arXiv subjects

Xia Hu

Publications and source records attributed to Xia Hu.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2026

$A^2E$ : An End-to-End Agent Auditing Engine

With the rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs), harnesses have become essential infrastructure for deploying agents across a wide range of domains. The fast-evolving harness ecosystem has also made rigorous capability evaluation increasingly important. However, efficiently building an end-to-end, systematic, and comprehensive evaluation pipeline remains a significant challenge. To address this challenge, we introduce $A^2E$ (Agent Auditing Engine), an end-to-end evaluation engine designed for agent harnesses. $A^2E$ leverages our newly proposed Agent Task Protocol (ATP) to enable the rapid integration of evaluation tasks with different harnesses. Through an automatically instrumented Monitor, it captures and generates standardized execution traces during experiments. In the Evaluation stage, $A^2E$ systematically assesses harness capabilities using a suite of multidimensional metrics. Compared with correctness alone, these metrics provide a more fine-grained characterization of differences among harnesses in execution efficiency, tool use, task planning, and error recovery. Experiments conducted with $A^2E$ further reveal that model-harness combinations exhibit substantial performance variation across different types of tasks, and that no single combination consistently outperforms all others across every task. These findings not only demonstrate the necessity of systematic evaluation but also provide useful guidance for the co-evolution of models and harnesses. Our code is available at https://github.com/datamllab/A2E.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Representational alignment yields generalizable safety in language models

Aligning large language models (LLMs) is essential for their safe deployment. Current alignment methods mainly optimize observable responses, yet models remain vulnerable when the same harmful intent is recast in unfamiliar or adversarial forms that humans can easily recognize. Prototype theory offers an account of this adaptability. Human concepts are represented around central cases, and new instances are categorized according to their graded typicality relative to these prototypes. Here we show that such categorization of moral concepts is weakly preserved in current LLMs. Across 23 LLMs, models often failed to distinguish opposed moral categories or preserve fine-grained typicality within each category. These deficits persist across parameter sizes and alignment stages. We developed representational similarity optimization, which directly aligns the latent representations in LLMs with the categorization expressed in human moral judgements, without supervising generated responses. In matched experiments using the same 251,334 moral annotations, standard behavioral alignment learned the intended moral judgements at the response level while leaving the categorization structure largely unchanged and increasing vulnerability across adversarial evaluations. Reorganizing moral categorization produced more modest gains in explicit judgements but consistently improved adversarial robustness across model scales on diverse benchmarks and attack strategies. Our findings provide functional support for the view that prototype-based categorization contributes to behavioral adaptability. They also show that transferring this representational principle to LLMs yields generalizable safety under adversarial conditions.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2026

AI agents reshape consensus formation in human groups

As large language model (LLM) agents shift from tools to participants in human groups, a fundamental question for collective behavior is how their growing presence reshapes consensus formation. Here we study mixed human-AI groups in a collaborative description game, in which shared conventions emerge through repeated rounds of random pairwise communication. Varying the proportions of LLM agents, we identify three distinct regimes of consensus formation: low agent proportions facilitate human-led consensus, intermediate proportions disrupt convergence, and high proportions restore strong consensus while shifting it toward agent-led conventions. Crucially, these regimes differ not only in the strength of convergence, but also in the semantic grounding and communicative form of the resulting consensus: human-led consensus is more concrete, holistic, and grounded in shared real-world analogies, whereas agent-led consensus is more abstract, less information-dense, and more geometrically segmented. Mechanistically, agent influence arises from a shared linguistic prior that places agents near one another in the expression space, combined with relatively stable expression choices across rounds; humans initially resist adopting expressions from partners perceived as AI but gradually yield to conformity pressure. These findings provide evidence that AI composition can shape the emergence, content, and perceived legitimacy of group norms, making agent proportion and transparency important design variables for human-AI systems.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2026

SafeEvolve: Harness-Policy Co-Evolution from Agent Experience for Safety Alignment

