arXiv subjects

Wesley Deng

Publications and source records attributed to Wesley Deng.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

CAVEAT: Towards Robust Computer-Use Agents in Incentive-Misaligned Environments

Computer-use agents (CUAs) increasingly act on behalf of users online. What happens when the environments they operate in have incentives that do not align with the user's? In online marketplaces, for example, platforms may favor some products over others, potentially steering agents away from the user's objective. Existing CUA benchmarks cover cooperative settings or explicit attacks, but do not test whether agents preserve user objectives when the environment itself has a stake in the outcome. We introduce CAVEAT, a controlled benchmark spanning nine marketplace environments and a taxonomy of eight common steering mechanisms. Across five model families, agents purchase the user-optimal product in 78.6% of matched-control episodes but only 17.3% when steering mechanisms are enabled. Larger models and increased reasoning improve robustness, but substantial failures persist. Our trajectory analysis and targeted ablations identify three points where steering enters the decision process: (1) agents distort the user's priorities, (2) prematurely narrow the set of alternatives they consider, and (3) commit before resolving decision-relevant evidence. Guided by this diagnosis, we develop CAVEAT-Harness, which directly targets these failure modes and raises user-optimal purchasing by 55.0%. Targeted post-training further improves a smaller open model. These results establish incentive robustness as a distinct challenge for delegated agents, diagnose how it fails, and show that targeted interventions can substantially improve it.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

The Fair Lending Model: How the Longest-Running Algorithmic Fairness Programs Work in Practice

U.S. financial institutions subject to fair lending laws have been running algorithmic fairness programs for decades. Despite this long history, remarkably little is known about how these requirements operate in practice. In this paper, we offer the first empirical account of how financial institutions test for and mitigate algorithmic discrimination on the ground. In doing so, we shed light on how the regulatory design of fair lending law and regulation have shaped the policies, processes, and practices of fair lending programs. Drawing on 35 semi-structured interviews with participants across the fair lending ecosystem, we find that while financial institutions have a floor of fairness practices aimed at preventing discrimination in lending largely absent in other domains, the specifics of how firms test for discrimination and search for less discriminatory algorithms varies widely. We also find that regulatory supervision via fair lending examinations has been the key driver of compliance work, but that the practical impact of fair lending programs often depends on how well they can navigate competing business incentives, perceived legal tensions, and regulatory uncertainty. Ultimately, our findings highlight the unique role that supervisory authority has played in successfully fostering fair lending practices -- a regulatory design feature that is distinct from other areas of civil rights law and almost completely absent from recent policy proposals for dealing with algorithmic discrimination.

cs.CY↗