Search arXiv⌕ Search

arXiv subjects

Victoria Westerhoff

Publications and source records attributed to Victoria Westerhoff.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Measuring Risk, Not Harm: Detecting Psychological Harm Risk Factors in LLM Conversations

Psychological harms from interactions with large language models cannot be monitored directly because they may emerge over repeated interactions and depend strongly on subjective individual user context. We propose measuring risk, not harm: detecting observable AI behaviors that constitute risk factors for psychological harm at the AI response level and aggregating these signals to support longitudinal monitoring. We operationalize eight such behaviors and construct a synthetic multi-label corpus of 47,062 AI responses and 373,873 response-factor labels, with targeted human annotations for validation and evaluation. We then compare trained embedding-based classifiers, direct LLM judging, and a classifier--judge cascade. All detectors are model-agnostic and operate only on LLM outputs, requiring no access to internal model states. We apply these detectors to several out-of-distribution human-AI conversation data sets from prior research. On held-out human-labeled data, the best cascade achieves macro precision of 0.86, recall of 0.76, and F1 of 0.79. On WildChat, it reduces LLM-judge calls by 97.1\% relative to direct judging. On DelusionEval, risk-factor detections cluster within conversations. Together, our results show that response-level behavioral risk-factor detection can provide a scalable measurement layer for longitudinal psychological-safety monitoring without conflating observable AI behavior with latent user harm.

cs.CL↗

In-House Evaluation Is Not Enough: Towards Robust Third-Party Flaw Disclosure for General-Purpose AI

The widespread deployment of general-purpose AI (GPAI) systems introduces significant new risks. Yet the infrastructure, practices, and norms for reporting flaws in GPAI systems remain seriously underdeveloped, lagging far behind more established fields like software security. Based on a collaboration between experts from the fields of software security, machine learning, law, social science, and policy, we identify key gaps in the evaluation and reporting of flaws in GPAI systems. We call for three interventions to advance system safety. First, we propose using standardized AI flaw reports and rules of engagement for researchers in order to ease the process of submitting, reproducing, and triaging flaws in GPAI systems. Second, we propose GPAI system providers adopt broadly-scoped flaw disclosure programs, borrowing from bug bounties, with legal safe harbors to protect researchers. Third, we advocate for the development of improved infrastructure to coordinate distribution of flaw reports across the many stakeholders who may be impacted. These interventions are increasingly urgent, as evidenced by the prevalence of jailbreaks and other flaws that can transfer across different providers' GPAI systems. By promoting robust reporting and coordination in the AI ecosystem, these proposals could significantly improve the safety, security, and accountability of GPAI systems.

cs.AI↗

Lessons From Red Teaming 100 Generative AI Products

In recent years, AI red teaming has emerged as a practice for probing the safety and security of generative AI systems. Due to the nascency of the field, there are many open questions about how red teaming operations should be conducted. Based on our experience red teaming over 100 generative AI products at Microsoft, we present our internal threat model ontology and eight main lessons we have learned: 1. Understand what the system can do and where it is applied 2. You don't have to compute gradients to break an AI system 3. AI red teaming is not safety benchmarking 4. Automation can help cover more of the risk landscape 5. The human element of AI red teaming is crucial 6. Responsible AI harms are pervasive but difficult to measure 7. LLMs amplify existing security risks and introduce new ones 8. The work of securing AI systems will never be complete By sharing these insights alongside case studies from our operations, we offer practical recommendations aimed at aligning red teaming efforts with real world risks. We also highlight aspects of AI red teaming that we believe are often misunderstood and discuss open questions for the field to consider.

cs.AI↗