arXiv subjects

Ted Kwartler

Publications and source records attributed to Ted Kwartler.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Control the Harness, Control the Cost: Routing and Governing AI Coding Agents in the Enterprise

Harnesses, the products that run AI coding agents, are multiplying, and enterprises are rolling them out to their employees: what started as pilots with a few hundred seats is scaling to tens of thousands. Most enterprises do not build these harnesses but buy them from large vendors, such as Anthropic's Claude Code or OpenAI's Codex. A harness decides which model answers, what the model reads, how the prompt cache is used and which subagents run, so it picks the rate on the price sheet and sets the volume bought at it. Enterprises that keep a proprietary or untuned harness at its defaults inherit these choices and their bill. We build a fast, customisable router in which Jev, a classifier with calibrated probabilities, labels every prompt against a bring-your-own taxonomy of agentic requests. Because one user turn is many requests over a prompt cache that belongs to one model, the router moves work only where no running conversation has to rebuild its cache: at session start, in side lanes and at subagent launch. From the price sheet we derive when a mid-task switch pays back, and a crossover: on long tool-heavy sessions the highest-priced model costs less than the next tier, as repricing about 10,000 real sessions from public datasets confirms. In an emulated enterprise of 10,000 seats with user behaviour taken from these datasets, the router recovers 14 to 21% of model spend at Anthropic's list prices of 21 September 2026, \$3.3M to \$5.0M a year. The paper also maps the risks across twenty harnesses, prices the dependence on one vendor's models, and proposes a control plane that enterprises can run from within, starting now, with a ladder for deciding later whether to own the harness.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

AI Guardrail Survival under Single-Cycle Agentic Self-Summarization

Long-running agents periodically compact their context, replacing the transcript with a model-generated summary. Recent work shows that dropping a standing safety constraint during compaction drives behavioral violations across many models (Governance Decay; Chen, 2026). We ask a finer question: under a single compaction cycle, how is a safety rule lost, and what does that imply for detection and evaluation? Our central finding is that a presence check is not a safety check: when compaction does not drop a rule outright, it often leaves something that looks like a rule but does not act like one. On behavioral replay, a degraded residue leads the model to perform the prohibited action far more often than an intact welded rule does (all-case gaps of +34 and +57 points under two replay models, both positive), category-level survival behaves like a residue, and even intact rules sometimes fail to fire, so an audit that checks only textual presence gives false assurance. Sharpening this, rule-form items are retained substantially more often than prominence-matched facts, which is exactly why presence-based checking feels adequate even though survival is not protection. Textual loss is regime-dependent (weld-or-drop with a single rule; degraded predicate-loss residues under a tighter budget), and we did not observe the hypothesized textual severing mode. Such loss is silent at runtime and detectable only by comparison with retained external ground truth (such as a constraint registry), which reveals textual absence but not whether a surviving rule still fires. We also document evaluation pitfalls where LLM-judge labels alone would have reversed a conclusion. All results concern a single compaction cycle.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2024

An indicator for effectiveness of text-to-image guardrails utilizing the Single-Turn Crescendo Attack (STCA)

The Single-Turn Crescendo Attack (STCA), first introduced in Aqrawi and Abbasi [2024], is an innovative method designed to bypass the ethical safeguards of text-to-text AI models, compelling them to generate harmful content. This technique leverages a strategic escalation of context within a single prompt, combined with trust-building mechanisms, to subtly deceive the model into producing unintended outputs. Extending the application of STCA to text-to-image models, we demonstrate its efficacy by compromising the guardrails of a widely-used model, DALL-E 3, achieving outputs comparable to outputs from the uncensored model Flux Schnell, which served as a baseline control. This study provides a framework for researchers to rigorously evaluate the robustness of guardrails in text-to-image models and benchmark their resilience against adversarial attacks.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2024

Good Parenting is all you need -- Multi-agentic LLM Hallucination Mitigation

This study explores the ability of Large Language Model (LLM) agents to detect and correct hallucinations in AI-generated content. A primary agent was tasked with creating a blog about a fictional Danish artist named Flipfloppidy, which was then reviewed by another agent for factual inaccuracies. Most LLMs hallucinated the existence of this artist. Across 4,900 test runs involving various combinations of primary and reviewing agents, advanced AI models such as Llama3-70b and GPT-4 variants demonstrated near-perfect accuracy in identifying hallucinations and successfully revised outputs in 85% to 100% of cases following feedback. These findings underscore the potential of advanced AI models to significantly enhance the accuracy and reliability of generated content, providing a promising approach to improving AI workflow orchestration.

cs.CR↗