augmented Generation

Web retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) splits a page into fixed-size text chunks or, in recent visual pipelines, screenshot tiles, and the retrieved item serves at once as the unit of indexing, ranking, and reading. We trace answer evidence from source HTML to reader input over the full English Wikipedia and find that this coupling loses evidence in text and screenshot pipelines alike: evidence present in the source page often fails to reach the reader intact, particularly structured content such as tables and infoboxes, which chunking separates from the headers and context that give it meaning. Stronger extraction, context expansion, and larger reader budgets leave the loss in place. We present Tessera, a training-free evidence delivery layer that decouples what a pipeline retrieves from what its reader reads. Given the pages behind any ranked list, Tessera rebuilds their HTML into fine-grained evidence units, each completed with its page title, section path, and table headers, selects the units relevant to the query, and packs them into the reader context at an unchanged token budget. The index, the retriever, and the reader stay as they are, so Tessera applies to text, screenshot, and agentic pipelines. Across three question answering benchmarks, Tessera improves answer accuracy by 5 to 6 points on text and screenshot pipelines, consistently across readers, retrievers, and reader budgets, and outperforms strong HTML-aware and structure-aware RAG baselines under matched budgets. The gains carry over to multi-step agentic search. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/sarendis56/Tessera.

cs.IR↗

Label-Budgeted Attribute Inference from Protected Features in Edge-Cloud Split Multimodal LLMs

Edge-cloud split inference runs the early layers of a multimodal large language model (MLLM) on a device and sends intermediate features to a server to complete the task. While keeping raw images local is often perceived as a privacy benefit, an honest-but-curious server can still infer sensitive attributes, such as age, gender, and race, from the received features. Existing protections intervene at the input, transmitted representation, or model's responses, but their native evaluations rely on final-response refusals or fixed-classifier failures, which underestimate an adaptive server's capabilities. To address this, we propose a label-budgeted attribute-inference framework that measures representation-level privacy through a recovery curve: the share of the unprotected leakage the server recovers as a function of its labeled-sample budget, from zero (a classifier trained on unprotected features) to a full labeled set. Our evaluation across two popular MLLMs reveals two critical findings. First, in unprotected pipelines, intermediate features leak all three attributes regardless of the split depth. Second, even when protection mechanisms are deployed across different stages, sensitive information remains recoverable under limited label budgets. For example, Safe-LLaVA removes biometric content from the model's responses, but from the features it transmits in split inference, 20 labeled samples per class recover 75-85% of the unprotected leakage. This work provides a label-budgeted measure of feature-level privacy for split MLLM inference and motivates defenses that act on the transmitted representation.

cs.CR↗

Semantics Delivery Network: Rethinking Web Retrieval Infrastructure for LLM Agents

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly ground their answers in proprietary data and live web content through both single-shot retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) and multi-turn agentic search. Yet the web path they use was built for human readers: search services return URLs and snippets ranked by generic relevance, and content delivery networks (CDNs) cache URL-addressed objects without knowing which passage an agent needs. LLMs instead consume short, semantically coherent passages - hereafter, chunks - selected for downstream utility rather than similarity alone, retrieve statefully across reasoning turns, and, as uncoordinated streams, repeatedly fetch, clean, chunk, and embed the same content. We argue that semantic chunk retrieval should become a first-class network-delivery abstraction, and propose the Semantics Delivery Network (SemDN): an origin-authorized, hierarchical substrate that indexes, searches, and caches web content at chunk granularity, serving clients and origins alike. SemDN is more than finer-grained caching: it must estimate missing or stale evidence without an explicit miss signal, let clients choose retrieval representations that origins need not see, and share state among clients with the same representation. Preliminary results show that page-first retrieval processes two to three orders of magnitude more content than agents consume, that agentic queries exhibit task-local chunk reuse invisible to URL caches, and that chunk delivery improves answer quality per context token. We organize an open research agenda around shareable retrieval state, hierarchical caching and refresh under coverage risk, and deployability, including incentives, privacy, and verifiability. Our code is available at: https://github.com/sarendis56/SemDN_HotNets26

cs.NI↗

Pointing the Way, Hiding the Destination: Practical Private Dense Retrieval at Scale

