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Shashwat Saxena

Publications and source records attributed to Shashwat Saxena.

8 recordsLinked to original sources

Reinforcement Learning Enables Scaling Generalist Robot Policy Improvement

The introduction of generalist robot policies has enabled a single, large model to learn to perform a variety of tasks from a vast pre-training corpus. While these models often exhibit powerful zero-shot generalization capabilities, they typically require an adaptation phase to achieve sufficient performance in deployment. Iterated self-improvement via reinforcement learning (RL) has demonstrated promise in enabling this adaptation, yet such approaches have been largely explored in single-task settings - where the goal is to simply improve on a narrow deployment task - which lies in stark contrast to the multi-task capabilities of the base policy. In this work we ask whether generalist robot policies are capable of multi-task, generalist improvement in deployment - targeting many diverse tasks simultaneously - and what algorithmic recipe enables this. To answer this question, we first develop a set of structured evaluations to test generalist improvement capabilities, and systematically evaluate algorithmic and practical design choices regarding value estimation, policy extraction and resource allocation. We show that not only can generalist policies be improved online across diverse tasks, but that the right recipe can enable generalization and increase performance on tasks not considered during online training. We characterize when this generalization occurs and show that both the training task distribution and the use of value-based RL are critical. To the best of our knowledge, this is among the first evidence for online generalist improvement for robot foundation models.

cs.LG↗

VaDar: Implicit Goal Conditioning via Value Disaggregation

Long-horizon tasks are important for modern AI and robotics, yet pose a challenge for reinforcement learning. Historically, a popular approach has been to decompose a task into subgoals, and learn a subgoal-conditioned policy to execute each subtask in sequence. We introduce an alternative called Value Disaggregation (VaDar), which trains a single subgoal-independent policy to maximize a linear combination of per-subgoal critic values. Because subgoal information is needed only at training-time, VaDar removes the need for possibly costly or cumbersome subgoal-selection during policy deployment. Moreover, through careful experiments, we show that VaDar (1) is always competitive with, and frequently outperforms, natural baselines like goal-conditioning and (2) succeeds on tasks with non-sequential goal structure and multiple optimization objectives. In particular, VaDar is the first algorithm to solve challenging, long-horizon tasks in the RoboCasa suite, even when starting from a policy pretrained from behavior cloning with near-zero initial task success. Taken together, VaDar's successes suggest that subgoal information benefits actor-critic reinforcement learning by enhancing the efficacy of critic learning, whereas policy goal-conditioning is often unnecessary.

cs.LG↗

Scalable Weak-to-Strong Verifier Hardening for Agent Environments

Agent environments are essential for large language model (LLM) development. They use programmatic verifiers to turn complex outcomes into rewards. Verifiers can be attacked into awarding full credit to cheating agents without completing the intended task, causing inaccurate evaluation and misalignment in training. As agent environments scale in numbers and difficulty, so must the repairing of exploitable verifiers. To this end, we ask whether today's model with scaled compute can automatically harden agent environments to prevent potentially stronger future models from reward hacking. We introduce a scalable, fully automatic approach to weak-to-strong verifier hardening. It first sets up an isolated verifier sandbox that agents cannot directly modify, then uses a hacker-fixer loop to find and repair remaining verifier vulnerabilities. We apply this loop to Terminal Bench, KernelBench, and SETA, substantially reducing attack success across these agent environments. The iterative design scales with the hardening budget, producing progressively stronger defenses as the number of loop iterations increases and outperforming the static, non-iterative baseline. An earlier version of our hacker-fixer loop has been adopted by the official Terminal Bench repository as a way to audit exploits in its environments. Project page: https://verifier-hardening.github.io/.

cs.CR↗

Jailbreaking in the Haystack

Recent advances in long-context language models (LMs) have enabled million-token inputs, expanding their capabilities across complex tasks like computer-use agents. Yet, the safety implications of these extended contexts remain unclear. To bridge this gap, we introduce NINJA (short for Needle-in-haystack jailbreak attack), a method that jailbreaks aligned LMs by appending benign, model-generated content to harmful user goals. Critical to our method is the observation that the position of harmful goals play an important role in safety. Experiments on standard safety benchmark, HarmBench, show that NINJA significantly increases attack success rates across state-of-the-art open and proprietary models, including LLaMA, Qwen, Mistral, and Gemini. Unlike prior jailbreaking methods, our approach is low-resource, transferable, and less detectable. Moreover, we show that NINJA is compute-optimal -- under a fixed compute budget, increasing context length can outperform increasing the number of trials in best-of-N jailbreak. These findings reveal that even benign long contexts -- when crafted with careful goal positioning -- introduce fundamental vulnerabilities in modern LMs.