The performance of LLM-based agents is jointly shaped by the base model and the harness used when interacting with the environment. This exposes them to safety risks in both harmful final responses and multi-step execution trajectories. Existing safety alignment mechanisms often rely on either external harness updates or policy optimization, yet applying either paradigm in isolation fails to bridge runtime control with intrinsic safety. We propose SafeEvolve, an experience-driven self-evolving framework for agent safety alignment. SafeEvolve leverages safety experience from completed on-policy trajectories to drive a continual loop of harness-policy co-evolution. On the harness side, SafeEvolve converts trajectory-level safety evidence into bounded, component-level updates across safety prompt and hierarchical skills, yielding auditable and reversible harness artifacts. On the policy side, SafeEvolve follows a two-stage SFT-RL paradigm, where harness-use SFT bootstraps the policy to actively leverage evolved harness artifacts, and harness-augmented RL further shapes autonomous safety behaviors during multi-step exploration via verifier-decomposed rewards. Through harness-policy co-evolution, SafeEvolve converts safety experience into an evolved runtime harness and improved policy behavior. Experiments on agentic safety benchmarks show that SafeEvolve achieves a stronger safety-utility tradeoff than existing baselines. For Qwen3.5-4B, SafeEvolve achieves a $3\times$ ASR reduction on AgentDojo while improving benign utility from 59.79% to 61.86%.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

PEAR: Permutation-Equivariant Adaptive Routing Multi-Agent Debate

Multi-agent debate improves the reliability of large language models (LLMs) through iterative peer critiques. However, fixed topologies often introduce persistent positional biases, amplify unreliable agents, and cause high sensitivity to role assignments. We introduce \textit{Permutation-Equivariant Adaptive Routing Multi-Agent Debate (PEAR)}, an inference-time train-free protocol that dynamically reconfigures communication roles and sparse topologies across consecutive debate rounds. By strategically switching agent-to-role assignments based on evolving agent states, PEAR prevents any agent from permanently occupying a privileged network position or distributes influence more evenly across the debate. We theoretically characterize PEAR as an equivariant sparse router: it preserves accuracy under agent relabeling while reducing routing complexity and improving generalization. Comprehensive empirical evaluations across four reasoning benchmarks and six diverse LLM backbones demonstrate PEAR significantly improves average accuracy over the strongest debate baselines. The code is available at https://github.com/EVIEHub/PEAR.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Safin-1: Safety from Within through Memory-Native State Evolution

Long-horizon complex tasks require foundation models to accumulate information, maintain internal states, and adapt over extended interactions. Safety should be an intrinsic property of the model itself, rather than a behavioral constraint relying solely on external safeguards or post-hoc alignment such as supervised fine-tuning. This motivates Safety from Within, where safety-relevant capabilities are represented and invoked through the model's native computation. We present Safin-1, a family of foundation models realizing this principle through memory routing and state evolution. Safin-1 is built on Memory-Anchor Routing across Context History (MARCH), a network architecture that maintains structured memory states and selectively retrieves relevant historical information through content-conditioned routing. It supports test-time adaptation of persistent capability states without repeatedly modifying the backbone, enabling controlled specialization over a shared foundation. We investigate this interface on downstream safety tasks through a Safety State, demonstrating effective state-based adaptation with substantial safety improvements. More broadly, the routed-state interface unifies contextual memory and persistent capability adaptation within the model's native computation, reframing memory from a passive record of prior context into an active substrate for maintaining and evolving model behavior. Evaluations across general capabilities, long-context understanding, retrieval, and efficiency further validate Safin-1. These findings provide a path toward safety as a state-native and adaptively maintainable capability. This work is only an initial architectural exploration of Safety from Within, and substantial further work is needed to realize this broader vision.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

SkillSafetyBench: Evaluating Agent Safety under Skill-Facing Attack Surfaces

Reusable skills are becoming a common interface for extending large language model agents, packaging procedural guidance with access to files, tools, memory, and execution environments. However, this modularity introduces attack surfaces that are largely missed by existing safety evaluations: even when the user request is benign, unsafe influence may reside in skill guidance, local artifacts, or execution-environment files that steer the agent toward unsafe actions. We present SkillSafetyBench, a runnable benchmark for evaluating such skill-facing safety failures. SkillSafetyBench includes 155 adversarial cases across 47 tasks, 6 risk domains, and 30 safety categories, each evaluated with a case-specific rule-based verifier. Experiments with multiple CLI agents and model backends show that non-user attacks can consistently induce unsafe behavior, with distinct failure patterns across domains, attack methods, and scaffold-model pairings. Our findings suggest that agent safety depends not only on model-level alignment, but also on how agents interpret skills, trust workflow context, and act through executable environments. The complete benchmark is available at https://github.com/AI45Lab/skill-safety-bench.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

Graph Engineering in the Era of LLM Agents: From Individual Intelligence to System Intelligence