Hosted retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) and semantic search allow users to query valuable provider-held corpora, raising two competing demands: to hide each query and chosen result, yet reveal only the documents that the user is authorized to receive. Existing cryptographic approaches either make this costly by processing the entire corpus for every query, or sacrifice quality for efficiency by scanning a few clusters. We repurpose learned deep hashing as a private filter: a randomized binary code points the provider to a short candidate list, while encrypted reranking and oblivious key transfer protect the precise query and final selection. This shortlist short-circuits full-corpus cryptographic search without sacrificing retrieval quality: with 200-500 candidates, it closely matches full-corpus retrieval across five zero-shot corpora spanning 25K to 5.4M documents. On the full 2.68M-passage NQ corpus over a 10-Gbps link, our protocol only adds 0.73 seconds, or 10 percent, to a 128-token Qwen3-32B RAG pipeline. The released code satisfies directional metric differential privacy (DP) and substantially reduces embedding-inversion and property-inference leakage, demonstrating that a carefully learned shortlist can make private dense retrieval both accurate and practical.

cs.CR↗

Spruce: Scalable Private Outsourced Retrieval Using Compact Embeddings

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has made dense retrieval over large document collections a standard building block. Organizations increasingly outsource vector indexes to untrusted clouds, exposing proprietary corpora and user queries. Cryptographic protection is challenging because each query searches corpus-scale state, causing computation, correlated randomness, and communication to grow with the corpus. At million-document scale, a naive secure implementation takes minutes and about 90 GB of communication per query. Even recent optimized systems require 10--22 seconds. We propose Spruce (Scalable Private Outsourced Retrieval Using Compact Embeddings), which co-designs representations with the cryptographic protocol. Spruce learns compact binary codes that preserve candidates for full-precision reranking, replacing corpus-wide embedding scoring with efficient Hamming-distance computation under two-server multi-party computation (MPC). A corpus-calibrated fixed-radius protocol avoids multi-round candidate selection while preserving retrieval quality. Spruce also provides private cluster pruning, which trades minor quality loss for substantially less computation, and a one-core owner-operated dealer that removes cloud OT preprocessing bottlenecks. Across four corpora containing 383K--5.42M documents, Spruce preserves the original search quality with median candidate sets of only 382--1,952. At 10 Gbps inter-server bandwidth, full scans take 0.21--2.97 seconds, $4.8$--$6.7\times$ faster than the closest measured prior work. Private pruning takes 0.06--1.09 seconds, achieves $13.1$--$22.9\times$ speedups, and retains $93.9\%$--$97.3\%$ of full-float NDCG. On the largest corpus, pruning and the dealer jointly improve sustained throughput by $31.5\times$ at 1 Gbps per link.

cs.CR↗

Relevance Is Not Sufficient Evidence: Detecting Evidence Gaps Before Generation in RAG

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) grounds large language models in external sources, but retrieved passages often name the right entities without providing the facts needed to answer. Even when instructed to abstain, 12 generators answer 40.0-99.3% of insufficient-evidence questions. Training generators to abstain ties the decision to model weights, may reward answers recalled from parametric knowledge, and still requires a full generator call. Can sufficiency be judged from the question and evidence alone, before any answer exists? We identify pitfalls in constructing insufficient-evidence tests: removing relevant evidence or pairing evidence with unrelated questions can reveal labels through lexical overlap or evidence position. We build a paired benchmark using substitution, deletion, and question-swap constructions that vary answer support while controlling selected surface features, such as word use. Sufficiency can be judged without generating an answer, but no single signal works across all datasets. We introduce RINSE (Relevance Is Not Sufficient Evidence), which combines three signals: whether every part of the question is covered, whether any passage offers an answer, and whether a small language model reading the passages together judges them sufficient. Across six datasets, RINSE ranks sufficient above insufficient evidence with a score of 0.837 (chance 0.5), exceeding the best of 10 prior methods (0.746) and a frontier model queried through an API (0.784). Its weakest dataset scores higher than any other method's weakest (0.684 vs. 0.676). RINSE runs locally before generation, taking 36.5 ms per question on a single GPU.

cs.CL↗

Backdoor in the Loop: Compromising Agentic Search via Malicious Retrievers

Agentic retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) interleaves reasoning with repeated retrieval, giving the retriever influence over both the evidence an agent observes and its subsequent search decisions. We study retriever backdoors that exploit this feedback loop and repurpose weak backdoor purification to conceal their presence. An attacker supplies a compromised retriever checkpoint while leaving the search agent and deployment corpus unchanged. Without corpus write access, the attacker can still suppress useful evidence, persistently retrieve a selected existing document, or steer the agent toward prolonged search, inflating retrieval, context, and latency cost. To conceal these behaviors from detection, we propose leveraging a controlled inject-and-remove cycle: deliberately inject a weaker backdoor and then unlearn it. This process weakens detector-visible signatures and fools the backdoor detectors with an illusion of purification while preserving the malicious retrieval behavior. These findings expose a systematic vulnerability in RAG systems in which a weak defense becomes an attacker's concealment tool for a backdoored retriever, even when the underlying corpus remains trustworthy.

