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Piotr Gruza

Publications and source records attributed to Piotr Gruza.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Tightness and solidity in fragments of Peano Arithmetic

It was shown by Visser that Peano Arithmetic has the property that any two bi-interpretable extensions of it (in the same language) are equivalent. Enayat proposed to refer to this property of a theory as \emph{tightness} and to carry out a more systematic study of tightness and its stronger variants that he called neatness and solidity. Enayat proved that not only $\mathsf{PA}$, but also $\mathsf{ZF}$ and $\mathsf{Z}_2$ are solid. On the other hand, it was shown in later work by a number of authors that many natural proper fragments of those theories are not even tight. Enayat asked whether there is a proper solid subtheory of the theories listed above. We answer that question in the case of $\mathsf{PA}$ by proving that for every $n$, there exist both a solid theory and a tight but not neat theory strictly between $\mathsf{I}Σ_n$ and $\mathsf{PA}$. Moreover, the solid subtheories of $\mathsf{PA}$ can be required to be unable to interpret $\mathsf{PA}$. We also provide simple examples of proper solid subtheories of $\mathsf{ZF}$ and $\mathsf{Z}_2$, as well as further separations between properties related to tightness, including an example of a sequential theory that is neat but not semantically tight in the sense of Freire and Hamkins.

math.LO↗

Definiteness properties of first-order schemes

The paper aims to establish a convenient formal framework for investigating the phenomenon of scheme definiteness, exemplified by first-order internal categoricity as studied by Väänänen, among others. To this end, we introduce the notion of $Φ$-definiteness, thereby refining and extending the conceptual landscape that underlies various first-order categoricity notions in the literature (internal categoricity, strong internal categoricity, intolerance). We provide arguments for the robustness of our definition and present examples of schemes that separate different categoricity- and completeness-like notions. Finally, we offer a brief glimpse into the issue of the definiteness of two canonical foundational schemes - the induction scheme and the replacement scheme.

math.LO↗

Varieties of truth definitions

We study the structure of the partial order induced by the definability relation on definitions of truth for the language of arithmetic. Formally, a definition of truth is any sentence $α$ which extends a weak arithmetical theory (which we take to be EA) such that for some formula $Θ$ and any arithmetical sentence $φ$, $Θ(\ulcornerφ\urcorner)\equiv φ$ is provable in $α$. We say that a sentence $β$ is definable in a sentence $α$, if there exists an unrelativized translation from the language of $β$ to the language of $α$ which is identity on the arithmetical symbols and such that the translation of $β$ is provable in $α$. Our main result is that the structure consisting of truth definitions which are conservative over the basic arithmetical theory forms a countable universal distributive lattice. Additionally, we generalize the result of Pakhomov and Visser showing that the set of (Gödel codes of) definitions of truth is not $Σ_2$-definable in the standard model of arithmetic. We conclude by remarking that no $Σ_2$-sentence, satisfying certain further natural conditions, can be a definition of truth for the language of arithmetic.

math.LO↗