LLMs have evolved from language generators to autonomous agents capable of complex, long-horizon tasks. This evolution has produced paradigms including Prompt Engineering to elicit model capabilities, Context Engineering to manage information access, Harness Engineering to organize external tools and resources, and Loop Engineering to support continual reflection and self-improvement. Yet as tasks grow more complex, individual intelligence faces a fundamental limit: many tasks require heterogeneous expertise, interdependent subtasks, parallel execution, independent verification, and persistent state, exceeding any single agent's organizational capacity. Augmenting one agent's capabilities or context cannot resolve this architectural mismatch; intelligence must instead be distributed across specialized agents and organized at the system level. We call this System Intelligence: an agent system's ability to organize and coordinate multiple intelligent components into a coherent, adaptive whole pursuing a shared objective. Achieving it requires more than adding agents; it demands explicit structures to organize work, coordinate heterogeneous agents, and maintain evolving execution states. We introduce Graph Engineering, an emerging paradigm for next-generation agent systems. Unlike prior paradigms that mainly optimize individual interactions or agent-level behavior, Graph Engineering constructs explicit, dynamic, evolving graph structures representing tasks, agents, and system states. These abstractions provide a unified foundation for organizing complex objectives, orchestrating heterogeneous agents, modeling system dynamics, and enabling scalable agent evolution. We systematically review the principles, methodologies, and applications of Graph Engineering for LLM agents. Related papers, open-source data, and projects are collected at https://github.com/DEEP-JLU/Awesome-Graph-Engineering.

cs.IR↗

arXiv2026

Life-Bench: A Benchmark and Knowledge Graph Framework for Multimodal Personalization Beyond Concept Recognition

As large language models increasingly power personal assistants, users expect them to reason over multimodal life histories, from recognizing people to understanding events to aggregating patterns, yet existing benchmarks primarily target concept-level recognition. We introduce Life-Bench, a fully synthetic, human-verified multimodal benchmark of over 11,800 question-answer pairs across 10 tasks, organized by required evidence scope: concept identification, event understanding, and aggregated reasoning. The benchmark's photo-centric personal histories are distributionally aligned with real user accounts under embedding statistic. The interconnected structure of personal data invites graph-based solutions; we propose LifeGraph, a personal knowledge graph framework providing structured retrieval with on-demand access to source visual evidence, showing particular promise on event and aggregated tasks. Systematic evaluation of four retrieval paradigms on Life-Bench demonstrates that accuracy degrades sharply with evidence scope, falling below 0.40 on aggregated tasks, and that no single paradigm dominates across categories. Performance beyond concept recognition remains modest for all evaluated methods, establishing personalization over multimodal histories as an open challenge and Life-Bench as a testbed for future progress.

cs.CV↗

arXiv2026

ClawSentry: A Progressive Multi-Tier Security Monitor for Safeguarding Autonomous LLM Agents

As large language model (LLM) agents move from conversation to executing code, reading local files, and orchestrating external tools, a single agent hijacked by a malicious third-party skill can cause data exfiltration, privilege escalation, or cascading compromise. We argue that agentic risk is progressive: it can enter at four loci of the agent control loop--skill admission, invocation-time intent, execution-time effect, and post-action consequence--while a denied dangerous objective can reappear across surface forms, tools, or turns; existing safeguards are typically local to one lifecycle boundary or one call. Guided by this threat model, we present ClawSentry, an open-source, framework-agnostic security supervision gateway for agent runtimes. Before a skill package is ever executed, First-use Skill Package Review (FSPR) audits it under a deterministic evidence floor, escalating unresolved cases to bounded read-only agentic review (locus A). At runtime, a three-tier progressive decision engine--a deterministic L1 layer, a rule-anchored L2 semantic reviewer, and a read-only L3 evidence-seeking agent--spends contextual review only on the residual ambiguity, while a session-level anti-bypass mechanism recognizes tool-switching and rephrased retries (loci B--C); a post-action path feeds high-severity evidence non-retroactively into later review (locus D). An Agent Harness Protocol (AHP) abstraction applies one policy across Codex, Claude Code, Kimi CLI, and Gemini CLI without modifying agent internals. On SkillInject with Codex/GPT-5.4, contextual ASR falls from 39.55% to 2.61% while contextual TSR moves only from 83.78% to 83.05%. Across five Work Agents on the full SkillsSafety benchmark, ClawSentry confines ASR to 9.09--15.03% from 33.5--49.7% unprotected, and aggregate TSR on clean skills remains 98.7%.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

ATBench: A Diverse and Realistic Agent Trajectory Benchmark for Safety Evaluation and Diagnosis

