Soumyadeep Bakshi | Search arXiv

arXiv2026

CWE-bench: Refocusing Agentic Security from Exploitation to Defense

Cybersecurity evaluations of AI agents have focused largely on offense, yet a working exploit does not show that an agent can make software safe. An attacker needs to exploit only one vulnerability; a defender must find and fix all of them. We introduce CWE-bench, a private benchmark of 120 held-out repository audit-and-repair tasks spanning 73 CWE types, eight languages, and all OWASP Top 10 2025 categories. Agents are given a repository to audit and a description of its threat model, but are not told the weakness, where it occurs, or how many vulnerable sites there are. Each patch must block the exploit while preserving original functionality, as checked by a programmatic verifier. We validated the verifier against a panel of agentic judges, manually reviewing disagreements during development and refining the checks. The best agents reach 68% pass@1 and 81% pass@4. We further conduct analyses showing that (i) agents with the same pass@1 differ widely in retry gains and cost, and (ii) no single agent is best across languages or vulnerability categories, and difficulty varies far more by vulnerability category than by language. As the offensive capabilities of agents improve, CWE-bench provides a broad and rigorous measure of whether their defensive capabilities keep pace.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

$\texttt{YC-Bench}$: Benchmarking AI Agents for Long-Term Planning and Consistent Execution

As LLM agents tackle increasingly complex tasks, a critical question is whether they can maintain strategic coherence over long horizons: planning under uncertainty, learning from delayed feedback, and adapting when early mistakes compound. We introduce $\texttt{YC-Bench}$, a benchmark that evaluates these capabilities by tasking an agent with running a simulated startup over a one-year horizon spanning hundreds of turns. The agent must manage employees, select task contracts, and maintain profitability in a partially observable environment where adversarial clients and growing payroll create compounding consequences for poor decisions. We evaluate 12 models, both proprietary and open source, across 3 seeds each. Only three models consistently surpass the starting capital of \$200K, with Claude Opus 4.6 achieving the highest average final funds at \$1.27 M, followed by GLM-5 at \$1.21 M at 11$\times$ lower inference cost. Scratchpad usage, the sole mechanism for persisting information across context truncation, is the strongest predictor of success, and adversarial client detection is the primary failure mode, accounting for $47\%$ of bankruptcies. Our analysis reveals that frontier models still fail through distinct failure modes such as over-parallelization, demonstrating the capability gaps for long-horizon performance. $\texttt{YC-Bench}$ is open-source, reproducible, and configurable.

cs.CL↗