A Graph-Based Stackelberg Security Game for Trustworthy 6G Disaggregated Architecture
Open, cloud-native, and AI-enabled 6G architectures make network functions easier to deploy, observe, and replace, often implemented with separate software modules. However, each explicit interface can also create an entry point, trust transition, and lateral-movement route from a cybersecurity perspective. This paper formulates architectural disaggregation as a graph-based Stackelberg design game for 6G system security. A deployment graph specifies candidate 6G system seams, while an architecture-dependent directed attack graph specifies externally reachable functions and multistage paths. The defender commits to seams and allocates hardening and monitoring; an informed attacker then chooses a path and effort. Because edge traversal and evasion factors compose multiplicatively, the attacker's path response becomes a shortest-path problem after a logarithmic transformation. Convex effort costs admit a conjugate representation, and, for each fixed architecture, the defender's control problem is a convex exponential-epigraph program solvable by path generation. We derive an architecture-comparison criterion, a threshold for AI transducers within 6G systems that jointly add visibility and exposure, and comparative statics for attacker entry and bypass innovation. Experiments with stylized standards-anchored O-RAN/6G systems over RAN, RIC, core, cloud, and edge-AI functions show that neither full integration nor maximal disaggregation is generally best. Uncontrolled seams can increase risk, whereas selectively monitored and hardened seams can improve the Stackelberg objective. We find a boundary is worthwhile only when its detection and containment gains exceed its added attack opportunities and coordination cost.