Evaluating the safety of LLM-based agents is increasingly important because risks in realistic deployments often emerge over multi-step interactions rather than isolated prompts or final responses. Existing trajectory-level benchmarks remain limited by insufficient interaction diversity, coarse observability of safety failures, and weak long-horizon realism. We introduce ATBench, a trajectory-level benchmark for structured, diverse, and realistic evaluation of agent safety. ATBench organizes agentic risk along three dimensions: risk source, failure mode, and real-world harm. Based on this taxonomy, we construct trajectories with heterogeneous tool pools and a long-context delayed-trigger protocol that captures realistic risk emergence across multiple stages. The benchmark contains 1,000 trajectories (503 safe and 497 unsafe), averaging 9.01 turns and 3.95k tokens, with 1,954 invoked tools drawn from pools spanning 2,084 available tools. Data quality is supported by rule-based and LLM-based filtering plus full human audit. Experiments on frontier LLMs, open-source models, and specialized guard systems show that ATBench is challenging even for strong evaluators, while enabling taxonomy-stratified analysis, cross-benchmark comparison, and diagnosis of long-horizon failure patterns.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Rethinking Generalization in Reasoning SFT: A Conditional Analysis on Optimization, Data, and Model Capability

A prevailing narrative in LLM post-training holds that supervised finetuning (SFT) memorizes while reinforcement learning (RL) generalizes. We revisit this claim for reasoning SFT with long chain-of-thought (CoT) supervision and find that cross-domain generalization is not absent but conditional, jointly shaped by optimization dynamics, training data, and base-model capability. Some reported failures are under-optimization artifacts: cross-domain performance first degrades before recovering and improving with extended training (a dip-and-recovery pattern), so shorttraining checkpoints can underestimate generalization. Data quality and structure both matter: low-quality solutions broadly hurt generalization,while verified long-CoT traces yield consistent cross-domain gains. Model capability is essential: stronger models internalize transferable procedural patterns (e.g., backtracking) even from a toy arithmetic game, while weaker ones imitate surface verbosity. This generalization is asymmetric, however: reasoning improves while safety degrades, reframing the question from whether reasoning SFT generalizes to under what conditions and at what cost.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Understanding Cognition-Induced Risks in Agentic AI Systems

Frontier agentic systems powered by large language models (LLMs) exhibit human-like patterns of cognition. As these systems become deeply integrated across different domains, their cognitive engagement raises critical concerns for human society that remain insufficiently studied. To address this gap, we systematically analyze risks induced by expanding cognitive capabilities, following a three-level framework defined by their cognitive scope, from physical cognition to social cognition, and finally to self-referential cognition. We study their potential risks to human agency, autonomy, and control capability, corresponding to each cognitive level. We finally propose strategies to mitigate these risks and enhance the controllability of agentic AI systems, ensuring their long-term safe development.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Do LLMs Know Their Vulnerable Scenarios?

Safety-aligned large language models are trained to refuse harmful requests, yet embedding the same requests in particular scenarios can bypass their safeguards. Existing red-teaming methods empirically identify effective scenarios through observed attack outcomes, but why particular scenarios weaken refusal remains mechanistically unclear. Meanwhile, mechanistic interpretability studies have characterized both refusal directions and jailbreak-associated features, without explaining the relationship between the two representations. In this work, we show that scenario-wrapped prompts activate internal scenario directions whose causal steering consistently reduces refusal scores. Building on this finding, we propose \textsc{Concept2Scenario}, a concept-based attribution framework for vulnerable scenario discovery. It instantiates a broad concept space with a sparse autoencoder, attributes refusal suppression to individual concepts, translates the identified concepts into interpretable natural-language scenarios, and identifies synergistic scenario combinations through interaction attribution. Across three open-source models, two safety benchmarks, and six black-box jailbreak methods, the discovered scenarios serve as reusable priors that improve average attack success rates by up to $18.2$ percentage points. They also transfer to GPT-5, Claude-Haiku-4.5, and Gemini-3-Flash, suggesting that some scenario-level refusal vulnerabilities are shared across model families. Moreover, the identified combinations outperform their individual constituents and enable iterative attacks to succeed in fewer turns.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