cs.CR↗

Behavioral Skill Reconstruction: Reconstructing Hidden Functionality from LLM Agent Skills

Closed source agent skills may encode proprietary instructions, scripts, constants, and data. Providers may offer their capabilities as services while keeping the underlying packages hidden. Prior work focuses on prompt injection attacks that directly disclose these artifacts, and existing defenses accordingly aim to prevent such leakage. However, preventing file disclosure does not prevent users from recovering the functionality those files implement. This raises a fundamental question: can a user reconstruct a skill's functionality through ordinary use while its files remain hidden? We study behavioral skill reconstruction (BSR), in which an attacker uses valid task requests and observed responses to build a functional clone of a hidden skill. We introduce SkillClone, a black-box attack that clones a target skill by forming an interface hypothesis from its public advertisement, issuing structured benign probes, synthesizing an executable replica, and iteratively repairing it through differential validation against the victim skill. Across 30 skills spanning rules, tables, procedures, and algorithms, SkillClone achieves exact or partial recovery on held-out inputs for several targets. Iterative requerying closes gaps missed by single-round reconstruction. Because SkillClone uses only legitimate interactions, disclosure-focused defenses provide limited coverage, and less detailed skill descriptions offer limited protection. These results show that file secrecy alone does not ensure functional secrecy. Defenses must also limit cumulative information leakage from ordinary use.

cs.CR↗

A Unified Open-Set Framework for Scalable PUF-Based Authentication of Heterogeneous IoT Devices

As modern cyber systems scale to include large populations of heterogeneous IoT devices, securing them against impersonation and forgery is a critical cybersecurity challenge. Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) offer a lightweight, hardware-rooted trust anchor for IoT security. However, different PUF architectures possess distinct challenge-response spaces and raw response reliabilities, making existing authentication protocols PUF-type specific. To bridge this interoperability bottleneck, this paper proposes a scalable, helper-data-free, open-set PUF authentication framework that leverages an OpenGAN-based classifier to manage heterogeneous fleets of IoT devices. Our method addresses the limitations of traditional database-centric and digital-twin modeling methods by encoding raw responses from diverse PUF types, including strong, weak and hybrid PUFs, into a unified image representation. This enables robust, single-pass classification and impostor rejection. We integrate the classifier into a generic protocol employing hybrid encryption and Bloom filter-based replay detection. Evaluated across four different types of noisy PUF data (Arbiter, SRAM, DRAM, and heterogeneous PUFs), our framework achieves 100% closed-set accuracy and near-zero open-set error rates with up to 45 devices, a significant improvement over the 3 to 5 devices in prior classification-based approaches. Prototyped on a Raspberry Pi, our framework completes one authentication cycle within 0.67 s, approximately 30x faster than the state-of-the-art open-set baselines.

cs.CR↗

Rethinking Jailbreak Detection of Large Vision Language Models with Representational Contrastive Scoring

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) are vulnerable to a growing array of multimodal jailbreak attacks, necessitating defenses that are both generalizable to novel threats and efficient for practical deployment. Many current strategies fall short, either targeting specific attack patterns, which limits generalization, or imposing high computational overhead. While lightweight anomaly-detection methods offer a promising direction, we find that their common one-class design tends to confuse unseen benign inputs with malicious ones, leading to unreliable over-rejection. To address this, we propose Representational Contrastive Scoring (RCS), a framework built on a key insight: the most potent safety signals reside within the LVLM's own internal representations. Our approach inspects the internal geometry of these representations, learning a lightweight projection to maximally separate benign and malicious inputs in safety-critical layers. This enables a simple yet powerful contrastive score that differentiates true malicious intent from mere distribution shift. Our instantiations, MCD (Mahalanobis Contrastive Detection) and KCD (K-nearest Contrastive Detection), achieve state-of-the-art performance on a challenging evaluation protocol designed to test generalization to unseen attack types. This work demonstrates that effective jailbreak detection can be achieved by applying simple, interpretable statistical methods to the internal representations, offering a practical path towards safer LVLM deployment.

cs.CR↗