cs.CR↗

OGPO: Sample Efficient Full-Finetuning of Generative Control Policies

Generative control policies (GCPs), such as diffusion- and flow-based control policies, have emerged as effective parameterizations for robot learning. This work introduces Off-policy Generative Policy Optimization (OGPO), a sample-efficient algorithm for finetuning GCPs that maintains off-policy critic networks to maximize data reuse and propagate policy gradients through the full generative process of the policy via a modified PPO objective, using critics as the terminal reward. OGPO achieves state-of-the-art performance on manipulation tasks spanning multi-task settings, high-precision insertion, and dexterous control. To our knowledge, it is also the only method that can fine-tune poorly-initialized behavior cloning policies to near full task-success with no expert data in the online replay buffer, and does so with few task-specific hyperparameter tuning. Through extensive empirical investigations, we demonstrate that OGPO drastically outperforms methods alternatives on policy steering and learning residual corrections, and identify the key mechanisms behind its performance. We further introduce practical stabilization tricks, including success-buffer regularization, two-sided conservative advantages, and Q-variance reduction, to mitigate critic over-exploitation across state- and pixel-based settings. Beyond proposing OGPO, we conduct a systematic empirical study of GCP finetuning, identifying the stabilizing mechanisms and failure modes that govern successful off-policy full-policy improvement.

cs.LG↗

Hardening Agent Benchmarks with Adversarial Hacker-Fixer Loops

Agent benchmarks score submissions with outcome verifiers that are typically hand-written and brittle, leaving them open to reward hacking. We audit 1,968 tasks across five terminal-agent benchmarks and find 323 (16%) hackable by frontier models given only the task description. This corrupts both leaderboard rankings and RL training signal, yet the standard response is manual and reactive. We introduce the hacker-fixer loop, a method for building exploit-resistant verifiers without per-task manual patching. The loop alternates three LLM agents: a hacker tries to pass the verifier without solving the task, a fixer patches the verifier to reject each discovered exploit, and a solver confirms the patched verifier still admits legitimate solutions. The loop iterates: each patch reshapes what the verifier rewards, surfacing the next exploit. We further add verifier access, and let patches transfer across tasks, to broaden the exploits the loop discovers. On KernelBench, the loop drives the attack success rate from 62% to 0% on a held-out corpus of publicly reported exploits. We also find that weaker agents in the loop can defend against much stronger hackers: Gemini 3 Flash's loop drives the stronger Gemini 3.1 Pro and Claude Opus 4.7's attack success rate from 76% and 61% to 0% on KernelBench, and Gemini 3.1 Pro's from 39% to 17% on Terminal Bench across 77 tasks. We release Terminal Wrench (323 hackable environments, 3,632 hack trajectories) as a snapshot of the current attack surface, our patched verifiers, the exploits the loop discovered, and our implementation as a basis for future work.

cs.CR↗

Terminal Wrench: A Dataset of 331 Reward-Hackable Environments and 3,632 Exploit Trajectories

We release Terminal Wrench, a subset of 331 terminal-agent benchmark environments, copied from the popular open benchmarks that are demonstrably reward-hackable. The data set includes 3,632 hack trajectories and 2,352 legitimate baseline trajectories across three frontier models (Claude Opus 4.6, Gemini 3.1 Pro, GPT-5.4). Each entry preserves the original task definition alongside full attack trajectories that show how the verifier was bypassed. It also includes cases where the task was not solved as intended. The tasks span system administration, machine learning, software engineering, and security challenges; the exploits range from simple output spoofing to stack-frame introspection, standard-library patching, and rootkit-style binary hijacking. Crucially, these exploits are specific to each task, rather than the evaluation harness, making them harder to patch. We also present a monitorability study in which hack trajectories are sanitized or stripped of reasoning traces and then scored by an LLM judge, showing that detection degrades meaningfully when chain-of-thought is removed (AUC drops from 0.97 to 0.92). The data set is publicly available at https://github.com/few-sh/terminal-wrench.

cs.CR↗

Hodoscope: Unsupervised Monitoring for AI Misbehaviors

Existing approaches to monitoring AI agents rely on supervised evaluation: human-written rules or LLM-based judges that check for known failure modes. However, novel misbehaviors may fall outside predefined categories entirely and LLM-based judges can be unreliable. To address this, we formulate unsupervised monitoring, drawing an analogy to unsupervised learning. Rather than checking for specific misbehaviors, an unsupervised monitor assists humans in discovering problematic agent behaviors without prior assumptions about what counts as problematic, leaving that determination to the human. We observe that problematic behaviors are often distinctive: a model exploiting a benchmark loophole exhibits actions absent from well-behaved baselines, and a vulnerability unique to one evaluation manifests as behavioral anomalies when the same model runs across multiple benchmarks. This motivates using group-wise behavioral differences as the primary signal for unsupervised monitoring. We introduce Hodoscope, a tool that operationalizes this insight. Hodoscope compares behavior distributions across groups and highlights distinctive and potentially suspicious action patterns for human review. Using Hodoscope, we discover a previously unknown vulnerability in the Commit0 benchmark (unsquashed git history allowing ground-truth recovery, inflating scores for at least five models) and independently recover known exploits on ImpossibleBench and SWE-bench. Quantitative evaluation estimates that our method reduces review effort by 6-23$\times$ compared to naive uniform sampling. Finally, we show that behavior descriptions discovered through Hodoscope could improve the detection accuracy of LLM-based judges, demonstrating a path from unsupervised to supervised monitoring.

cs.AI↗