MARCH: Scaling Recurrent Memory with Content-Routed State Anchors

Transformers owe much of their strong long-context retrieval capability to a token-level memory that grows with context length. This flexibility, however, incurs a quadratic computation complexity during training and a key--value cache that grows linearly during autoregressive inference. Recurrent alternatives offer efficient decoding by compressing the entire history into a fixed-size state, but often underperform on recall-intensive tasks since earlier associations usually get overwritten by subsequent updates, and only the most recent contextual information is retained. In this paper, we introduce Memory-Anchor Routing across Context History (MARCH), a network architecture that effectively scales state-space models beyond a fixed-size dimension, while maintaining computational efficiency over long-sequences. MARCH periodically caches cumulative recurrent-state checkpoints as state anchors and associates each anchor with a compact, content-conditioned anchor key. This lets MARCH maintain a memory bank, which can grow as context length increases, providing a controllable trade-off between historical resolution and memory cost. At each token, MARCH produces an anchor query to attend all causally available state anchors, and the output is calculated as an attention-style aggregation over all historical anchors along the current state. We show that after standard pretraining, MARCH consistently outperforms multiple linear attention variants across commonsense reasoning, LongBench, and in-context retrieval. These results demonstrate that content-routed state caching substantially strengthens recurrent long-range memory while preserving its native computation path.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

Hidden in Plain Sight: Diffusion-Based Unrestricted Robotic Attacks on Vision-Language-Action Models

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models have shown strong capabilities in controlling robots across diverse manipulation tasks. However, their adversarial robustness remains largely underexplored, and exploiting this weakness can lead to physical-world harm. Existing attacks on VLA models often rely on pixel-space perturbations or white-box access, resulting in noticeable artifacts and limited deployability in real-world robotic systems. In this work, we propose DURA, a diffusion-based unrestricted robotic attack that generates visually natural adversarial patches for VLA models. DURA supports both white-box and black-box attack settings, where the black-box setting requires only the predicted actions of the victim model. By optimizing along the latent trajectory of a pretrained diffusion model, DURA generates visually natural patches while steering the robot toward attacker-specified target actions. Extensive experiments in both simulation and the real physical world show that DURA consistently outperforms existing methods. Our findings expose a safety risk for physically deployed VLA models and call for stronger defenses.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

SHE: Trajectory-driven Safety Harness Evolution for LLM Agents

The safety of large language model (LLM) agents depends not only on model weights but also on the agent harness that manages context, memory, tools, permissions, and runtime control. Existing safety mechanisms often treat the harness as a fixed deployment artifact, limiting their ability to evolve with emerging risks. Moreover, coupled functions across harness components obscure safety responsibility attribution, making localized evolution difficult. We propose Safety Harness Evolution (SHE), a framework that learns evolving safe boundaries from rollout trajectories. SHE decomposes the harness into four artifacts with explicit safety responsibilities, including the System Prompt, Rule Bank, Safety Memory, and Tool Policy, defining clear functional boundaries for localized evolution. Based on this decomposition, SHE introduces an attribution-guided evolution loop that converts trajectory failures into structured diagnoses, learns artifact-specific boundary refinements, and selects evolved harnesses through safety-utility validation. Experiments on Agent-SafetyBench demonstrate that SHE effectively enhances safety through harness evolution, achieving a 3.1x ASR reduction compared with static SafeHarness, while also improving benign utility. The evolved harness further generalizes to unseen risks on the held-out AgentHarm benchmark and transfers across agent models without additional evolution.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

PrivacyPeek: Auditing What LLM-Based Agents Acquire, Not Just What They Say

LLM-based agents are rapidly advancing, autonomously invoking external tools to complete multi-step tasks for users. However, agents often acquire more sensitive information than the task requires. Existing privacy benchmarks audit what the agent's response or outgoing actions disclose, but overlook the acquisition stage where data first enters the agent's context. The over-acquired information is then one careless action or one attack away from an outright leak. To assess its prevalence, we introduce \emph{PrivacyPeek}, a benchmark for evaluating acquisition-stage privacy leakage of LLM-based agents, with $1{,}182$ cases across $7$ acquisition behaviours and $16$ application domains. Specifically, \emph{Acquisition Inspection} examines the agent's tool-call trajectory, both the tools it invokes and the data it receives, to detect when it acquires sensitive information beyond the task scope. \emph{Probe Elicitation} then issues a follow-up probe and measures how readily an attacker could elicit sensitive information the agent acquired but did not disclose. Our experiments on $10$ LLM-based agents across $4$ model families show that the unnecessary acquisition of sensitive information is widespread. In addition, we observe a correlation between the task-completion capability and acquisition-stage leakage. Prompt-level defences reduce only a small fraction of acquisition-stage leakage, leaving the majority unmitigated. These results make auditing acquisition-stage privacy both urgent and necessary. Our dataset and code are available at https://github.com/Xuan269/PrivacyPeek-Resource.

cs.CR↗