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Thao Amelia Pham

Publications and source records attributed to Thao Amelia Pham.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Red-Teaming Multi-Agent Attacks for Loss-of-Control Risks

AI agents are growing more capable and persistent, and are being deployed in ever larger numbers. As more start collaborating, AI control measures must remain effective when they covertly collude on a harmful objective. We introduce MiniLab, a synthetic series of live services and codebases (5 interconnected services, 249 benign tasks, 8 attack objectives), adapted from internal AI deployment infrastructure. We demonstrate distributed attacks, in which different agents carry out separate attack fragments, and how their covertness evades frontier monitors when reading their trajectories individually. We show how distributed attacks spread across diverse contexts and harmful objectives through 16 human-optimized attacks (weight exfiltration, unmonitored rogue deployment, permission elevation, and more). A frontier monitor, GPT-5.6 Sol, reading each agent separately flags only 7% of successful distributed attacks, compared with 87% when a single agent carries out the same side task. Individual attacks can also be composed into longer attack sequences toward a greater loss-of-control outcome, without any individual agent being flagged. Finally, we tested whether models can plan these covert attacks: even with execution and monitor feedback, the best model-planned attacks succeed covertly against a single-trajectory GPT-5.6 Sol monitor in at most 25% of executions, compared with 80% for human-crafted plans, though this may scale with model capabilities. By turning worst-case coordinated attacks into reproducible red-team cases, our work provides a foundation for preventing locally benign agent actions from accumulating into system-level loss of control.

cs.CR↗

GT-HarmBench: Benchmarking AI Safety Risks Through the Lens of Game Theory

Frontier AI systems are increasingly capable and deployed in high-stakes multi-agent environments. However, existing AI safety benchmarks largely evaluate single agents, leaving multi-agent risks such as coordination failure and conflict poorly understood. We introduce GT-HarmBench, a benchmark of 1,535 high-stakes scenarios spanning game-theoretic structures such as the Prisoner's Dilemma, Stag Hunt and Chicken. Scenarios are drawn from realistic AI risk contexts in the MIT AI Risk Repository. Across 15 frontier models, agents fail to choose socially beneficial actions in 38% of high-stakes cases, such as military escalation, election manipulation, and medical malpractice. We measure sensitivity to game-theoretic prompt framing and ordering, and analyze reasoning patterns driving failures. We further show that game-theoretic interventions improve socially beneficial outcomes by up to 18%. Our results highlight substantial reliability gaps and provide a broad standardized testbed for studying alignment in multi-agent environments. The benchmark and code are available at https://github.com/causalNLP/gt-harmbench.

cs.AI↗